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More than twenty-five years after the enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the American workforce remains
remarkably segregated by race and sex.2 Job segregation is not a
' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000 et seq (1988), is the major
federal statute prohibiting discrimination in employment. It prohibits employers with fif-
teen or more employees from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.
2 Throughout the 1980s, approximately 60% of all male and female workers would have
been required to switch to occupations atypical for their sex in order to achieve integration.
See, for example, Jerry A. Jacobs, Revolving Doors: Sex Segregation and Women's Careers
20, 28-29 (Stanford, 1989); Andrea H. Beller, Trends in Occupational Segregation by Sex
and Race 1960-1981, in Barbara F. Reskin, ed, Sex Segregation in the Workplace: Trends,
Explanations, Remedies 11 (National Academy Press, 1984). Such estimates of occupational
segregation by sex understate the degree of segregation, because even women in apparently
integrated occupations tend to be employed in industries, firms, departments, and jobs that
are highly segregated by sex. See, for example, William T. Bielby and James N. Baron, A
Woman's Place is With Other Women: Sex Segregation Within Organizations, in Reskin,
ed, Sex Segregation in the Workplace at 27, 35 (finding that in a random sample of 393
California firms, 90% of the workers were employed in job titles to which only men or
women were assigned); Barbara A. Gutek and Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spil-
lover, and Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J Soc Issues 55, 61-62 (Winter 1983)
(finding that in a representative sample of 1,232 Los Angeles workers, 42% of the women
employed in male-dominated occupations reported that the other people in their jobs were
mostly female).
Although occupational segregation by race has declined more rapidly than occupational
segregation by sex, see Randy P. Albelda, Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender,
1958-1981, 39 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 404, 405-06 (1986), the degree of occupational segrega-
tion by race remains substantial. See Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, The Color Line
and the Quality of Life in America 271-73 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1989) (documenting
occupational segregation by race among male workers); Julianne Malveaux and Phyllis Wal-
lace, Minority Women in the Workplace, in Karen Shallcross Koziara, Michael H. Moskow,
and Lucretia Dewey Tanner, eds, Working Women: Past, Present, Future 265, 282-85 (Ind
Rel Res Ass'n, 1987) (documenting occupational segregation by race among female workers).
In addition, recent. research suggests that the post-1965 trend toward racial integration of
occupations slowed to a halt in the late 1970s or early 1980s. See, for example, John Bound
and Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress: Erosion of the Post-1965 Gains in the
1980s?, in Steven Shulman and William Darity, Jr., eds, The Question of Discrimination 32,
40-41 (Weslyan, 1989). Estimates of occupational segregation by race understate the degree
of segregation, because even minority workers in apparently integrated occupations tend to
be concentrated disproportionately in certain industries, sectors, firms, and jobs. See, for
1992] Lack of Interest Defense 1075
separate-but-equal arrangement; minorities and women are con-
centrated in work offering lower wages, less status, and fewer op-
portunities for advancement.' In fact, job segregation is the pri-
mary evil the statute was meant to address.4 Title VII promised to
"break down old patterns of segregation and hierarchy," and to
integrate minorities and women into more highly-rewarded
employment.
To fulfill this statutory promise, and to reveal and root out the
discriminatory employment practices that lead to job segregation,
the courts have looked to statistics for evidence. From the begin-
ning of Title VII enforcement, judges have recognized that statisti-
cal evidence plays a critical role in "uncover[ing] clandestine and
covert discrimination."' Thus, in cases alleging classwide discrimi-
example, Henry Jay Becker, Racial Segregation Among Places of Employment, 58 Soc
Forces 761, 765-67 (1980); Sharon M. Collins, The Making of the Black Middle Class, 30
Soc Probs 369, 377-79 (1983); Robert L. Kaufman and Thomas N. Daymont, Racial Dis-
crimination and the Social Organization of Industries, 10 Soc Sci Res 225 (1981); Marshall
I. Pomer, Labor Market Structure, Intragenerational Mobility, and Discrimination: Black
Male Advancement Out of Low-Paying Occupations, 1962-1973, 51 Am Soc Rev 650, 653-56
(1986). In particular, African American workers are heavily concentrated in public sector
employment. See, for example, Michael K. Brown and Steven P. Erie, Blacks and the Leg-
acy of the Great Society: The Economic and Social Impact of Federal Social Policy, 29
Pub Pol 299, 306-09 (1981); Phillip I. Moss, Employment Gains By Minorities, Women in
Large City Government, 111 Monthly Lab Rev 18, 18-19 (Nov 1988).
3 The most severe problem associated with job segregation is its effect on women's and
minorities' earning power. A substantial portion of the male-female wage gap is attributable
to women's concentration in lower-paying occupations and jobs. See, for example, Elaine
Sorenson, The Wage Effects of Occupational Sex Composition: A Review and New Find-
ings, in M. Anne Hill and Mark R. Killingsworth, eds, Comparable Worth: Analyses and
Evidence 78-79 (ILR Press, 1989); US Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P-70, No 10, Male-Female Differences in Work Experience, Occupation, and Earn-
ings: 1984 4 (1987); Donald J. Treiman and Heidi . Hartmann, eds, Women, Work, and
Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value 33-38 (National Academy Press, 1981). Simi-
larly, a substantial portion of the racial wage gap is associated with minorities' concentra-
tion in lower-paying occupations, jobs and sectors. See, for example, William T. Dickens and
Kevin Lang, A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory, 75 Am Econ Rev 792, 802 (1985); Robert
L. Kaufman, A Structural Decomposition of Black-White Earnings Differentials, 89 Am J
Soc 585, 601-03 (1983).
4 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 22 Rutgers L Rev 465, 465 (1968); United Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443
US 193, 202-03 (1979) (concluding from a review of the legislative history of Title VII that
"it was clear to Congress that 'the crux of the problem was to open employment opportuni-
ties for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them' "); Johnson v
Transportation Agency, 480 US 616, 628 (1987) (recognizing that Title VII was intended to
dismantle similar patterns of sex segregation in employment).
" Johnson, 480 US at 628, citing Weber, 443 US at 204.
' Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 340 n 20 (1977), quoting
United States v Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F2d 544, 551 (9th Cir 1971), and citing other
appellate decisions.
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nation,7 plaintiffs make a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that the employer has significantly underhired women or
minorities relative to their representation in some larger pool of
eligible workers.8 Statistical evidence enables plaintiffs to prove
the existence of the patterns of segregation they seek to dismantle.
If statistical evidence is critical to realizing Title VII's purpose
of eliminating job segregation, there is one defense that runs di-
rectly counter to this purpose: the "lack of interest" defense.
Through this defense, employers seek to rationalize the patterns of
segregation revealed by statistical evidence by arguing that such
patterns resulted not from discrimination, but from protected class
members' own lack of interest in the higher-paying jobs in which
they are underrepresented. If credited, this argument provides a
complete defense to liability.' For if traditional patterns of segre-
gation and hierarchy reflect only minorities' and women's preexist-
ing job preferences and not employer discrimination, there is no
need for judicial intervention. Thus, if widely accepted, the lack of
interest defense has the potential to eviscerate Title VII's role in
dismantling job segregation.
EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co. illustrates the dynamics of the
lack of interest defense. 10 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) claimed that Sears had engaged in sex dis-
crimination in selecting workers for commission sales jobs, reserv-
ing them mostly for men while relegating women to much
lower-paying, noncommission sales jobs." To support this claim,
the EEOC presented statistical studies showing that women who
had applied for sales jobs at Sears were significantly less likely
than men of similar qualifications to be hired for commission
' Classwide discrimination cases include class actions initiated by private parties-under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and pattern or practice cases brought by the EEOC or
the Department of Justice under § 707(a) of Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e-6(a) (1988).
' See, for example, Teamsters, 431 US at 339 n 20; Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio,
490 US 642, 650 (1989).
The employer may assert the lack of interest argument in an attempt to defeat the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Alternatively, if the plaintiff's proof suffices to make a prima
facie case, the employer may assert this argument in an attempt to establish a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the proven disparity. In either case, the lack of interest argu-
ment is intended to undermine the probative value of the plaintiff's statistical proof. For
this reason, we sometimes refer to the lack of interest argument as a "defense."
10 628 F Supp 1264 (N D IIl 1986).
" Between 1973 and 1980, the median hourly wages for first-year commissioned sales-
workers were approximately twice as high as the median hourly wages for all noncommis-
sioned salesworkers. See Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief-Commission Sales Issues at 27, EEOC v
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F Supp 1264 (N D Ill 1986) (No. 79-C-4373).
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sales.1" The district court refused to attribute this disparity to sex
discrimination, however, and concluded instead that it reflected fe-
male sales applicants' own lack of interest in commission sales po-
sitions.13 According to the judge, women "disliked the perceived
'dog-eat-dog' competition" of commission selling, and preferred
the security and "more enjoyable and friendly" nature of the
lower-paying, noncommission sales jobs.1 4 In the court's eyes, Sears
had done nothing to segregate its salesforce; the company had
merely honored the preexisting employment preferences of work-
ing women themselves.
Although Sears was a sex discrimination case, the lack of in-
terest defense has also been used in race discrimination cases. In
fact, the defense debuted in the race discrimination context, where
as early as 1967 employers sought to explain racial segregation in
their workplaces as the expression of minorities' own lack of inter-
est in higher-paying jobs. Recent Supreme Court decisions show
that this reasoning retains vitality. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v
Atonio, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a system of ra-
cial stratification at two salmon canneries which was so extreme
that the dissenting Justices compared it to "a plantation econ-
omy.""3 The statistical evidence showed that although almost all of
the companies' low-paid cannery workers were of Filipino, native
Alaskan, Samoan, Chinese or Japanese descent, few of these mi-
norities filled the higher-paying, unskilled noncannery positions
that required similar qualifications.16 Minority witnesses testified
that the canneries' employment practices-including nepotism,
word-of-mouth recruiting, separate hiring channels, and segregated
housing and eating facilities for cannery and noncannery work-
ers-had convinced them that it would be futile to apply for the
more desirable unskilled noncannery positions. The Supreme
12 Between 1973 and 1980, for exaniple, women constituted 61% of all full-time sales
applicants at Sears, but only 27% of the newly hired full-time commissioned salesworkers.
In contrast, women were approximately 75% of Sears' noncommissioned salesforce. See
Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n as Appellant at 7, EEOC v Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 839 F2d 302 (7th Cir 1988) (Nos. 86-1519 and 86-1621) ("EEOC Brief").
Additional studies that controlled for any differences between male and female sales appli-
cants on a number of different qualifications revealed similarly significant disparities. See
Sears, 628 F Supp at 1296-98; EEOC Brief at 20-26.
13 Sears, 628 F Supp at 1324-25.
14 Id at 1307.
"6 490 US at 663 n 4 (Stevens dissenting); id at 662 (Blackmun dissenting).
6 Id at 650 & n 5.
17 Atonio v Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl Prac Dec (CCH) 33,821, 33,837-38 (W D
Wash 1983).
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Court held, however, that plaintiffs had failed even to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, because "the vast majority of
cannery workers did not seek jobs in unskilled noncannery posi-
tions" and "there [was] no showing that many of them would have
done so even if none of the arguably 'deterring' practices ex-
isted." '18 Apparently, the Court agreed with the trial judge's finding
that "[t]here has been a general lack of interest by cannery work-
ers in applying for [the more lucrative] noncannery workers'
jobs."19
As Sears and Wards Cove illustrate, the lack of interest de-
fense rests on two sets of sweeping assertions about minorities' or
women's work aspirations. First, the employer asserts that among
the pool of eligible workers, the minorities or women are systemati-
cally less interested in higher-paying jobs than their white male
counterparts. In fact, minorities and women must lack interest to a
degree sufficient to explain their degree of underrepresentation in
those jobs.20 In addition, the employer asserts that minorities' or
women's purported lack of interest arose independently of the em-
ployer's influence. For if the employer's actions discouraged these
groups from expressing an interest in the work, the employer is
responsible for the resulting segregation. Thus, the validity of the
defense depends also on the claim that women's or minorities' al-
leged aversion to higher-paying jobs arose from social and cultural
forces beyond the employer's control.2 As an evidentiary matter,
these assertions are difficult, if not impossible, to verify. Because
'8 490 US at 653-54.
Atonio, 34 Empl Prac Dec (CCH) at 33,829. This aspect of the Supreme Court's
holding in Wards Cove has been overlooked. Even the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which over-
turns other parts of the Court's decision, apparently fails to address this important aspect of
the holding. See Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991).
1o The purpose of the lack of interest defense is to refute statistical evidence showing
that the employer has underhired minorities or women relative to their representation
among the larger pool of eligible workers. The lack of interest defense does not undermine
the statistical evidence simply because some minorities or women lack interest in the work
at issue; some whites or males undoubtedly lack interest as well. Instead, the defense suc-
ceeds if, and only if, the minorities or women in the proposed pool are sufficiently less inter-
ested in the work than their white or male counterparts to account for the degree of their
underrepresentation. For a mathematical illustration of this point, see Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Work-
place in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv L Rev 1749, 1797
n 182 (1990).
1 For a detailed examination and criticism of the assumption that women's job aspira-
tions are shaped prior to and independently of their experiences in the work world, see
Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1815-39 (cited in note 20) (arguing that women's work aspira-
tions are formed primarily by the structure of opportunities and social relations within labor
markets and workplaces).
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people's "interest" in particular jobs and the sources of that inter-
est are intangible factors that elude direct measurement and proof,
the lack of interest defense invites courts to adopt the same sort of
overbroad generalizations about women and minorities that Title
VII has been construed to prohibit in other contexts.2
Indeed, on a more substantive level, the lack of interest de-
fense appeals to some of the same images that have traditionally
been used to justify women's and minorities' economic disadvan-
tage. Women have commonly been portrayed as marginal workers,
whose early socialization (or even biological predisposition) to ster-
eotypically "feminine" roles precludes a commitment to nontradi-
tional work.23 Implicit in such accounts is the notion, made explicit
in Sears, that women workers "choose" lower-paying, female-domi-
nated jobs to preserve their feminine identities and their familial
roles. Similarly, African Americans and other minorities have fre-
quently been depicted as undedicated workers, whose distinctive
upbringing or culture fails to instill the motivation and discipline
22 The only other defense that invokes such broad generalizations about protected class
members as a group is the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, which is not
available to employers in race discrimination cases. See 42 USC § 2000-2(3) (1982). The
courts have construed the BFOQ defense narrowly, holding that the employer must prove
that "the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of
one sex exclusively," Diaz v Pan Am World Airways, 442 F2d 385, 388 (5th Cir 1971) (em-
phasis in original), or that "all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely
and efficiently the duties of the job involved." Weeks v Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F2d 228, 235 (5th Cir 1969). See also United Auto Workers v Johnson Controls, 111
S Ct 1196, 1205-06 (1991). The courts have reasoned that the BFOQ defense is to be inter-
preted narrowly, because it draws upon precisely the sort of broad generalizations about
women that Title VII was intended to prohibit. See, for example, Dothard v Rawlinson, 433
US 321, 333-34 (1977); Diaz, 442 F2d at 387; Weeks, 408 F2d at 235.
2 For evidence of such views among employers, see Veronica Beechey and Tessa Per-
kins, A Matter of Hours: Women, Part-Time Work and the Labour Market 103-09 (Minne-
sota, 1987) and Cynthia Cockburn, Machinery of Dominance: Women, Men and Technical
Know-How 165 (Pluto, 1985). For examples of academic research that attributes job segre-
gation to women's preexisting preferences rather than to labor market discrimination, see
Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J Lab Econ
S33 (1985) (arguing that women choose lower-paying, female-dominated jobs to conserve
energy for their domestic obligations); Richard B. Freeman, Availability, Goals and
Achievements in Affirmative Action; Economic Perspective, in Equal Employment Advisory
Council, Perspectives on Availability: A Symposium on Determining Protected Group Rep-
resentation in Internal and External Labor Markets 93, 97 (EEAC, 1978) ("[W]omen may
have, for reasons of preference, biology, or their position as a secondary earner, different job
preferences than men. They may prefer working in an office or doing lighter factory work
than men and thus congregate in certain occupational areas."). For summaries and criti-
cisms of this sort of gender bias in academic research, see Mary Lindenstein Walshok, Blue-
Collar Women: Pioneers on the Male Frontier 270-76 (Anchor, 1981); Roslyn L. Feldberg
and Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Male and Female: Job Versus Gender Models in the Sociology
of Work, 26 Soc Probs 524 (1979).
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necessary for higher-level employment.24 According to such expla-
nations, apparently adopted by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove,
minority workers select and stay in lower-paying jobs because they
lack the initiative to pursue better alternatives. Appeals to such
accounts, which tend to romanticize women and denigrate minori-
ties, produce similar effects in Title VII cases. By portraying segre-
gation as the expression of women's or minorities' preexisting job
preferences, and by attributing their preferences to social and cul-
tural forces beyond employers' control, the lack of interest defense
privatizes job segregation and places it beyond the responsibility of
employers and courts.
Although the lack of interest defense has the potential to frus-
trate Title VII's purpose of eliminating job segregation, there has
been little systematic study of how the courts have responded to
this defense. 25 This Article analyzes judicial responses to the lack
of interest defense in all published Title VII race and sex discrimi-
24 For evidence of such attitudes among employers, see Joleen Kirshenman and
Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But...". The Meaning of Race for
Employers, in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds, The Urban Underclass 203,
213 (Brookings Institute, 1991) (quoting Chicago area employers for the view that African
American workers "have a bad work ethic, they create tension in the work place, they are
lazy and unreliable, they have a bad attitude"). For evidence of such attitudes among the
general public, see James R. Kluegel, "If There Isn't a Problem, You Don't Need a Solu-
tion". The Bases of Contemporary Affirmative Action Attitudes, 28 Am Behav Scientist
761, 766 (1985) (reporting that in a 1977 public opinion survey, two-thirds of all whites
believed that African Americans had worse jobs and lower income "because most blacks
don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty"). In addition,
neoconservative academics attribute racial differences in economic status not to labor mar-
ket discrimination, but to minorities' independently acquired cultural characteristics, in-
cluding their alleged failure to internalize the ethic of hard work and discipline. See, for
example, George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty 64-74 (Basic, 1981); Thomas Sowell, Civil
Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? 46-47 (William Morrow, 1984). For summaries and criticisms of
the neoconservative position, see Thomas D. Boston, Race, Class and Conservatism 54-92
(Unwin Hyman, 1988); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv L Rev 1331, 1379-
80 (1988).
" Although numerous feminist scholars have discussed the Sears case-see, for exam-
ple, Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 Feminist Stud 375 (1986);
Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructural-
ist Theory for Feminism, 14 Feminist Stud 33, 38-47 (1988); Joan C. Williams, Deconstruct-
ing Gender, 87 Mich L Rev 797, 813-21 (1989)-only Schultz's earlier study provided a sys-
tematic examination of how federal courts have responded to the lack of interest defense in
sex discrimination cases. See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev 1749 (cited in note 20). Scholars have
devoted even less attention to analyzing how this defense has fared in race discrimination
cases. Other than Schultz's study and a 1977 article by David Copus, The Numbers Game is
the Only Game in Town, 20 Howard L J 374, 396 (1977), we are not aware of any work that
has discussed the courts' treatment of the lack of interest argument in the race discrimina-
tion context.
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nation cases decided since 1965. Our analyses of the results, evi-
dentiary standards, and reasoning in these cases suggest that the
courts have compromised both women's and minorities' protec-
tions against job segregation. We document two distinct but
equally disturbing trends.
We find, first, that the courts have responded to the lack of
interest defense with a gender bias. Section I shows that in the
1965-1989 period as a whole, the courts have been considerably
more likely to credit the lack of interest defense in sex discrimina-
tion cases than in race discrimination cases. Although theoretically
it is possible that this disparity arose because sex discrimination
plaintiffs presented weaker cases for rejecting the lack of interest
defense than race discrimination plaintiffs, the data do not support
this explanation. Our analyses of the content of the cases in Sec-
tion II show that the sex discrimination cases are not weaker than
the race discrimination cases to a degree sufficient to explain the
disparity in plaintiffs' success rates. Rather, we demonstrate that
judges have not applied the same standards for evaluating the va-
lidity of the lack of interest defense in sex and race discrimination
cases, but have treated the same types of evidence and facts differ-
ently. On the whole, judges have imposed more stringent standards
of proof for refuting the lack of interest defense on sex discrimina-
tion plaintiffs than on race discrimination plaintiffs. Section IV
presents evidence that judges affiliated with the Republican party
are primarily responsible for the disparity in sex and race discrimi-
nation plaintiffs' success rates.
The courts' double standards for sex and race discrimination
cases reflect gender bias in the way judges have understood the
dynamics of job segregation. Like the dominant culture, the courts
have assumed that women's work aspirations and identities are
shaped exclusively through early socialization or even innate pre-
dispositions, rather than in response to labor market conditions. As
a result, judges have imposed heavy burdens on sex discrimination
plaintiffs to overcome the presumption that sex segregation is the
expression of women's own culturally (or even biologically) in-
spired "differences" in job preferences. In the race discrimination
context, by contrast, the courts acknowledged early on that minori-
ties' work aspirations had been formed and artificially limited in
response to a discriminatory labor market. Historically, because
judges presumed that any racial differences in job preferences had
been forged in the context of employment discrimination, they
were less inclined to rationalize racial segregation as the reflection
of minorities' own cultural "differences."
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Since the late 1970s, however, the courts have retreated from
their traditional approach to the lack of interest defense in race
discrimination cases. Section I demonstrates that race discrimina-
tion plaintiffs' success against the lack of interest defense plum-
meted after 1977. Section III shows that changes in the strength
and evidentiary composition of the race discrimination cases can-
not fully account for the dramatic degree of plaintiffs' losses. Since
1978, the courts have been more likely to accept the lack of inter-
est defense even in strong cases in which they previously would
have rejected it. In addition, judges have responded to the key
types of evidence in a manner that is far less favorable to plain-
tiffs. These findings suggest that in the more recent period, the
courts have simply become more predisposed to attribute racial
segregation to minorities' preexisting job preferences. Remarkably,
Section IV suggests that this shift affected judges across the entire
political spectrum. Judges affiliated with the Democratic and Re-
publican parties, and judges appointed by presidents from Eisen-
hower to Carter, all became more likely to accept the lack of inter-
est defense in race discrimination cases after 1977.
Taken together, our findings suggest that the courts have
moved toward a more conservative understanding of racial segrega-
tion that converges with the way they have traditionally under-
stood sex segregation. Just as the courts have always tended to ex-
cuse sexual inequality in employment as the expression of
culturally (or biologically) created gender differences in work aspi-
rations, judges have also begun to rationalize racial inequality in
employment as the reflection of racial differences in work prefer-
ences that are not rooted in larger labor market conditions. As a
consequence of these views, there is little role for the law in consti-
tuting-or changing-the dynamics that lead to race and sex segre-
gation on the job.
After explaining the context and data for our study, Section I
documents the two trends in success rates described above. Section
II examines the difference in plaintiffs' success rates in race and
sex discrimination cases, and analyzes the content of the cases to
evaluate alternative explanations for this disparity. Section III em-
ploys similar methods to investigate the reasons for the decline in
plaintiffs' success in race discrimination cases since the late 1970s.
Section IV examines the relationship between judges' decisions on
the lack of interest defense and their political affiliations.
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I. MAJOR TRENDS IN CASES ADDRESSING THE
LACK OF INTEREST DEFENSE
A. The Issues
This Article is part of a larger project to analyze all published
federal court decisions that have addressed the lack of interest de-
fense since Title VII's enactment. Our objective here is to address
two major questions: (1) Have the courts responded to the lack of
interest defense similarly in race and sex discrimination cases over
the past twenty-five years? and (2) Have the courts altered their
approach to this defense in race discrimination cases over time?
Our focus on these issues is framed, in part, by the results of
earlier work by the senior author. In Telling Stories About Women
and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argu-
ment,26 Schultz analyzed all published sex discrimination cases
that have addressed the lack of interest defense since 1965. Her
analysis showed that from the beginning, the courts have assumed
that women's work interests and identities are shaped in private
realms of life that are independent of and prior to the work world.
In this view, early socialization (or even biological factors) influ-
ences women to develop stable aspirations for "feminine" jobs
before they ever begin working or searching for work; their prefer-
ences constitute predetermined inputs into the labor market. Be-
cause this view attributes little or no role to employers in creating
sex segregation, the courts required plaintiffs to meet difficult bur-
dens to prove that sex segregation had not resulted from women's
own preexisting job preferences. As part of the earlier study, Sch-
ultz showed that the courts' approach in sex discrimination cases
was not inevitable. The courts had taken a far more progressive,
pro-plaintiff approach in an early body of race discrimination
cases. In the early race discrimination cases, the courts assumed
that minorities' work aspirations had been formed and artificially
limited in response to discriminatory labor market conditions. An
insistence that employers change those conditions led judges to
evaluate the evidence in a manner more favorable to plaintiffs.
This Article examines two important issues that were raised
by Schultz's earlier work. First, we undertake a more comprehen-
sive comparison of the courts' responses to the lack of interest de-
fense in race and sex discrimination cases decided since the enact-
26 Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1749 (cited in note 20).
7 Id at 1771-75.
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ment of Title VII. Although the analysis of race discrimination
cases in Telling Stories was limited to cases decided between 1965
and 1971, the difference in the courts' treatment of the lack of in-
terest defense in race and sex discrimination cases suggested by
that limited comparison was striking. Numerous commentators
have pointed to the courts' failure to accord sex discrimination the
same serious scrutiny as race discrimination in other areas of law.2"
Because our society's conceptions of gender are deeply rooted in
the sexual division of labor,2" dominant cultural images of women
as uncommitted workers who prefer less challenging, "feminine"
jobs may have been more deeply ingrained in the national and ju-
dicial consciousness than images of racial minorities as undedi-
cated workers who desire less rewarding, racially-stereotyped jobs.
The EEOC's early failure to treat sex segregation in employment
as seriously as racial segregation provides an example of such bi-
ased attitudes.30 Indeed, the standard interpretation of the original
28 See, for example, Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Su-
preme Court, 92 Yale L J 913, 925-26 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under
the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 Wash U L Q 161, 164-72;
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 979-98 (1984);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 14, 97-99, 127-41 (Yale,
1979); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 Women's Rts L Rep 175, 178 (1982).
29 The dominant culture defines "masculinity" and "femininity" largely in terms of eco-
nomic "breadwinner" versus "dependent" status, respectively. Susan Faludi's recent review
of two decades of public attitude surveys powerfully confirms this theme. Faludi states:
For twenty years .... pollsters have asked [their] subjects to define masculinity. And
for twenty years, the leading definition, ahead by a huge margin, has never changed. It
isn't being a leader, athlete, lothario, decision maker, or even just being "born male." It
is simply this: being a "good provider for his family." If establishing masculinity de-
pends most of all on succeeding as the prime breadwinner, then it is hard to imagine a
force more directly threatening to [] Americaii manhood than ... [women's] drive for
economic equality.
Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women 65 (Crown, 1991).
30 The EEOC's early failure to treat Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination
as seriously as the prohibition against race discrimination is well documented. See, for ex-
ample, Jane De Hart-Mathews, The New Feminism and the Dynamics of Social Change, in
Linda K. Kerber and Jane De Hart-Mathews, eds, Women's America: Refocusing the Past
437, 447-48 (Oxford, 1987) ("Despite the fact that the law proscribed discrimination on the
basis of sex as well as race, the commission refused to take seriously the problem of sexual
discrimination. The first executive director of the EEOC... regarded the sex provision as a
'fluke' best ignored."). It was not until 1969, for example, that the EEOC's guidelines on sex
discrimination prohibited employers from using sex-segregated advertising for jobs. Com-
pare 29 CFR § 1604.4(b) (1966) (permitting advertising placements under "Male" and "Fe-
male" headings to convey "that some occupations are considered more attractive to persons
of one sex than the other"), with 29 CFR § 1604.5 (1989) (prohibiting such placements un-
less sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job). Similarly, it was not until 1969
that the EEOC's guidelines prohibited employers from relying on state laws restricting
women to certain employment to defend sex segregation in their workforces. See Barbara
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1964 Act's prohibition against sex discrimination as a
"joke"-rather than a serious response to the injustice of women's
economic plight-may also evidence such bias. 1 The long history
of labor market discrimination against women is well-
documented.s2
Despite Title VII's inauspicious "story of origins,"33 Congress
made clear when it amended Title VII in 1972 that sex segregation
Allen Babcock, et al, Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies 267 (Little,
Brown, 1975).
11 Sources interpreting the original 1964 Act's prohibition against sex discrimination as
a "joke"-a last-ditch effort by opponents to defeat the more important ban on racial dis-
crimination-are so ubiquitous that this view has become the standard interpretation of the
statute's history. See, for example, Arthur B. Smith, Jr., Employment Discrimination Law:
Cases and Materials 327 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1978); Note, Developments in the Law: Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv L Rev 1109,
1167 (1971); Sex and Nonsense, The New Republic 10 (Sep 4, 1965); Wetzel v Liberty Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 511 F2d 199, 204 (3d Cir 1975).
Some scholars have challenged this interpretation. For example, Michael Gold has ar-
gued that even if the members of Congress who introduced the amendment adding the pro-
hibition against sex discrimination did so for the purpose of attempting to defeat the bill,
the majority of Congress did not share that motivation when they approved the amendment.
See Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to
Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 Duquesne L Rev
453, 457-69 (1981). As Gold points out, the House of Representatives approved the amend-
ment adding the ban on sex discrimination on two separate occasions. On the second occa-
sion, a majority of the House voted for the amendment, and then voted to approve the
entire bill. According to Gold, "lit would be absurd to believe that the Representatives who
approved the [ I amendment [ ] wanted to impair the very bill which they promptly ap-
proved by an overwhelming margin." Id at 461. Those who spoke in favor of the amendment
spoke at length about the injustice of employer discrimination relegating women (or at least
white women) to the least desirable jobs because of their sex. See, for example, 110 Cong
Rec 2579-81 (Feb 8, 1964) (remarks of Representatives Griffiths and St. George). To con-
clude on the basis of this limited legislative history that Congress adopted the amendment
because of a desire to defeat the legislation, rather than to respond to the inequity of
women's economic plight, may require an implicit assumption that sex discrimination in
employment was less deserving of congressional attention than racial discrimination.
S" For examples of historical work documenting labor market discrimination that rele-
gated women to less desirable, female-dominated jobs, see Philip Sheldon Foner, Women
and the American Labor Movement: From the First Trade Unions to the Present 497 (Free
Press, 1980); Maurine Weiner Greenwald, Women, War and Work: The Impact of World
War I on Women Workers in the United States 9-10, 22-23, 94-99 (Cornell, 1980); Jacque-
line Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from
Slavery to the Present 179-80, 104-05 (Basic, 1985); Susan Estabrook Kennedy, If All We
Did Was To Weep at Home: A History of White Working-Class Women in America (Indi-
ana, 1979); Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the
United States (Oxford, 1982); and Ruth Milkman, Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job
Segregation By Sex During World War 11 (Illinois, 1987).
" In this context, the "story of origins" refers to the constitutive myths and ideals we
ascribe both to Title VII's ban on sex discrimination, and to ourselves as a nation and as a
people in having enacted the legislation. See Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil
Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 Wis L Rev 579, 580 n 6, adopting
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is a serious form of employment discrimination that courts must
treat with the same degree of concern as they treat race discrimi-
nation and all other forms of discrimination.3 4 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has used the same approaches to analyze Title VII
race and sex discrimination cases, 35 and has suggested that the
same standards apply for evaluating the lack of interest argument
in both contexts.36 We examine whether the lower courts have fol-
lowed the congressional mandate and the Supreme Court's lead, or
whether cultural bias has instead led the courts to impose more
difficult standards on sex discrimination plaintiffs.
the term from Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origins and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 Mich L
Rev 2280 (1989).
34 When Congress amended Title VII in 1972, both the House and the Senate made
clear that they viewed sex segregation as a primary evil that the statute was intended to
address. See H R Rep No 92-238, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 4-5, reprinted in 1972 USCCAN 2137,
2140 ("[W]omen are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and the less remu-
nerative positions on the basis of their sex alone. Such blatantly disparate treatment is par-
ticularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex dis-
crimination since its enactment in 1964."); S Rep No 92-415, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 7 (1971)
(including similar statements). Congress emphasized that the courts were to treat sex dis-
crimination with the same seriousness as race discrimination or any other form of prohibited
discrimination. See, for example, S Rep No 92-415 at 7 ("While some have looked at...
women's rights as a frivolous divertissement, this Committee believes that discrimination
against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and that it is
to be accorded the same degree of concern given to any type of similarly unlawful con-
duct."); and H R Rep No 92-238 at 5 ("Discrimination against women is no less serious than
other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of
social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination."). See also Barnes v Costle, 561
F2d 983, 987 (DC Cir 1977).
" See, for example, Johnson v Transportation Agency, 480 US 616, 631 (1987) (up-
holding the validity under Title VII of an affirmative action plan for women after applying
the same analysis it had used in United Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 US 193
(1979), a case construing the validity of an affirmative action plan for Blacks); Meritor Sav.
Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66-67 (1986) (citing decisions recognizing a cause of action for
racial harassment under Title VII to support the recognition of a cause of action for sexual
harassment under Title VII).
' In Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 330 (1977), a sex discrimination case, the Court
supported its analysis of the lack of interest issue with a reference to its earlier analysis of
the same issue in a race discrimination case, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v United
States, 431 US 324, 365-67 (1977). Subsequently, in Johnson, a majority of the Court up-
held the validity under Title VII of an affirmative action program for women, concluding
that the plan was justified by the "manifest imbalance that reflected underrepresentation of
women in 'traditionally segregated job categories.'" 480 US at 631, citing Weber, 443 US at
197. The Court rejected Justice Scalia's position, which sought to distinguish Weber, a race
discrimination case, on the ground that the absence of women from road maintenance work
was attributable to women's own lack of interest rather than to the employer's historical
discrimination. See Johnson, 480 US at 668 (Scalia dissenting) ("[Road maintenance work]
is a 'traditionally segregated job category' not in the Weber sense, but in the sense that,
because of longstanding social attitudes, it has not been regarded by women themselves as
desirable work.") (emphasis in original).
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In addition, we investigate whether the courts have retreated
from their traditional approach to the lack of interest defense in
race discrimination cases. Just as cultural bias may have influenced
the courts to apply heightened standards for evaluating the lack of
interest defense in sex discrimination cases, so too shifting atti-
tudes toward race relations may have induced judges to back away
from their early pro-plaintiff approach to this defense in race dis-
crimination cases. The early race discrimination cases discussed in
Telling Stories were decided in the immediate aftermath of the
civil rights movement-a time when many federal judges under-
stood racial discrimination to be pervasive and believed that Title
VII required them to dismantle entrenched structures of racial hi-
erarchy.3 7 Today, by contrast, despite evidence that employers con-
tinue to practice racial discrimination,38 we inhabit a period that is
widely described as the "post-Civil Rights era." Recent Supreme
Court decisions have departed from established civil rights ap-
proaches so dramatically that Congress has found it necessary to
restore protections the Court had dismantled. 9
This change did not occur in a vacuum. During the late 1970s,
the Supreme Court had already begun to reject some of the more
expansive approaches the lower courts had developed for combat-
ting employment discrimination. 40 By that time, affirmative action
17 See, for example, Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the
Southern Jurisprudence of Employment Discrimination, 6 Indus Rel L J 313, 316, 340-44
(1984); Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes 322-23 (Simon and Schuster, 1981).
38 See, for example, Jomills Henry Braddock II and James M. McPartland, How Minor-
ities Continue to be Excluded From Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on Labor
Markets and Institutional Barriers, 43 J Soc Issues 5 (1987); Randall Samborn, Many
Americans Find Bias At Work, Natl L J 1 (Jul 16, 1990); Marjery Austin Turner, Michael
Fix, and Raymond J. Struyk, Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished: Discrimi-
nation in Hiring (Urban Institute, 1991).
39 After vetoing an earlier bill that had been passed by nearly two-thirds of the House
and Senate, see the Civil Rights Act of 1990, S 2104, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, 136 Cong Rec 364
(daily ed, Feb 7, 1990), President Bush signed into law a compromise bill intended to re-
verse some of the Supreme Court's recent restrictive interpretations of Title VII. See the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991). During the signing cere-
mony, however, President Bush endorsed an interpretive memorandum submitted by Sena-
tor Dole, which described the bill as "an affirmation of existing law," including the Supreme
Court decisions it was designed to reverse. See President Bush's Statement on Signing the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 226 Daily Labor Report (BNA) D-1 (Nov 22, 1991); Andrew Rosen-
thal, Reaffirming Commitment, Bush Signs Rights Bill, NY Times Al (Nov 21, 1991).
40 See, for example, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 353-
54 (1977) (invalidating the use of the disparate impact model to challenge seniority systems
that perpetuate the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination); East Texas Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v Rodriguez, 431 US 395, 405-06 (1977) (restricting the use of "across-the-board" class
actions in Title VII litigation); Regents of the Univ. of California v Bakke, 438 US 265, 305
(1978) (Powell) (invalidating a race-conscious program intended to achieve greater racial
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had come under serious attack,41 and neo-conservative accounts
that attribute racial differences in occupational attainment to mi-
norities' own attitudes or culture rather than to labor market dis-
crimination were beginning to gain prominence.42 These same cur-
rents appeared in the attitudes of white Americans generally. By
1976, almost three-quarters of all whites believed that African
Americans and other minorities "no longer face[d] unfair employ-
ment conditions."4 They also believed that minorities' economic
disadvantage was the result of their own lack of initiative and ef-
fort. In 1977, almost two-thirds of white Americans attributed Af-
rican Americans' economic deprivation to the fact that "most
blacks don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves
up out of poverty. '44 In such a political climate, the lack of interest
diversity in medical school admissions); Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239 (1976) (re-
quiring proof of discriminatory intent to establish that racial disparities in employment vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment); Personnel Admin. of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US
256, 274 (1979) (adopting a narrow definition of the intent required to establish sex discrim-
ination under the Fourteenth Amendment).
For scholarship documenting the courts' retreat in the late 1970s, see Blumrosen, 6
Indus Rel L J at 340-46 (cited in note 37); Jerome M. Culp, A New Employment Policy for
the 1980's: Learning From the Victories and Defeats of Twenty Years of Title VII, 37
Rutgers L Rev 895 (1985); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn
L Rev 1049, 1079-1118 (1978). Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law 619,
622-23 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1980).
41 See, for example, William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, The Changing Culture
of Affirmative Action, 3 Res in Pol Soc 137, 137-62 (1987); Kluegel, 28 Am Behav Scientist
at 775-80 (cited in note 24).
42 For examples of neoconservative work that had been published by the late 1970s, see
Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (Harvard,
1975); Thomas Sowell, Three Black Histories, in Thomas Sowell, ed, American Ethnic
Groups 7, 39-40 (Urban Institute, 1978). See generally, Equal Employment Advisory Coun-
cil, Perspectives on Availability (cited in note 23) (containing a number of articles question-
ing whether statistical studies can control for pre-labor market differences sufficiently to
render them probative of discrimination). For accounts of neoconservative organizing and
activities, including challenges to affirmative action, see Jerome L. Himmelstein, To the
Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism (California, 1990); Peter Steinfels,
The Neo-Conservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics (Simon and
Schuster, 1979).
43 Kluegel, 28 Am Behav Scientist at 764-65, Table 1 (cited in note 24). See also James
R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, Whites' Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity, 47 Am Soc Rev
518, 519 (1982) (reporting that in 1980, 73% of whites saw "blacks' opportunity as equal to
or greater than the average person in America (assuming that persons work hard)"); James
R. Kluegel, Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black- White Gap in Socioeconomic Sta-
,tus, 1977-89, 55 Am Soc Rev 512, 517 (1990) (showing that the proportion of whites who
attribute the Black-white socioeconomic gap to a lack of will or effort on the part of Blacks
remained stable between 1977 and 1988-89).
"" Kluegel, 28 Am Behav Scientist at 767, Table 2 (cited in note 24).
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defense may have resonated with the popular tendency to hold mi-
norities responsible for their own economic disadvantage.
B. The Data
This study draws on a data set of all published Title VII race
and sex discrimination cases since 1965 in which a federal district
court or court of appeals has addressed the lack of interest de-
fense.45 The data set includes decisions addressing the argument
that women or minorities failed to apply for the jobs at issue,
where the implicit premise of the argument is that they lacked in-
terest in the work.46
Because we are examining how courts have responded to the
lack of interest argument, we treat as the unit of analysis not the
entire case, but rather the specific claim or claims of discrimina-
tion against which this argument was asserted.47 In addition, be-
cause we are comparing how the courts have responded to the lack
of interest argument in the race and sex discrimination contexts,
we classify the race and sex discrimination claims in mutually ex-
45 Under the senior author's supervision, law students systematically searched for judi-
cial decisions addressing the lack of interest argument in the following two sources: (1) the
Fair Employment Practice Cumulative Digests, published by the Bureau of National Affairs,
Volumes 1-46; and (2) the West digests, including the Eighth Decennial Digest, Ninth De-
cennial Digest, the General Digest, Sixth Series, Volumes 1-53, and the General Digest, Sev-
enth Series, Volumes 1-2. Although our search was designed to locate all published decisions
in which a federal court addressed the lack of interest argument, we may not have located
every such case. Such a failure would raise no methodological problem, however, so long as
the search strategy did not yield a biased selection of cases. There is no reason to suspect
any such bias. A list of the 117 cases in our data set, with complete citations, is on file with
the University of Chicago Law Review.
4' For an example of a case in which an employer's assertion that women failed to apply
for a nontraditional job rested on an assumption that women lacked interest in the work,
see Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 330 (1977), discussed in Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at
1761-63 (cited in note 20).
41 If, for example, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination in both hiring and promotion,
but the court addressed the lack of interest argument only in connection with the hiring
claim, our data set would include only the hiring claim. By contrast, if the court analyzed
the lack of interest argument separately in connection with the hiring and promotion claims,
our data set would include each of these claims. Because the evidence presented in connec-
tion with the lack of interest argument may be different for different claims (for example,
hiring and promotion), it would have been impossible to capture the full range of evidence
that influenced outcomes without including each such claim as a separate unit of analysis.
Furthermore, it seemed methodologically indefensible to exclude arbitrarily one claim or the
other. In any event, only 13 of the cases in our data set involved multiple claims. Plaintiffs'
success rates in race and sex discrimination cases are very similar regardless of whether only
one or multiple claims are included.
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clusive terms."8 We treat a claim as a sex discrimination claim if
the employer argued that women (of whatever race) lacked interest
in the work because of their gender, and as a race discrimination
claim if the employer argued that members of a minority group (of
whatever sex) lacked interest in the work because of their race. 9
Although the data set contains both district court and court of ap-
peals decisions, it includes only the district court or appellate deci-
sion for any given claim; in general, we include the final decision
that included a clear resolution and substantive analysis of the
4 As our classification scheme makes clear, however, the lack of interest argument
poses a potential double risk for women of color. As women, they may confront the argu-
ment that they lack interest in male-dominated jobs because of their gender. As minorities,
they may confront the argument that they lack interest in predominantly white jobs because
of their race. This double risk is particularly unfair, since women of color historically have
been relegated to jobs that are less desirable than those available to men of color or white
women. See, for example, Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow at 134-40, 199-221, 303-04
(cited in note 32); Teresa L. Amott and Julie Matthaei, Race, Gender, and Work: A Mul-
ticultural Economic History of Women in the United States 141-91 (South End Press,
1991).
" If, for example, the plaintiffs alleged both sex and race discrimination in hiring, but
the court addressed the lack of interest argument only in connection with the sex discrimi-
nation claim (analyzing whether women lack interest in the work), our data set would in-
clude only one sex claim. If, on the other hand, the court addressed the lack of interest
argument separately in connection with both the sex and race discrimination claims (analyz-
ing whether women lack interest in the work and also whether minorities do), our data set
would include both the sex and race claims as separate cases. In a few cases, the plaintiffs
alleged both race and sex discrimination and the court did not address the lack of interest
argument separately in connection with each of these claims, but simply undertook a com-
bined analysis of whether women and minorities lack interest in the work. Because part of
our project involves examining whether there are differences in the courts' responses to the
lack of interest argument in. the race and sex discrimination contexts, it would have been
problematic to include those cases in which the courts by definition failed to distinguish
between the two contexts. We therefore excluded them from the data set.
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lack of interest defense.50 Overall, our data set includes 117 claims
for which courts gave a clear ruling on this defense.5'
Although our data set approximates the universe of all pub-
lished decisions addressing the lack of interest argument, cases in
which employers assert this argument are not necessarily represen-
tative of other Title VII disputes.5 2 In addition, almost all of the
cases in our data set were resolved after trial, and tried cases may
not be a random sample of all filed cases.53 Finally, all of the cases
in our data set were published, and published cases may not be a
random sample of all filed or tried cases.5 4
Because we are analyzing how the courts have responded to a
defense (the lack of interest defense), however, published decisions
rather than all filed cases provide the best source of data for our
study. Filed cases not resolved by formal adjudication (particularly
cases that settle) are unlikely to contain records that disclose the
1* Thus, where a district court's decision was not appealed, or was appealed but was
reversed or vacated on grounds unrelated to the lack of interest argument, the district
court's resolution of the lack of interest argument was final and we treat the case as having
been decided by the district court. Where a district court's decision was appealed, and the
appellate opinion included a resolution and a substantive discussion-of the merits of the
lack of interest argument, the court of appeals' resolution of the argument was final and we
treat the case as having been decided by the court of appeals. In a few anomalous cases, the
court of appeals apparently affirmed the district court's ruling on the lack of interest argu-
ment, but the appellate opinion contained no substantive discussion of the merits of this
argument. Because we are investigating the extent to which the courts relied on certain
types of evidence and other facts to resolve the lack of interest issue, we treat these cases as
having been decided by the district court and we utilize the district court's opinion in our
analyses.
51 Because almost all of our analyses investigate whether the plaintiff or defendant pre-
vailed on the lack of interest argument, we excluded a few cases in which it was unclear
from the court's decision which party (if any) prevailed.
82 See note 60.
5 See, for example, George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984). Of course, even filed lawsuits are only a small
portion of actionable grievances that might have been brought to the legal system. See Wil-
liam L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... 15 L & Soc Rev 631, 636 (1980-81); David M.
Trubek, et al, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L Rev 72, 85-87 (1983). There is
evidence that people who experience employment discrimination are less likely to take ac-
tions to vindicate their rights than people with other types of grievances. See Barbara A.
Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public 141-42, 146, 262 (American Bar Foundation, 1977);
Samborn, Natl L J 1 (Jul 16, 1990) (cited in note 38); see also Richard E. Miller and Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L & Soc Rev
525, 537, 544-45 (1980-81) (reporting the same result for people who experience discrimina-
tion generally).
See, for example, Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Pub-
lished Cases: A Research Note, 15 Justice System J 782 (1992); Peter Siegelman and John
J. Donohue, Studying the Iceberg From its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpub-
lished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L & Soc Rev 1133 (1990).
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defenses the employer intended to assert. Even if the records for
some non-adjudicated cases revealed the employers' contemplated
defenses, the records would be unlikely to disclose the full range of
relevant facts and evidence.55 Furthermore, even if the records for
such cases disclosed the planned defenses and evidence, they
would not reveal the presiding judge's reactions to the evidence
and other case characteristics. For these reasons, cases adjudicated
on the merits are the only group of cases likely to contain the in-
formation we seek.""
In light of the possibility that the decisions in our data set
may be unrepresentative, we compare them to a second data set
comprised of a sample of a closely-matched group of filed cases.
Because the published decisions in our data set include only cases
in which the lack of interest defense was actually raised and re-
solved, it is useful to have as a baseline the underlying group of all
filed cases in which this defense might have been raised. To create
such a baseline, we utilized the American Bar Foundation's
("ABF") random sample of 1,247 employment discrimination cases
" See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Se-
curities Class Actions, 43 Stan L Rev 497, 506 n 24 (1991) ("Settlement agreements typi-
cally contain confidentiality provisions restricting the disclosure of discovery material.
Moreover, important facts or their implications often are not contained in discovery materi-
als, though they are known to one or both sides and would be material to the outcome.");
Richard L. Marcus and Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation 531 (West, 1985) (observ-
ing that defendants often "insist upon entry of a protective order with regard to material
they previously produced through discovery as part of a negotiated settlement package").
" Among employment discrimination cases, cases with published opinions are far more
likely than unpublished cases to include cases that were adjudicated on the merits (through
trial, motion for summary judgement, or motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim), as
opposed to cases that were settled, dropped, or dismissed for procedural reasons. See Siegel-
man and Donahue, 24 L & Soc Rev at 1155 (cited in note 54). Consequently, published
decisions are the most direct source of data for our study.
Even though published cases may not be representative of all filed cases, published
decisions nonetheless have an important influence on the outcomes of filed cases. Because
published decisions are more readily accessible than unpublished ones, lawyers and advo-
cates rely on them heavily in negotiating settlement agreements, evaluating the strength of
potential cases, and, more broadly, advising clients and constituents of their legal rights.
See, Susan W. Brenner, On Publication and Precedent: An Inquiry Into the
Ethnomethodology of Case Reporting in the American Legal System, 39 DePaul L Rev 461,
500-06 (1990); Marc Galanter, Conceptualizing Legal Change and its Effects: A Comment
on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change," 8 J L Econ & Org 235, 240 (observing that
lawyers must rely on "conventional legal interpretation," because they have only limited
information about settlements). Thus, published decisions addressing the lack of interest
argument help establish the formal legal framework within which workers not involved in
the immediate legal contest will understand and bargain with their employers about job
segregation in the future.
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filed in federal district courts in seven districts.5 7 We sorted this
ABF data set into the subset of filed Title VII cases in which em-
ployers are most likely to assert the lack of interest argument: class
action cases alleging race or sex discrimination in hiring, transfer,
promotion, and other employment practices directly associated
with job segregation. Due to the dramatic decline in Title VII
class action filings since the late 1970s,59 this sorting process re-
duced the number of cases in the ABF data set substantially, to
seventy-seven cases for the entire period. 0 We refer to this resul-
tant data set as the "ABF sample." Although our data set and the
ABF sample differ in some respects,6' the ABF sample provides a
reasonable approximation of the set of filed cases in which the lack
'" From a complete listing of all federal employment discrimination cases filed between
1972 and 1987 and compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under Code 442
(Civil Rights, Employment) American Bar Foundation researchers collected data on a ran-
dom sample of 1,247 cases filed in federal district court in seven districts. See Siegelman
and Donohue, 24 L & Soc Rev at 1136 n 6 (cited in note 54). The seven judicial districts and
corresponding cities included in the ABF sample are the Southern District of New York
(New York); the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago); the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia (Philadelphia); the Northern District of California (San Francisco); the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas (Dallas); the Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta); and the Eastern District
of Louisiana (New Orleans). Id at 1136 n 7, 1143.
" In our own data set, almost all of the cases alleged Title VII violations (although
some cases also alleged violations of other statutory or constitutional provisions). In addi-
tion, all but a few of the cases alleged discrimination in recruiting, hiring, assignment, trans-
fer, promotion, and other employment practices directly associated with job segregation. (In
three anomalous cases, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination in discharge, union organizing,
or training.) Finally, 88.0% of our cases alleged classwide claims of discrimination as op-
posed to individual claims. The predominance of classwide claims among cases addressing
the lack of interest defense is not surprising. The lack of interest argument is used to chal-
lenge plaintiffs' statistical evidence, and plaintiffs are most likely to present statistical evi-
dence in connection with classwide claims of discrimination.
19 For documentation of this decline, see John J. Donohue and Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 1019-21
(1991).
"o Of the 1,247 cases in the original ABF data set, 941 alleged Title VII violations; of
these 941 cases, 508 involved employment practices associated with job segregation; of these
508 cases, 418 alleged either race (including national origin) or sex discrimination; and of
these 418 cases, 77 involved class actions. Overall, the sorting process reveals that classwide
claims alleging discrimination in hiring or other employment practices associated with job
segregation constitute only around 8.2% of all filed Title VII cases (77 out of 941). This
figure underscores the fact Title VII cases involving the lack of interest argument may not
be representative of all filed Title VII cases.
"' As noted above, the ABF data set includes cases filed from July 1, 1972, through
March 31, 1987, whereas our data set includes cases decided from 1967 through 1989. In
addition, the ABF data set includes only cases filed in federal district court, whereas our
data set includes decisions published by federal district courts and courts of appeals. Fi-
nally, in the ABF data set the unit of analysis is the entire case, whereas in our data set the
unit of analysis is the individual claim against which the lack of interest defense was
asserted.
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of interest argument was a possible defense. Where appropriate, we
compare the cases in our data set to the cases in the ABF sample.
In light of the small number of cases in the ABF sample, however,
we reach only tentative conclusions from these comparisons.
Because we are interested in determining whether the courts'
responses to the lack of interest argument changed over time, our
analyses control for the period in which the case was decided. For
a number of reasons, we treat 1977 as the central dividing point. In
1977, the Supreme Court decided three important cases which ad-
dressed the lack of interest argument for the first time.2 In these
decisions, the Court defined the lack of interest issue as a factual
question to be resolved by the trial courts,63 and stressed that trial
judges should examine this issue and scrutinize plaintiffs' statisti-
cal evidence with care.64 Rhetorically at least, the Court's decisions
signalled a departure from earlier courts of appeals decisions,
which had emphasized the power of statistical proof and expressed
skepticism about whether minorities' lack of interest in higher-
paying employment could ever suffice to explain patterns of racial
segregation on the job. To the extent that the Court was retreating
from the appellate courts' more liberal approach, this retreat may
have been part of a larger trend in employment discrimination law.
Between 1976 and 1978, the Supreme Court issued a number of
decisions that were unfavorable to employment discrimination
plaintiffs. 5 Indeed, according to many scholars, this period repre-
sented a turning point in Title VII doctrine (and civil rights law
82 These cases are Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324 (1977);
Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321 (1977); and Hazelwood School District v United States,
433 US 299 (1977). For a detailed discussion of how the Supreme Court addressed the lack
of interest issue in these cases, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1759-65 (cited in note 20).
83 See Teamsters, 431 US at 371-72; Dothard, 433 US at 330-31; Hazelwood, 433 US at
311-13.
" In Teamsters, the Court stated: "We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable;
they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In
short, their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." 431 US
at 340. In Hazelwood, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court for a more precise
delineation of the relevant labor market and the resulting statistical disparity. In connection
with the specification of the relevant labor market, the Court directed the trial judge to
consider carefully Hazelwood's position that the neighboring city school district's affirmative
action efforts had diverted to the city a disproportionate number of Black teachers who
might otherwise have been interested in Hazelwood. 433 US at 310-13. Even in Dothard, in
which the Court affirmed the lower court's holding that plaintiffs' statistical proof sufficed
to make a prima facie case of disparate impact, the Court emphasized that the State had
introduced no evidence to undermine the plaintiffs' statistics: "If the employer discerns fal-
lacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing
evidence of his own. In this case no such effort was made." 433 US at 331.
85 See note 40.
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generally), which ushered in a modern era of more burdensome
standards of proof for plaintiffs e.6  Thus, distinguishing cases de-
cided before and after 1977 helps to locate any shifts that may
have occurred in the lower courts' treatment of the lack of interest
argument.
C. The Frequency and Success of the Lack of Interest Defense in
Race and Sex Discrimination Cases Over Time
Our analyses reveal some important differences in the se-
quencing and success of the lack of interest defense in race and sex
discrimination cases over time. Table 1 shows the distribution of
race and sex discrimination cases, before and after 1977, for the
published decisions in our data set and the filed cases in the ABF
sample. Although we describe the two time periods as 1967-77 and
1978-89 to reflect the periods covered by our data set, the ABF
sample actually begins in 1972 and ends in 1987.61 For conve-
nience, we refer to the cases in our data set as "published lack of
interest cases" and to the cases in the ABF sample as "potential
lack of interest cases."
TABLE 1: Frequency of Published Cases Addressing the Lack of
Interest Defense and Filed Cases in the ABF Sample,
By Race and Sex Over Time
Period Race Sex
Published Potential Published Potential
Lack of Lack of Lack of Lack of
Interest Cases Interest Cases Interest Cases Interest Cases
1967-1977 68.3% (43) 75.0% (45) 20.4% (11) 64.7% (11)
1978-1989 31.7% (20) 25.0% (15) 79.6% (43) 35.3% (6)
1967-1989 100% (63) 100% (60) 100% (54) 100% (17)
66 Id.
" The difference in the time periods covered by our data set and the ABF data set do
not change the basic patterns reported in Table 1. There are no race discrimination cases
after 1987 in our data set. If all the race discrimination cases decided before 1972 were
excluded from our data set, the distribution of race discrimination cases would decline to
60.8% in the 1972-77 period and increase to 37.3% in the 1977-87 period. Similarly, there
are no sex discrimination cases before 1972 in our data set. If all the sex discrimination
cases decided after 1987 were excluded from our data set, the distribution of sex discrimina-
tion cases would increase to 21.6% in the 1972-77 period and decline to 78.4% in the 1977-
87 period.
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Columns two and four reveal a major difference in the time
trends for published race and sex discrimination cases addressing
the lack of interest argument: the race discrimination cases are
concentrated in the 1967-77 period, while sex discrimination cases
are concentrated in the more recent 1978-89 period. For race dis-
crimination cases, the trend in the distribution of published cases
over time parallels the distribution of filed cases. In our data set,
courts decided 68.3 percent of the race discrimination cases be-
tween 1967 and 1977, and 31.7 percent between 1978 and 1989.
Similarly, in the ABF sample, race discrimination cases decreased
dramatically after 1977, with only 25 percent of all cases filed after
that year. 8 These patterns reflect larger trends for employment
discrimination cases, in which class action and hiring discrimina-
tion case filings plunged dramatically in the late 1970s."9 Thus, the
decline evidenced in column two signals that potential race dis-
crimination plaintiffs have stopped filing the class action chal-
lenges to job segregation in which employers are likely to raise the
lack of interest defense, not that employers have stopped asserting
this defense.
For sex discrimination cases, the distribution of published lack
of interest cases in our data set does not mirror that of potential
lack of interest cases in the ABF sample. In our data set, courts
decided only 20.4 percent of the sex discrimination cases in the
1967-77 period, and 79.6 percent in the 1978-89 period. In the ABF
sample, by contrast, the sex discrimination cases follow the same
general trend as the race discrimination cases: the vast majority
were filed before 1978. Thus, sex discrimination cases raising the
lack of interest argument are underrepresented in the early to mid
1970s and overrepresented in the late 1970s and 1980s. This pat-
tern may suggest that in sex discrimination cases, employers began
to resort to the lack of interest defense more frequently after 1977.
Just as the time trends differ for published race and sex dis-
crimination cases addressing the lack of interest argument, the
trends in success rates also differ for the two groups of cases. Table
2 shows plaintiffs' success rates in the race and sex discrimination
cases in our data set for the 1967-77 and 1978-89 periods. This
68 In addition, more refined analyses (not shown in Table 1) reveal that in both our
data set and the ABF sample, race discrimination cases slowed to a halt after 1983. Our
search for published cases addressing the lack of interest defense located only one race dis-
crimination case decided after 1983, a mere 1.6% of the total group of published race cases.
Similarly, in the ABF sample, only one race discrimination case was filed after 1983, a mere
1.7% of the total group of filed race cases.
6'9 See Donohue and Siegelman, 43 Stan L Rev at 1015-16, 1019-20 (cited in note 59).
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analysis defines "success" to mean that plaintiffs persuaded the
court to reject the lack of interest argument. Additional analyses
show, however, that prevailing on the interest argument is virtually
tantamount to prevailing on the underlying claim of discrimina-
tion.70 Thus, the results in Table 2 would be similar if success were
defined to mean that plaintiffs prevailed on the underlying claim.7 1
TABLE 2: Plaintiffs' Success Rates in Cases Addressing the
Lack of Interest Defense, By Race and Sex Over Time
Period Race Sex
1967-1977 86.0% (37/43) 54.5% (6/11)
1978-1989 40.0% (8/20) 58.1% (25/43)
1967-1989 71.4% (45/63) 57.4% (31/54)
Two striking patterns emerge from this analysis. First, in the
1967-89 period as a whole, plaintiffs have been far more likely to
prevail on the lack of interest argument in race discrimination
cases than in sex discrimination cases. Plaintiffs persuaded courts
to reject this argument in 71.4 percent of all race cases, but in only
57.4 percent of all sex cases. This disparity is largely attributable
to the earlier period, for after 1977 sex discrimination plaintiffs ex-
perienced similar or even somewhat greater success than race dis-
crimination plaintiffs on the lack of interest argument. Additional
analyses (not shown in the table) reveal that in the 1978-83 period,
plaintiffs' success rates in race and sex discrimination cases were
7o Among both the race and sex discrimination cases, there was not a single case in
which the party who lost on the lack of interest argument prevailed on the underlying claim.
In race discrimination cases, plaintiffs won on the underlying claim in 75.6% (34 out of 45)
of the cases in which they won on the lack of interest argument, and defendants won on the
underlying claim in 83.3% (15 out of 18) of the cases in which they won on this argument; in
all other cases, neither party clearly prevailed on the underlying claim. Similarly, in sex
discrimination cases, plaintiffs won on the underlying claim in 83.9% (26 out of 31) of the
cases in which they won on the lack of interest argument, and defendants won on the under-
lying claim in 87.0% (20 out of 23) of the cases in which they won on the argument; in all
other cases, neither party prevailed on the underlying claim. For both race and sex cases,
the association between success on the lack of interest argument and success on the underly-
ing claim is highly significant (p-value = .00 for both sets of cases).
71 In race discrimination cases, plaintiffs' success rate would be 87.5% in the 1967-1977
period, 35.3% in the 1978-1989 period, and 69.4% in both periods combined. Similarly, in
sex discrimination cases, plaintiffs' success rate would be 60.0% in the 1967-1977 period,
55.6% in the 1978-1989 period, and 56.5% in both periods combined.
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roughly equivalent; in the 1984-89 period, there are too few race
discrimination cases to permit comparison.72
The second, and perhaps even more striking trend, is that race
discrimination plaintiffs have become substantially less likely to
prevail on the lack of interest argument since the late 1970s. In the
1967-77 period, race discrimination plaintiffs experienced near uni-
versal success, persuading courts to reject the lack of interest de-
fense in 86 percent of all cases. In the 1978-89 period, by contrast,
plaintiffs prevailed in only 40 percent of the cases. More refined
analyses disclose that plaintiffs' success rate plummeted around
1978, and declined steadily thereafter. 73 This sharp drop-off fol-
lowed by a steady decline contrasts with the pattern for sex dis-
crimination cases, in which plaintiffs' success rates remained rela-
tively stable before and after 1978 (and even increased between
1984 and 1989).
To place these two patterns in context, it would be useful to
be able to determine whether they hold for the ABF sample. Un-
fortunately, the numbers of tried cases in the ABF sample are too
small to permit meaningful comparison.74 It is less helpful to refer
to other studies of employment discrimination for comparison, be-
cause they examine cases that are very different from the class ac-
tion challenges to job segregation in which the lack of interest ar-
gument is most likely to be raised. Nonetheless, the decline in
plaintiffs' success rates in the race discrimination cases in our data
set does not appear to be inconsistent with the patterns reported
72 In the 1978-83 period, plaintiffs won 42.1% (8 out of 19) of the race discrimination
cases, and 48.3% (14 out of 29) of the sex discrimination cases. In the 1984-89 period, there
was only one race discrimination case, which plaintiffs lost. Plaintiffs' success rate increased
substantially in sex discrimination cases, however, to 78.6% (11 out of 14 cases). Although
these data raise the possibility that the courts began to treat sex discrimination plaintiffs
more favorably than race discrimination plaintiffs after 1983, there are simply too few race
discrimination cases to permit meaningful comparison.
73 Between 1975 and 1977, race discrimination plaintiffs won an overwhelming 90.9% of
their cases. In the 1978-80 period, this figure fell precipitously to only 54.5%, and in the
1981-83 period, it fell to 25%. After 1983, there was only one race discrimination case, and
plaintiffs lost.
7' In the ABF sample, there were only seven race discrimination cases tried before
1978, and only one race case tried thereafter. There was only one sex discrimination case
tried before 1978, and only one sex case tried thereafter. Nonetheless, in this small ABF
sample, the same two trends emerge as in our data set. First, plaintiffs' success rates were
lower in sex discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases: plaintiffs won 25% (2
out of 8) of the race discrimination cases that reached trial, but they won 0% (0 out of 2) of
the sex discrimination cases that reached trial. Second, plaintiffs' success rate declined in
race discrimination cases over time: between 1972 and 1977, plaintiffs won 28.6% (2 out of
7) of the race discrimination cases that reached trial, but between 1978 and 1987, plaintiffs
won none (0 out of 1) of the race discrimination cases that reached trial.
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in other studies. In a study of all published federal appellate em-
ployment discrimination cases decided between 1965 and 1985, for
example, Burstein found that race discrimination plaintiffs' success
rates declined between 1965-75 and 1976-85.71 In another study of
all race-based intentional discrimination cases tried in federal dis-
trict courts between 1976 and 1988, Eisenberg and Johnson found
that plaintiffs prevailed in 40 percent-a figure identical to our 40
percent success rate for race discrimination plaintiffs after 1978.6
Researchers have also reported success rates for sex discrimination
cases that parallel those in our data set. In Burstein's study, for
example, sex discrimination plaintiffs prevailed in 58 percent of
their cases, a figure almost identical to the 57 percent success rate
in our cases. On the other hand, the only two other studies that
have compared success rates for race- and sex-based employment
discrimination cases have not reported lower rates for sex discrimi-
nation cases .7  These findings may suggest that the decline in race
discrimination plaintiffs' success rates in our data set is indicative
of a larger trend for Title VII cases, while the disparity between
race and sex discrimination plaintiffs' success rates is unique to
71 See Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle
for Equal Employment Opportunity, 96 Am J Soc 1201, 1214, 1215 (1991) (reporting that
race discrimination plaintiffs' success rates in published federal appellate cases declined
from 77% in the Johnson administration, to 62% in the Nixon and Ford administrations, to
53% and 54% in the Carter and Reagan administrations, respectively).
11 See Theodore Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work? 76 Cornell L J 1151, 1172 (1991).
7 See Burstein, 96 Am J Soc at 1215 (cited in note 75). See also Karen O'Connor and
Lee Epstein, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of Judicial Support
for Gender-Based Claims, 64 Soc Sci Q 327, 328 (1983) (reporting that plaintiffs won 58.8%
of all cases alleging any type of sex discrimination decided by the Supreme Court between
1969 and 1981); Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp and C. K. Rowland, Women's Rights
Before the Federal District Courts, 1971-1977, 11 Am Pol Q 205, 207-08 (1983) (reporting
that plaintiffs prevailed in 51% of all cases alleging any type of sex discrimination decided
by the federal district courts and published in the Federal Supplement between 1971 and
1977). But see Trudy Mills, On the Use of Equal Employment Laws, 24 Pac Soc Rev 196,
206 (1981) (reporting that plaintiffs won only 32% of all cases alleging sex discrimination in
employment decided by federal district courts in five circuits and published in the Fair
Employment Practices reporter between 1967 and 1975).
78 In Burstein's study of published federal appellate employment discrimination cases,
plaintiffs had identical success rates in race and sex discrimination cases (58%) for the over-
all 1965-1985 period. See Burstein, 96 Am J Soc at 1215 (cited in note 75). In Schwab and
Eisenberg's study of all federal civil rights cases filed in three judicial districts during 1981,
Title VII plaintiffs had higher success rates in sex discrimination cases than in race discrim-
ination cases. See Stewart Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg, The Influence of Judicial
Background on Settling and Winning Cases and A Study of the Disputing Pyramid 18-19
(on file with U Chi L Rev). Given that Schwab and Eisenberg's study examines Title VII
cases filed in only one year, however, their finding is not necessarily inconsistent with ours.
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cases addressing the lack of interest defense or to cases challenging
job segregation.
The lower success rates in sex discrimination cases in our data
set may suggest that, overall, the courts have treated sex discrimi-
nation plaintiffs less favorably than race discrimination plaintiffs
in connection with the lack of interest argument. Similarly, the de-
cline in plaintiffs' success rates in more recent race discrimination
cases seems to suggest that since 1978, the courts have responded
less favorably to race discrimination plaintiffs in connection with
this argument. These two hypotheses are consistent with commen-
tators' observations that the courts have tended to treat sex dis-
crimination less seriously than race discrimination, and that the
courts have been less sympathetic to complaints of race discrimi-
nation since the late 1970s. Nonetheless, as we explain below, there
are reasons to be cautious in drawing conclusions about judicial
attitudes from differences in success rates alone. Section II exam-
ines the first trend, drawing on quantitative analyses of the race
and sex discrimination cases to evaluate alternative explanations
for sex discrimination plaintiffs' lower overall success rate. Section
III analyzes the second trend, using similar methods to account for
the lower success rates in modern race discrimination cases.
II. THE DOUBLE STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETING RACE AND SEX
SEGREGATION ON THE JOB: JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE LACK OF
INTEREST DEFENSE IN RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES,
1967-1989
A. Alternative Theoretical Explanations for the Difference in
Success Rates
Sex discrimination plaintiffs may have experienced lower suc-
cess rates than race discrimination plaintiffs during the 1967-89
period for two different reasons. If judges held culturally biased
attitudes about women's work aspirations, they may have been
more predisposed to accept the lack of interest defense in sex dis-
crimination cases than in race discrimination cases. As a result,
judges may have imposed more difficult standards of proof for re-
futing the lack of interest argument on sex discrimination plain-
tiffs. If sex discrimination plaintiffs generally presented evidence
and facts that provided as strong a basis for rejecting the lack of
interest argument as race discrimination plaintiffs, the fact that
sex discrimination plaintiffs experienced less success on this argu-
ment would suggest that the courts have treated them less favora-
bly. On the other hand, one cannot infer that judges responded
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with such bias without first comparing the relative strength of the
sex and race discrimination cases. Judges may have applied the
same legal standards for evaluating the lack of interest defense in
both types of cases, but the sex discrimination plaintiffs simply
presented weaker evidence and facts under these uniform stan-
dards. If so, they would have experienced lower success rates. We
refer to these two explanations as the "judicial bias" and "weaker
evidence" theories, respectively.
The weaker evidence theory poses a provocative question:
Why would the sex discrimination cases have been weaker, in the
aggregate, than the race discrimination cases in our data set? The
literature suggests two potential explanations.
1. Underlying activity.
The first explanation focuses on the relationship between the
"underlying activity" that generates charges of discrimination and
the strength of the evidence introduced in litigated cases. It is not
contained in a formal model, but derives instead from the notion
that litigation reflects underlying social realities. 79 According to
this explanation, employers may have been less likely to discrimi-
nate-or less likely to discriminate in a blatant, obvious fash-
ion-against women than against minorities in connection with
hiring and other employment practices associated with job segrega-
tion. As a result, the sex discrimination cases may have had weaker
evidence and facts than the analogous group of race discrimination
cases. If this were true, sex discrimination plaintiffs would have
been less likely to prevail on the lack of interest argument than
race discrimination plaintiffs, even if judges were applying the
same legal standards to evaluate this argument in both sets of
cases.
Analytically, however, this explanation may be inadequate. As
twenty years of research on the disputing process has established,
between litigation and the underlying activity lies a complex
structure of disputing activity, in which grievances are per-
ceived, disputes constructed and transformed, resources or-
' See Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 L & Soc Rev 371, 373-
74 (1990) (discussing the "intuitively plausible notion" that there is a correlation between
the volume of an underlying activity and the volume of filed and litigated cases arising out
of that activity); Burstein, 96 Am J Soc at 1209 (cited in note 75) (drawing on the "underly-
ing activity" hypothesis to suggest that the volume of employment discrimination cases
should reflect "the incidence of activities prohibited by the law.., the size of the group and
the pervasiveness of discrimination its members face").
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ganized and rationed, and so forth .... [M]any factors [] me-
diate the relationship so that litigation is not a mere reflection
of underlying activity. 0
Even if sexually discriminatory employment practices were less
prevalent or less blatant than racially discriminatory practices dur-
ing the period under consideration, this would not necessarily
mean that filed or litigated sex discrimination cases would have
been weaker than the corresponding group of race discrimination
cases. If, for example, victims of sex discrimination were less likely
than victims of race discrimination to perceive equivalent work sit-
uations as discriminatory or were less likely to be organized to ini-
tiate litigation,"' they may have filed sex discrimination suits only
in circumstances involving facts and evidence that were as strong
as those involved in the average race discrimination suit. The ex-
tent or egregiousness of discrimination in the economy as a whole
may not correlate directly with the strength of discrimination cases
that are filed or brought to trial.
The underlying activity explanation also rests on questionable
empirical assumptions. Although it is difficult to estimate the ex-
tent or egregiousness of discrimination, the assumption that sexu-
ally discriminatory practices have been less prevalent than racially
discriminatory practices over the past twenty-five years is open to
serious doubt. Researchers typically estimate the extent of job seg-
regation with a construct called the index of segregation, which
measures the proportion of workers who would have to switch to
occupations atypical for their race or sex in order for occupations
to become racially or sexually integrated."2 Studies using this index
show that since Title VII's enactment, the degree of job segrega-
tion by sex has been greater than the degree of job segregation by
race. 3 In 1965, for example, the index of sex segregation was ap-
80 Galanter, 24 Law & Soc Rev at 375-76 (cited in note 79). For examples of this litera-
ture, see Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, 15 L & Soc Rev 631 (cited in note 53); Miller and Sarat,
15 L & Soc Rev 525 (cited in note 53). For a summary, see Marc Galanter, Adjudication,
Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler, eds, Handbook
of Law and the Social Sciences 151 (Russell Sage, 1986).
8 See Burstein, 96 Am J Soc 76, at 1210-12 (cited in note 75) (suggesting that the
dearth of sex discrimination complaints relative to race discrimination complaints filed in
the early years of Title VII enforcement is attributable to the fact that women are less likely
to perceive discrimination and less likely to be organized to initiate litigation).
82 See Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, A Methodological Analysis of Segre-
gation Indexes, 20 Am Soc Rev 210 (1955).
83 See Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos, Job Queues, Gender Queues: Women's In-
roads into Male Occupations 5-6 (Temple, 1990); Barbara F. Reskin and Heidi I. Hart-
mann, eds, Women's Work, Men's Work: Sex Segregation on the Job 19 (National Acad-
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proximately 58.8 percent, while the index of racial segregation was
38.0 percent; by 1981, the index of sex segregation had declined
only slightly to 52.6 percent, while the index of racial segregation
had fallen to 20.4 percent.84 These and other studies suggest that
sex discrimination has been no less pervasive than race discrimina-
tion in employment.8 5
Although it is possible that the systems of racial stratification
were more overt-and therefore led to more powerful, clear-cut
cases of discrimination-this explanation, too, seems doubtful.
Certainly, employers have had open and notorious systems of ra-
cial exclusion and segregation that relegated African Americans
and other minorities to menial jobs.8 6 Yet, the evidence shows that
employers have used similarly overt systems of segregation to rele-
gate women (of all races) to undesirable jobs. 7 Indeed, state law
provided institutionalized support for sex segregation in employ-
ment. Four years after Title VII's enactment, twenty-six states had
laws that prohibited women from working in certain occupations or
jobs; forty-one states and the District of Columbia restricted
women's hours of work; eighteen states and Puerto Rico prohibited
or limited women's night work; eleven jurisdictions imposed weight
lifting restrictions on women; and six states prohibited women
from working before and after childbirth.88 Thus, the claim that
sexually discriminatory practices have been less overt or blatant
than racially discriminatory practices related to job segregation
seems to lack empirical support.
emy, 1986); Albelda, 39 Indus & Lab Rel Rev at 405-06 (cited in note 2); Belier, Trends at
20 (cited in note 2).
84 See Albelda, 39 Indus & Lab Rel Rev at 405 (cited in note 2).
85 See Burstein, 96 Am J Soc at 1210 (cited in note 75); Glen Cain, The Economic
Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination, in The Handbook of Labor Economics 693-785
(Worth-Holland, 1986).
88 See, for example, Herbert Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal System: Race,
Work and the Law (BNA, 1977); Blumrosen, 6 Indus Rel L J at 342 (cited in note 37);
Blumrosen, 22 Rutgers L Rev at 471 (cited in note 4).
87 The evidence of overt discrimination against women workers is voluminous. For ex-
amples, see Barbara R. Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women 82-114 (Basic
Books, 1986); William T. Bielby and James N. Baron, Men and Women at Work: Sex Seg-
regation and Statistical Discrimination, 91 Am J Soc 759, especially 794-95 (1986) (listing
employers' policies).
88 See US Dept of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1969 Handbook on Women Workers 270-79
(GPO, 1969). For additional information about restrictive labor legislation for women, see
Judith A. Baer, The Chains of Protection: The Judicial Response to Women's Labor Legis-
lation (Greenwood, 1978); US Dept of Labor, Women's Bureau, Summary of State Labor
Laws for Women 13-14 (GPO, 1965); Pauli Murray and Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and
the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo Wash L Rev 232, 248-253 (1965).
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2. Selection effects.
The literature on the selection of disputes for litigation pro-
vides a second set of explanations for why the sex discrimination
cases in our data set may have been weaker than the race discrimi-
nation cases. According to this literature, even if the underlying
group of filed race and sex discrimination cases were of equal
merit, different factors may have governed the selection of the race
and sex discrimination cases for litigation. As a result, the litigated
sex discrimination cases may have been weaker than the race dis-
crimination cases. To understand how this result could occur, a
simplified description of the dominant models of the litigation-se-
lection process is necessary.
Although there are a number of formal models that vary in
scope and complexity, 9 most theories start from the premise that
filed cases are more likely to go to trial when the parties have dif-
fering expectations as to the probable outcome.90 If the parties
have equal stakes in the litigation and equal ability to predict the
outcome, then neither objectively strong nor objectively weak cases
will tend to reach trial. Because the parties will tend to agree on
the probable outcomes of objectively strong and objectively weak
cases, they will save costs by settling before trial. Consequently,
the cases that are most likely to wind up in court are "close" cases
in which the parties tend to disagree about the probable out-
come.' In fact, Priest and Klein's model predicts that in cases in
which the above conditions are met, the plaintiffs' success rate will
converge to fifty percent, regardless of the favorableness or unfa-
vorableness of the applicable legal standard.2
'9 We do not attempt to account for more technical selection effects models that ad-
dress such complexities as strategic bargaining and legal cost allocation. For examples of
such models, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Infor-
mation, 15 Rand J Econ 404 (1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 Rand
J Econ 198 (1987); and Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J Legal Stud 55 (1982).
0 The most prominent of these models is the one developed by Priest and Klein. See
Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 53). For a comprehensive review of selec-
tion models, see Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J Econ Lit 1067 (1989). For articles questioning whether
the uncertainty reflected in differing expectations fuels litigation to the extent suggested by
most selection models, see Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bank-
ruptcy": Bankruptcy and Bargaining, 75 Va L Rev 205, 209-11 (1989); Peter H. Schuck,
The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U Chi L
Rev 337, 346 n 30, 352-53 (1986).
"1 See Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 12-17 (cited in note 53); George L. Priest,
Measuring Legal Change, 3 J L Econ & Org 193, 199-200 (1987).
92 See Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 17-20.
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In cases in which the parties' stakes or predictive abilities sys-
tematically differ, however, Priest and Klein predict that success
rates will deviate from fifty percent.93 Where defendants have sys-
tematically greater stakes in the litigation than plaintiffs, for ex-
ample, the success rate will drop below fifty percent. Defendants
will in general offer more to settle such cases, but will offer rela-
tively more to settle cases that are strong for plaintiffs and rela-
tively less to settle cases that are weak for plaintiffs, leaving for
litigation a biased sample of weaker cases in which plaintiffs are
less likely to win.94 Where defendants' attorneys have a superior
ability to predict case outcomes than plaintiffs' attorneys, similar
results will occur.95
An elaboration of these factors produces two hypotheses for
why the sex discrimination cases may have been weaker than the
race discrimination cases in our data set.96 If employers had
greater stakes (relative to plaintiffs) in the sex discrimination cases
than in the race discrimination cases, the selection effects litera-
ture would predict lower success rates for plaintiffs in the sex dis-
crimination cases selected for trial even if judges applied the same
standards for evaluating the lack of interest defense in both groups
of cases.97 Likewise, if employers' attorneys had greater abilities
(relative to plaintiffs) to predict the outcomes of sex discrimination
" According to Priest and Klein, success rates may also deviate from 50% in cases in
which litigation costs are low in relation to settlement costs, or in cases in which expected
judgments are high in relation to litigation costs. See id at 39; Theodore Eisenberg, Litiga-
tion Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 Georgetown L J
1567, 1579 (1989). A wealth of evidence shows, however, that litigation costs are very high in
Title VII class action cases. See Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing
Lawsuits Over Job Bias, NY Times Al (Jul 24, 1991); Lewis M. Steel, Why Attorneys
Won't Take Civil Rights Cases, The Nation 362 (Mar 26, 1983). Furthermore, expected
judgments are relatively low in civil rights cases, including employment discrimination
cases. See Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1580, 1580 n 62.
" See William F. Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust, in Robert D. Tollison,
ed, The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Papers by William Baxter 16-21 (Lex-
ington, 1980); Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud 24-26 (cited in note 53).
See Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1582 (cited in note 93).
" Priest and Klein make clear that their model could be applied to cases in which
liability turns on the acceptance or rejection of an affirmative defense. See Priest and Klein,
13 J Legal Stud at 8 n 26 (cited in note 53).
" The same result could occur if plaintiffs had greater stakes, relative to employers, in
the race discrimination cases than in the sex discrimination cases. Because it seems more
plausible that employers' stakes would vary across race and sex discrimination cases than
that plaintiffs' stakes might do so, we characterize this explanation as involving greater rela-
tive stakes for employers in sex discrimination cases.
For an analogous explanation of how selection effects might account for differing suc-
cess rates in various types of civil rights cases, see Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1581-82
(cited in note 93).
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cases than race discrimination cases, similar results could occur.
Under either set of conditions, the courts might have been apply-
ing the same standards to evaluate the lack of interest defense in
both race and sex discrimination cases. Yet, because a greater pro-
portion of sex discrimination cases that were strong for plaintiffs
settled before trial, plaintiffs' success rate would have been lower
in sex discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases liti-
gating the lack of interest defense.
Although the selection effects literature generates coherent hy-
potheses for why the sex discrimination cases in our data set may
have been weaker than the race discrimination cases, the validity
of the empirical assumptions underlying these hypotheses is not
self evident. Why, for example, would employers have greater rela-
tive stakes in sex discrimination cases? Although the literature
contains no clear delineation of the circumstances that give rise to
differential stakes,9e a number of commentators have suggested
that employers have greater stakes than plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases in general.9 9 According to these commenta-
tors, employers may be more likely than plaintiffs to fear reputa-
tional harm beyond the expected dollar amount of the judgment. 100
In addition, Title VII litigation may affect employers' ongoing be-
havior and prospects for future lawsuits' 01 in a way that it does not
98 The selection effects literature suffers from the absence of a clear, empirically verifia-
ble definition of the circumstances that lead to differential stakes. Professors Schwab and
Eisenberg have noted:
[F]ormal model analysts explain many departures from expected patterns of litigation
success by invoking the concept of differential stakes. . . .Departures from idealized
litigation models ... are quickly attributed to differential stakes the parties have in the
outcome. If one defines differential stakes broadly enough, they can explain many de-
partures from theoretical predictions. But at some point the explanation becomes a
truism .... [Tihere is a danger of overworking the concept to explain away large
classes of untidy results and, perhaps more importantly, preempting further probing
for explanations.
Stewart Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 Cornell L
Rev 719, 753 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
9 See, for example, Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1582 (cited in note 93); Siegelman
and Donohue, 24 L & Soc Rev at 1148 (cited in note 54).
100 For sources suggesting that harm to reputation may lead to differential stakes, see
Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1579; Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 40 (cited in note
53).
101 For sources suggesting that cases involving disruption to ongoing activity and the
prospect of future litigation may lead to differential stakes, see Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L
J at 14; Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 28. For a different explanation of why "repeat
players" who are regularly engaged in the activity leading to the dispute will fare better in
litigation, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Soc Rev 95 (1974).
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affect plaintiffs. Yet, even if such factors explain why employers
have greater stakes than plaintiffs in Title VII cases generally, 102 it
is not clear why such factors would be more salient in sex discrimi-
nation cases than in race discrimination cases. To account for why
employers' relative stakes would be greater in the sex discrimina-
tion cases in our data set requires additional explanation.
One possible explanation for this disparity turns on the
greater numbers of women among the potential workers who might
take advantage of litigation challenging job segregation. Because in
many areas women constitute a larger share of the population and
labor force than minorities, employers may believe that the sec-
ondary effects of losing classwide sex discrimination cases are more
problematic than the effects of losing comparable race discrimina-
tion cases.103
A second potential explanation turns on the relative levels of
government involvement in sex and race discrimination cases. Be-
cause government enforcement agencies have limited resources to
initiate litigation and are concerned about the precedential effect
of their cases on future enforcement efforts, numerous commenta-
tors have hypothesized that government plaintiffs have greater
The concern over the disruption of ongoing activity may be particularly acute in class-
wide cases involving multiple plaintiffs and the potential for wide-ranging prospective reme-
dies. For a detailed description of the types of affirmative remedies the federal courts have
ordered historically in Title VII suits, see Eric Schnapper, The Varieties of Numerical
Remedies, 39 Stan L Rev 851, 874-912 (1987).
1*2 One could argue that neither of these factors adequately explains why employers
would have greater stakes than plaintiffs in all types of employment discrimination cases. In
cases alleging discrimination in discharge, for example, it is difficult to see why the harm to
the employer's reputation would be any greater than the harm to the discharged worker's
reputation. Cases alleging discrimination in hiring or other practices associated with job
segregation may raise different considerations. In discriminatory hiring cases brought by
individuals, the potential disruption to the employer's business or the precedential effect on
future lawsuits may increase the employer's stakes beyond the value of the judgment to the
plaintiff. Nonetheless, this balance may shift in class action cases or cases initiated by insti-
tutional plaintiffs. Where such litigation is part of an effort to restructure the labor market
to provide better jobs to minorities or women throughout the community, the plaintiff's
stake in obtaining such jobs and in obtaining favorable precedent may be as great or greater
than the employer's stake in continuing his current practices.
10- See Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1593 n 95 (cited in note 93) (suggesting that
employers' relative stakes in employment discrimination litigation may vary across regions,
because "in an area with a small minority population the secondary effects of losing an
employment discrimination case may be less troublesome to defendants than in an area with
large minority populations"). The same result might have occurred if employers were simply
more resistant (or feared that their existing workforces would be more resistant) to hiring
women than hiring minorities for the higher-paying jobs at issue in these cases.
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stakes than private plaintiffs in the same types of litigation. 104 For
similar reasons, commentators have suggested that government de-
fendants may have greater stakes than their private counterparts
in the same types of litigation.105 Thus, if a smaller proportion of
sex discrimination cases than race discrimination cases involving
the lack of interest argument were initiated by the Justice Depart-
ment or the EEOC (as opposed to private parties), or if a larger
proportion of the sex discrimination cases involved government
employers (as opposed to private employers), the different levels of
government involvement could help explain why employers may
have had greater relative stakes in sex discrimination cases.
This same set of factors may also provide grounding for the
differential abilities explanation for sex discrimination plaintiffs'
lower success rates. If private attorneys who represent employers
in employment discrimination cases had better access to informa-
tion, greater resources, or more expertise than private attorneys
who represent plaintiffs, the employers' bar may have had an ad-
vantage over the plaintiffs' bar in predicting case outcomes accu-
rately. 06 Similarly, some commentators have suggested that gov-
ernment attorneys have an advantage over private attorneys in
predicting case outcomes. 10 7 If a smaller proportion of sex discrimi-
nation cases than race discrimination cases were initiated by the
federal government, or if a larger proportion of sex discrimination
cases were brought against government employers, these factors
104 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J
Legal Stud 305, 307-08 (1972); Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 53-54 (cited in note 53);
Galanter, 9 L & Soc Rev at 97-104 (cited in note 101).
105 See, for example, Schwab and Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 752-55 (cited in note
98); Stanton Wheeler, et a, Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Winning and Losing in State
Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 Law & Soc Rev 403 (1987).
106 It is plausible, for example, that attorneys who represent employers are more likely
than attorneys who represent plaintiffs to work in large firms with extensive resources or in
government agencies. In a review of the literature on civil rights cases, Schwab and Eisen-
berg observed that "most civil rights litigation is not brought by institutional litigators or by
large firms engaging in pro bono activity" but instead by the "local, small-firm lawyer." See
Schwab and Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 768, 769 (cited in note 98). Heinz and
Laumann's study of the Chicago bar may be interpreted to provide additional support for
this thesis. Of the few lawyers in their sample who devoted at least 25% of their time to
civil rights cases, 29% worked in small firms (of less than 10 lawyers). See John P. Heinz
and Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar 78-79 n 18
(Russell Sage and American Bar Foundation, 1982). Although another 50% of the civil
rights lawyers in Heinz and Laumann's study worked for government agencies, see id, such
lawyers may be more likely to be involved in defending government agencies accused of
discrimination than in prosecuting civil rights violations.
107 See Schwab and Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 750-52 (cited in note 98); Wheeler,
et al, 21 Law & Soc Rev at 441 (cited in note 105).
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could help account for why employers' attorneys may have had
greater relative abilities to predict the outcomes of sex discrimina-
tion cases.
Despite their plausibility, these hypotheses receive only lim-
ited support from the data. In our data set, the sex discrimination
cases are slightly less likely to involve government plaintiffs, and
slightly more likely to involve government employers, than the race
discrimination cases. The differences are not large, however.108
Furthermore, the cases in our data set may have been affected by
the same sort of selection effects under consideration. It is possi-
ble, for example, that the government was actually more likely to
initiate race discrimination cases than sex discrimination cases
challenging job segregation; yet, if employers were more likely to
assert the lack of interest defense in sex discrimination cases than
in race discrimination cases initiated by the government, our data
might show a higher level of government representation among the
sex discrimination cases. Thus, the ABF sample provides a better
basis for determining the relative levels of government
involvement.
Although the number of cases in the ABF sample is small, the
sample provides little evidence that a gap in government represen-
tation led employers to have either greater relative stakes or abili-
ties in sex discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases.
In fact, in the ABF sample, the sex discrimination cases were
slightly less likely than the race discrimination cases to have been
brought against government employers. 09 In addition, the race dis-
crimination cases were only trivially more likely than the sex dis-
crimination cases to involve the federal government as plaintiff.
The federal government had only minimal participation in either
type of case, initiating only one of the sixty race discrimination
cases and none of the seventeen sex discrimination cases. 110
The ABF sample provides even stronger evidence to under-
mine the selection effects explanation. According to this explan-
108 In our data set, 27.8% of the sex discrimination cases involved the federal govern-
ment as plaintiff, compared to 34.9% of the race discrimination cases. In addition, 33.3% of
the sex discrimination cases involved government employers, compared to 20.6% of the race
discrimination cases. See Table 3.
1o Whereas 17.6% (3 out of 17) of the sex discrimination cases involved government
employers, 25% (15 out of 60) of the race discrimination cases involved such employers.
'10 See also Burstein, 96 Am J Soc at 1216-17 (cited in note 75) (finding that among
published employment discrimination cases decided by the federal courts of appeals be-
tween 1965 and 1985, sex discrimination cases were slightly more likely than race discrimi-
nation cases to have involved federal government participation on the side of the plaintiffs).
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ation, sex discrimination plaintiffs experienced lower success rates
not because the courts treated them less favorably, but because
employers' greater relative stakes or abilities led them to settle a
greater proportion of filed sex discrimination cases (including a
disproportionate number of cases that were strong for plaintiffs).
Thus, an important empirical corollary of the selection effects the-
ory is that among the underlying group of filed cases in which the
lack of interest argument was a potential defense, the sex discrimi-
nation cases should have been more likely to settle and less likely
to reach trial than the race discrimination cases. Yet, in the ABF
sample, the race and sex discrimination cases were almost equally
likely to settle and almost equally likely to reach trial. Whereas
51.7 percent (31 out of 60) of the race discrimination cases settled
before trial, an almost equivalent 52.9 percent (9 out of 17) of the
sex discrimination cases did so. Similarly, 13.3 percent (8 out of
60) of the race discrimination cases reached trial, and an almost
equivalent 11.8 percent (2 out of 17) of the sex discrimination
cases reached trial. These findings undercut the proposition that
differential selection effects account for the lower success rate in
the sex discrimination cases. Indeed, they suggest that a remarka-
bly similar selection process has operated in race and sex discrimi-
nation cases.
3. The need to compare the strength of the cases.
Ultimately, both the underlying activity and the selection ef-
fects theories explain the difference in success rates by hypothesiz-
ing that the sex discrimination cases were weaker than the race
discrimination cases in our data set. These explanations are not
mutually exclusive with the judicial bias explanation; both weaker
evidence and judicial bias could have contributed to the lower suc-
cess rate in sex discrimination cases. To the extent that sex dis-
crimination plaintiffs presented facts and evidence that were as
strong as those presented by race discrimination plaintiffs, how-
ever, the lower success rate in sex discrimination cases would sug-
gest that the courts have treated sex discrimination plaintiffs less
favorably. Thus, a good way to sort out these explanations is to
compare the strength of the two groups of cases.
The next Section provides such a comparison. To evaluate the
relative strength of the race and sex discrimination cases, we as-
sume that the courts have treated the evidence and other facts
similarly in both types of cases, and then examine whether differ-
ences in the composition of the cases render the sex discrimination
cases sufficiently weaker for plaintiffs than the race discrimination
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cases to account for the disparity in plaintiffs' success rates. We
measure the relative strength of the cases by determining the de-
gree to which they contain the major types of evidence the courts
have considered in determining whether to attribute job segrega-
tion to employer discrimination or to protected class members'
own lack of interest. Since Title VII's enactment, five types of evi-
dence have dominated judicial discussion of the lack of interest ar-
gument in both race and sex discrimination cases: (1) evidence that
the employer segregated the workforce on the basis of race or sex
before the liability period began ("evidence of past discrimina-
tion"); (2) evidence that the employer discriminated against indi-
vidual minorities or women or displayed facially discriminatory be-
havior toward them during the current liability period ("direct or
anecdotal evidence of discrimination"); (3) evidence that the em-
ployer made special efforts to attract minorities or women to tradi-
tionally segregated jobs ("special efforts"); (4) evidence that the
employer engaged in formal recruiting activities, as opposed to re-
lying on informal word-of-mouth recruiting ("formal recruiting");
and (5) evidence that the employer relied on a subjective system to
evaluate and select candidates for the jobs at issue ("subjective se-
lection system"). Controlling for these five types of evidence pro-
vides an objective, comprehensive measure of the strength of the
merits of the cases. In addition to these evidentiary factors, we an-
alyze other factors which extend beyond the merits of the cases
but which nonetheless may have influenced case outcomes, such as
whether the government was a party and whether blue-collar or
white-collar work was at issue. We also control for the time period
(1967-77 or 1978-89), doctrinal framework (disparate treatment or
disparate impact), and level of court (district court or court of ap-
peals) involved.
Although we rely exclusively on the courts' opinions to gather
the data for our analyses, 1 ' our methodology is designed to mini-
mize the risk of incorporating into the data any biases in judges'
attitudes and approaches toward the evidence. To determine
whether a particular type of evidence was presented, we adopted a
uniform definition of that type of evidence, and then searched the
"' Most other scholars who have performed content analyses of published employment
discrimination cases have also relied exclusively on the courts' opinions to gather the data
for their analyses. See, for example, Paul Burstein, Attacking Sex Discrimination in the
Labor Market: A Study in Law and Politics, 67 Soc Forces 641 (1989); Paul Burstein and
Kathleen Monaghan, Equal Employment Opportunity and the Mobilization of Law, 20 L &
Soc Rev 355 (1986); Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L J at 1567 (cited in note 93); Mills, 124 Pac
Soc Rev 196 (cited in note 77).
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opinions to discover whether the court made a statement acknowl-
edging the existence of that type of evidence. For example, to de-
termine whether evidence of special efforts was present, we
searched the entire opinion for any statement acknowledging that
the employer had taken affirmative steps to attract minorities or
women to the jobs at issue. We did not rely on whether the court
characterized those steps as "special efforts" or considered them
sufficiently impressive to support an inference that protected class
members lacked interest in the work, because such characteriza-
tions might reflect the very biases in judges' evaluations of the evi-
dence that our analyses are designed to investigate. In cases in
which the court's opinion made no reference to a particular type of
evidence, we assumed that that type of evidence was not
presented.
Our methodology controls indirectly for whether the evidence
met a minimal threshold of quality or persuasiveness, for unless
the evidence was minimally credible, the court may not have been
willing to acknowledge its existence in the opinion. Thus, to the
extent that sex discrimination plaintiffs were less likely than race
discrimination plaintiffs to present evidence of a sufficient quality
to warrant an affirmative acknowledgment in the opinion, our anal-
yses control for such differences in quality. Of course, differences
in the quality of the evidence are not the only reason why judges
may have mentioned some types of evidence less frequently in sex
discrimination cases: biased attitudes may have led to the same
phenomenon. If, for example, judges considered a particular type
of evidence less probative of the lack of interest issue in sex dis-
crimination cases than in race discrimination cases, judges might
have referred to that type of evidence less frequently in sex dis-
crimination decisions. To the extent that such differences in judi-
cial reporting occurred, our analyses would underreport the pres-
ence of that type of evidence in sex discrimination cases. As a
result, our analyses would be biased in favor of the weaker evi-
dence explanation (and against the judicial bias explanation).112
112 A simple mathematical example illustrates this point. In our data set, 77.8% (49 out
of 63) of the race discrimination cases included evidence of past discrimination, but only
64.8% (35 out of 54) of the sex discrimination cases did so. See Table 3. Suppose, however,
that the courts regarded evidence of past discrimination as a powerful refutation of the lack
of interest argument in race discrimination cases, but much less powerful in sex discrimina-
tion cases. Suppose further that because of these attitudes, judges acknowledged the exis-
tence of evidence of past discrimination in all the race discrimination cases in which plain-
tiffs presented it, but they failed to acknowledge this same evidence in seven of the sex
discrimination cases in which plaintiffs presented it. If the seven additional sex discrimina-
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Beyond this screening factor, our analyses do not control di-
rectly for the quality or persuasiveness of individual pieces of evi-
dence. Because judges' descriptions of the evidence may be colored
by their own views about the effect or weight that type of evidence
should be given in particular classes of cases, it would have been
impossible to measure the quality of the evidence without building
into our analyses the very biases in judges' attitudes and ap-
proaches toward particular types of evidence that our analyses are
designed to investigate.
B. A Comparison of the Content of Race and Sex Discrimination
Cases
Our analyses of the content of the race and sex discrimination
cases suggests little difference in their evidentiary and factual com-
position. Table 3 presents the means (or the percentage of cases in
which each factor was present) for the evidence and non-evidence
variables in sex and race discrimination cases, respectively. The
second column shows what percentage of the race discrimination
cases included the five types of evidence and other case character-
istics. The third column presents analogous information for the sex
discrimination cases.
tion cases were included, 77.8% (42 out of 54) of the sex discrimination cases would have
included evidence of past discrimination, rather than 64.8%. Thus, our data set would un-
derreport the presence of evidence of past discrimination in the sex discrimination cases. In
fact, our data set would make it appear that the sex discrimination cases were weaker than
the race discrimination cases with respect to evidence of past discrimination, when in reality
the two sets of cases were equally likely to include this type of evidence. As a result, our
assessment of the relative strength of the race and sex discrimination cases would overstate
the weaker evidence explanation (and understate the judicial bias explanation) for sex dis-
crimination plaintiffs' lower success rate.
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TABLE 3: Variable Means for Race and Sex Discrimination Cases
Variables Race Sex
(n=63) (n=54)
Direct or Anecdotal Evidence 60.3% 59.3%
Special Efforts 34.9% 38.9%
Subjective Selection System 66.7% 68.5%
Formal Recruiting 14.3% 22.2%
Evidence of Past Discrimination 77.8% 64.8%
Government Plaintiff 34.9% 27.8%
Government Defendant 20.6% 33.3%
Blue-Collar Work 84.1% 72.2%
Disparate Impact Analysis 68.3% 27.8%
These figures reveal few differences in the evidentiary content
of the race and sex discrimination cases. In fact, the two groups of
cases include almost equivalent proportions of three of the five
types of evidence. As the first row shows, the race and sex discrimi-
nation cases were almost equally likely to contain direct or anecdo-
tal evidence of discrimination. Direct evidence refers to proof of
overt discrimination, such as explicit bars on hiring women or mi-
norities, sexually or racially segregated advertising, or statements
directly revealing discriminatory intent. Anecdotal evidence refers
to evidence that the employer discriminatorily rejected individual
women or minority applicants or discouraged them from applying;
it provides concrete instances of discrimination against individuals
who expressed an interest in the work. Because both forms of dis-
crimination may deter interested class members from applying, di-
rect and anecdotal evidence might be expected to help plaintiffs
overcome the lack of interest argument. On the other hand, failing
to present such evidence might not have hurt plaintiffs. If the
courts were disinclined to attribute job segregation to minorities'
or women's own lack of interest in higher-paying employment,
judges may have been willing to hold employers liable even in the
absence of concrete proof that employers discriminated against al-
ready-interested individuals. 1
13
"I See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1774 (cited in note 20) (demonstrating that between
1967 and 1971, the lower courts did not require plaintiffs to present anecdotal evidence of
discrimination in order to counter employers' arguments that minorities lacked interest in
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The sex and race discrimination cases also included similar
proportions of evidence of special efforts. By claiming that their
special efforts to attract women or minorities to traditionally segre-
gated jobs failed, employers hope to buttress their arguments that
these groups lacked interest in such jobs.114 In addition, the sex
and race discrimination cases were almost equally likely to include
evidence that the employer relied on a subjective selection system.
In an objective system, the employer selects candidates on the ba-
sis of criteria that are measured and weighted uniformly across
candidates. By contrast, in a subjective system, the employer relies
on unmeasurable criteria on which evaluators might rate the same
candidates differently, or uses measurable criteria but has no stan-
dardized system to ensure that evaluators give these criteria the
same weight across candidates. If, for example, an employer dele-
gated to supervisors discretion to select "the most qualified" candi-
dates for promotion, without specifying particular criteria to be
used by the supervisors to evaluate the qualifications of all candi-
dates on a uniform basis, the employer would be relying on a sub-
jective selection system. Traditionally, the lower courts have con-
demned such systems, because they provide the opportunity for
conscious or unconscious bias to influence evaluators' judgments.'1 5
Thus, by supplementing their statistical proof with evidence that
predominately white jobs). For examples of race discrimination cases in which courts con-
cluded that anecdotal evidence was not required, see Jones v Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
431 F2d 245, 247 (10th Cir 1970) ("True, no specific instances of discrimination have been
shown. However, because of the historically all white make-up of the Company's [job] cate-
gory, it may well be that negroes simply did not bother to apply."); United States v Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 416 F2d 123, 127 (8th Cir 1969).
I" See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1789-92 (cited in note 20) (discussing employers' use
of this strategy in sex discrimination cases). For illustrations of race discrimination cases in
which employers have sought to use this strategy, see Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F2d at 138-
39 (employer argued that even after extensive efforts to attract Blacks to the union's ap-
prenticeship program, "[niot one has taken the initiative to apply"); League of United
Latin American Citizens v City of Santa Anna, 410 F Supp 873, 881 (C D Cal 1976);
Stamps v Detroit Edison Co., 365 F Supp 87, 109 (E D Mich 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
515 F2d 301 (6th Cir 1975).
"' One of the classic condemnations of subjective selection systems was expressed by
the Fourth Circuit in 1972:
Elusive, purely subjective standards must give way to objectivity if statistical indicia of
discrimination are to be refuted .... [I]n the absence of objective criteria applied to all
workers alike, the statistics indicate that race is the only identifiable factor explaining
the disparity between the jobs held by white employees and those held by black em-
ployees .... [T]he lack of objective guidelines for hiring and promotion ... are badges
of discrimination that serve to corroborate, not to rebut, the racial bias pictured by the
statistical pattern of the company's work force.
Brown v Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir 1972). See also
Rowe v General Motors, 457 F2d 348, 359 (5th Cir 1972).
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the employer used a subjective selection system, plaintiffs seek to
strengthen the inference of discrimination and to undercut the
lack of interest explanation.
Only the two remaining evidence variables suggest dimensions
on which the sex discrimination cases may have been somewhat
weaker than the race discrimination cases. Sex discrimination cases
were somewhat more likely to involve evidence of a formal recruit-
ing system. In the absence of formal recruiting systems, employers
tend to rely on their employees to spread information about jobs
and job openings to friends and relatives. Because white workers
tend to communicate job information mostly to other whites, the
lower courts have concluded that informal, word-of-mouth recruit-
ing systems are racially discriminatory.116 In light of this reasoning,
employers who do not engage in formal recruiting should have a
more difficult time persuading judges that protected class mem-
bers' failure to apply was due to lack of interest rather than a lack
of knowledge about job opportunities. The difference between the
sex and race discrimination cases on this variable is not large,
however.
A more sizeable difference in the evidentiary composition of
the sex and race discrimination cases exists in connection with evi-
dence of past discrimination. This evidence should help plaintiffs
counter the lack of interest defense. In an influential body of early
race discrimination cases, the courts held that where an employer
has discriminated in the past, minorities' failure to pursue tradi-
tionally segregated jobs does not signal a lack of interest in the
work, but rather a sense of futility created by the employer's his-
tory of discrimination."7 To the extent that this same reasoning
1"' See, for example, EEOC v Detroit Edison Co., 515 F2d 301, 313 (6th Cir 1975)
("The practice of relying on referrals by a predominantly white work force rather than seek-
ing new employees in the marketplace for jobs was found to be discriminatory ... [T]he
findings are supported by substantial evidence."); United States v Georgia Power Co., 474
F2d 906, 925 (5th Cir 1973) ("Under word-of-mouth hiring practices, friends of current em-
ployees admittedly received the first word about job openings. Since most current employees
are white, word-of-mouth hiring alone would tend to isolate blacks from the 'web of infor-
mation' which flows around opportunities at the company."); Parham v Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F2d 421, 427 (8th Cir 1970) (same).
" See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1772-73 (cited in note 20) (discussing the early cases
which developed the futility doctrine). For the first case we found which applied the futility
doctrine, see Cypress v Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F2d 648,
653 (4th Cir 1967) ("That so few Negro physicians have applied is not indication of a lack of
interest, but indicates, we think, a sense of the futility of such an effort in the face of the
notoriously discriminatory policy . . . "). See also Wade v Mississippi Cooperative Exten-
sion Service, 372 F Supp 126, 141 (N D Miss 1974) ("That so few blacks have applied for
promotions does not demonstrate a lack of interest but rather indicates that, given the his-
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applies to sex discrimination cases, the fact that sex discrimination
plaintiffs were less likely to introduce evidence of past discrimina-
tion would have weakened their chances of prevailing on the lack
of interest defense.
The next three variables in Table 3 reflect information about
the identity and status of the parties: whether the federal govern-
ment was a plaintiff; whether the defendant was a federal, state, or
local government; and whether the jobs to which plaintiffs sought
access involved blue-collar or white-collar work. From a legal
standpoint, these factors do not affect the merits and should not
have influenced the outcome of the lack of interest argument:
Judges are not supposed to treat government litigants differently
from private litigants or white-collar plaintiffs differently from
blue-collar plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that
these factors may have influenced case outcomes.
A number of researchers have estimated that government liti-
gants-plaintiffs and defendants-have higher success rates than
their private counterparts in the same type of litigation. 118 Assum-
ing that this phenomenon is valid for Title VII cases involving the
lack of interest argument, the lower level of government plaintiffs
or the higher level of government defendants in the sex discrimina-
tion cases might have contributed to sex discrimination plaintiffs'
lower success rates. In any event, the overall difference in presence
of government litigants between sex and race discrimination cases
is not large.
Although the vast majority of both race and sex discrimination
cases raising the lack of interest defense involved blue-collar work,
the sex discrimination cases were somewhat less likely to involve
such work. The literature contains contradictory predictions about
whether employment discrimination plaintiffs seeking blue-collar
or white-collar work will have higher success rates. Because al-
lowing disadvantaged groups access to lower-level jobs is less
tory of discriminatory practices, blacks concluded that it was futile, if not ill-advised, to
apply for higher professional jobs when vacancies occurred.").
11' Commentators have proposed a number of reasons why government litigants may
have higher success rates. The government's finite resources may lead it to initiate only
cases in which it has a higher-than-usual likelihood of winning; the government's interest in
future precedent may increase its stake in the litigation; the government's repeat-player
status may yield organizational advantages; or the government may simply invest greater
resources to strengthen the cases it chooses to initiate. See notes 104-05. In addition, as my
colleague Bill Whitford pointed out to me, judges may give greater credence to suits initi-
ated by the government because the decision to file suit has been made by an official who
has a less obvious interest in its outcome than a private litigant.
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threatening to the power structure," 9 some commentators have
suggested that plaintiffs should have greater chances of success in
cases involving blue-collar work. 120 Others predict that white-collar
plaintiffs will have a better chance of prevailing, because they
bring greater resources to the litigation.12' Neither of these predic-
tions are specific to cases raising the lack of interest defense, how-
ever, and each assumes that the type of work sought will cut in the
same direction in both sex and race discrimination cases. Thus,
there is no consensus about whether the underrepresentation of
blue-collar cases serves to strengthen or weaken the sex discrimi-
nation cases in our data set.
The biggest difference between the sex and race discrimina-
tion cases arises in connection with the doctrinal analysis variable.
This variable does not attempt to measure the strength of the mer-
its of a case; it reveals whether the court used a disparate impact
framework or instead relied exclusively on a disparate treatment
framework to analyze the plaintiffs' claim. 22 Under a disparate
treatment analysis, plaintiffs must prove that the employer acted
with a discriminatory intent; 23 a disparate impact analysis re-
quires no such showing. 124 Numerous commentators have sug-
gested that the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination
makes a disparate treatment framework less favorable to plaintiffs
than a disparate impact framework. 125 This observation may be
119 See, for example, James R. Kluegel, The Causes and Costs of Racial Exclusion from
Job Authority, 43 Am Soc Rev 285, 286-87 (1978); Wendy C. Wolf and Neil D. Fligstein,
Sex and Authority in the Workplace, 44 Am Soc Rev 235, 240 (1979).
Il' See, for example, Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High
Places, 95 Harv L Rev 947 (1982).
121 See, for example, Burstein, 67 Soc Forces at 649 (cited in note 111); Mills, 24 Pac
Soc Rev at 207 (cited in note 77).
112 In some cases, the court analyzed the claim under both a disparate treatment and a
disparate impact framework. We treated these cases as disparate impact cases, to reflect the
fact that plaintiffs got the benefit of the allegedly more favorable disparate impact analysis.
123 See, for example, Texas Dept of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 252-56
(1981) (individual disparate treatment cases require proof of discriminatory intent); Team-
sters, 431 US at 324, 335 n 15 (1977) (classwide disparate treatment cases require proof of
discriminatory intent).
12 To establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the plaintiff need only prove
that apparently neutral selection criteria operated to exclude protected class members at a
disproportionate rate. See, for example, Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 330 (1977);
Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424, 429-30 (1971). The employer bears the burden of
proving the business necessity of the challenged criteria. See the Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§
104(m), 105(k)(1)(a)(ii), Pub L No 102-66,-105 Stat 1071 (1991).
11' See, for example, Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San
Diego L Rev 1163 (1978). For a recent summary of the literature discussing the burden-
someness of an intent standard, see Eisenberg and Johnson, 76 Cornell L Rev at 1160-61
(cited in note 76).
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particularly applicable to cases involving the lack of interest de-
fense, because the suggestion that protected class members lacked
interest in the work may undercut the inference of discriminatory
intent required to prove disparate treatment more directly than it
undermines a showing of disparate impact.12 6 In our data set, the
sex discrimination cases were substantially less likely than the race
discrimination cases to be analyzed under a disparate impact
framework. This disparity is largely attributable to the effect of
time. Most of our sex discrimination cases were decided after
1977,12 and the use of the disparate impact model declined dra-
matically after that year.128 The less frequent use of the disparate
"I In classwide disparate treatment cases, the plaintiffs make a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination by proving that protected class members are significantly under-
represented in the employer's workforce or in particular jobs. If the employer shows that
this disparity is attributable to the class members' own lack of interest in the work, this
showing directly undercuts the inference of intentional discrimination that would otherwise
be drawn from plaintiffs' statistical proof. See, for example, Hazelwood School District v
United States, 433 US 299, 311 & n 17 (1977) (suggesting that minorities' failure to apply
would undercut the inference of intentional discrimination by providing an alternative ex-
planation for their underrepresentation in the employer's workforce). In disparate impact
cases, by contrast, the role of the lack of interest argument is more subtle. The plaintiff
makes a prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employer's use of
one or more selection criteria operated to exclude protected class members at a dispropor-
tionate rate. In some cases, however, the employer argues that because the only class mem-
bers who would tend to be interested in the work are those who meet the required criteria,
the criteria could not have operated to exclude eligible women or minorities at a dispropor-
tionate rate. See, for example, Dothard, 433 US at 348 (White dissenting) (stating that
plaintiffs' evidence failed to establish that the employer's use of a height and weight re-
quirement had excluded a disproportionate number of women from prison guard positions,
on the ground that he was not "convinced that a large percentage of the actual women
applicants, or those who are seriously interested in applying, for [such] positions would fail
to satisfy the height and weight requirements"). This use of the lack of interest argument is
controversial, however, because it embroils the court in circular logic that potentially under-
mines the entire disparate impact model. Id at 330 (recognizing that protected class mem-
bers' failure to apply would not necessarily undermine a showing of disparate impact, be-
cause protected class members may have been deterred from applying by the very
requirements the plaintiffs claim have a disparate impact).
127 In our data set, 79.6% (43 out of 54) of the cases decided from 1967-1977 were
analyzed under a disparate impact framework, but only 23.8% (15 out of 63) of the cases
decided from 1978-1989 were analyzed under a disparate impact framework. The volume of
disparate impact cases declined in both the race and sex discrimination cases in our data
set. Yet, because the early sex discrimination cases were less likely than the early race dis-
crimination cases to involve a disparate impact analysis, this decline was less dramatic for
the sex discrimination cases. Among race discrimination cases, the proportion of disparate
impact cases declined from 88.4% (38 out of 43) in the 1967-77 period to 25% (5 out of 20)
in the 1978-89 period. Among sex discrimination cases, the proportion of disparate impact
cases declined from 45.5% (5 out of 11) in the early period to 23.3% (10 out of 43) in the
later period.
1" For speculations as to why the number of cases in which the courts used a disparate
impact framework may have declined, see text at notes 190-94.
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impact model in sex discrimination cases, although not weakening
the merits of such cases relative to the race discrimination cases,
may nevertheless have decreased sex discrimination plaintiffs'
chances of prevailing.
Overall, however, the race and sex discrimination cases are
comparable in content-particularly on the evidentiary dimen-
sions, which measure the relative strengths of the cases. The few
differences that emerge from Table 3 do not seem sufficient to ex-
plain the sizeable gap in plaintiffs' success rates in sex and race
discrimination cases. That sex discrimination plaintiffs won less
often even though their cases had comparable characteristics sug-
gests that judges may have responded to the same evidence and
facts differently in sex and race discrimination cases. If judges
viewed sex segregation as a less serious problem than race segrega-
tion, they may have been more predisposed to accept the lack of
interest explanation in such cases. As a result, they may have im-
posed different-and more difficult-standards for refuting this ar-
gument in sex discrimination cases. The next Section examines
this possibility in more detail.
C. A Comparison of Judicial Standards for Evaluating the Lack
of Interest Defense
Schultz's previous article provides a framework for under-
standing why judges may have reacted differently to the same evi-
dence in race and sex discrimination cases. Most fundamentally,
Schultz found that the courts' responses to the evidence have been
framed by differing assumptions about the sources of minorities'
and women's work aspirations. In early race discrimination cases,
the courts acknowledged that minorities' job preferences had been
formed and artificially limited by discriminatory labor market con-
ditions. Yet, in sex discrimination cases, the courts have assumed
that women's work preferences are shaped through early socializa-
tion (or even innate predisposition), rather than in response to la-
bor market discrimination. As a result, judges have tended to view
women's job preferences as impervious to employers' influence.
Schultz found that these differences in assumptions have led the
courts to evaluate the same types of evidence less favorably in sex
discrimination cases.
The analyses in this Section confirm that the courts have re-
sponded to the same types of evidence differently-and less favor-
ably-in sex discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases.
Our results reveal that in the 1965-89 period as a whole, each of
the five types of evidence has had a markedly different effect on
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the outcome of the lack of interest argument in sex and race dis-
crimination cases. Table 4 presents the results of logistic regression
analyses which test the influence of each type of evidence and
other case characteristics on the plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing
on the lack of interest argument, while controlling simultaneously
for all the other factors. 12 The first set of analyses (the "full mod-
els") includes all nine content variables analyzed in Table 3, as
well as a date variable, which reflects whether the case was decided
in the 1967-77 period or the 1978-89 period. The second set of
analyses (the "parsimonious models") excludes variables of little or
no significance.13 0 A positive coefficient for a variable indicates that
other factors being equal, the presence of that factor increased
plaintiffs' likelihood of winning. A negative coefficient means that,
all else equal, the presence of that factor decreased plaintiffs' like-
lihood of winning. In addition to reporting the coefficients, we re-
port the t-ratios for each variable.' 3 '
M2 Because our analyses treat outcome as a dichotomous variable (either the plaintiff
wins or loses on the lack of interest argument), logistic regression models are more appropri-
ate than ordinary least squares regression models. In logistic regression, the dependent vari-
able or "logit" [L] is the natural log of the odds ratio of the probability that an event P
occurs to the probability that it does not occur [Lu (P/1-P)]. While the log odds ratio is a
linear function of the independent variables, the probability itself is not linear. That is, the
effect of a change in one of the independent variables on the probability of an event occur-
ring also depends on the initial values of the other variables in the model. For an introduc-
tion to logit models, see Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for
Social Scientists 179-216 (Academic Press, 1977); David W. Hosmer, Jr. and Stanley
Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression (Wiley, 1989). For another study that uses logit
models to analyze the influence of various types of evidence and other factors on the out-
comes of civil rights cases, see Eisenberg and Johnson, 76 Cornell L Rev at 1185 (cited in
note 76).
130 The parsimonious models exclude variables of little or no significance. The chi-
squared statistic for the full race model is 39.23 and for the parsimonious race model is
36.28, which yields a difference of 2.95. The critical value of the chi-squared statistic at the
10% level of confidence for four degrees of freedom is 7.78. Thus, excluding the direct/
anecdotal evidence, special efforts, government plaintiff, and disparate impact variables
from the race model does not significantly decrease the fit of the model. Similarly, the chi-
squared statistic for the full sex model is 19.81 and for the parsimonious model is 11.12,
which produces a difference of 8.69. The critical value of the chi-squared statistic at the
10% level of confidence for seven degrees of freedom is 12.0. Consequently, the six variables
excluded from the full sex model are not jointly significant. For an analogous use of parsi-
monious models, see Eisenberg and Johnson, 76 Cornell L Rev at 1188-89 (cited in note 76).
121 Because our search strategy was designed to locate every published decision that
addressed the lack of interest defense, the collection of claims in our study approximates a
universe rather than a sample. Strictly speaking, it is unnecessary to test for statistical sig-
nificance of the relationship between variables in a universe, as opposed to a sample of
cases. Here and elsewhere, however, we report the results from tests of statistical signifi-
cance to give the reader a sense of the relative importance of the variables in influencing
outcomes. In the logits, a t-ratio of 1.64 or greater indicates that the coefficient is significant
at .10 or less. A .10 level of significance means that the probability that the outcomes would
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TABLE 4: Logistic Regression Results for Race and Sex Discrimination Cases
Analyzed Separately: The Influence of the Evidence and Other Facts on
Plaintiffs' Likelihood of Prevailing
Full Models Parsimonious Models
Race Sex Race Sex
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio)
Constant
Evidence of Past
Discrimination
Direct/Anecdotal
Evidence
Special Efforts
Formal Recruiting
Subjective Selection
System
Blue Collar Work
Government
Plaintiff
Government
Defendant
Disparate Impact
Analysis
Date (> 1978)
-5.268
(-2.111)
2.405
(1.968)
-0.161
(-0.149)
1.653
(1.425)
-4.355
(-2.381)
2.850
(2.587)
3.155
(1.920)
-0.766
(-0.685)
4.371
(2.135)
1.081
(0.892)
-1.879
(-1.548)
0.213
(0.144)
-1.167
(-1.576)
2.163
(2.332)
-1.246
(-1.621)
1.307
(1.428)
-0.760
(-0.833)
-1.195
(-1.297)
-0.846
(-1.055)
-1.180
(-1.487)
2.160
(2.118)
1.654
(1.594)
-3,489
(-1.948)
1.832
(1.828)
0.011
(0.011)
-1.096
(-1.626)
1.227
(1.956)
-3.787
(-2.288)
2.607
(2.622)
3.044
(2.106)
3.927
(2.155)
-2.522
(2.660)
1.287
(1.701)
Log Likelihood -18.076 -26.930 -19.551 -31.275
Likelihood Ratio Test* x = X2(10)= x2(6) (3) =
(vs. model with 39.23 19.81 36.28 11.12
constant term only)
Number of Cases 63 54 63 54
* The log-likelihood ratio is defined as two times the absolute value of the difference
between the log-likelihood for the model with the constant term only and the competing
model. This ratio is distributed X'(d.Q, where d.f. (degrees of freedom) is the number of vari-
ables added to the model. The log-likelihood for the model with a constant term only is
-36.835 for the sex discrimination cases and -37.691 for the race discrimination cases.
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1. The evidence.
The results for the five evidence variables show that the courts
have evaluated the same types of evidence differently in race and
sex discrimination cases. Remarkably, the coefficient for every evi-
dence variable had different signs across the race and sex models.
In fact, each variable had a significantly different effect on plain-
tiffs' likelihood of winning in race and sex discrimination cases.13 2
Evidence of past discrimination significantly increased plain-
tiffs' chances of prevailing in race discrimination cases; the coeffi-
cients for this variable are large and significant in both race mod-
els. In sex discrimination cases, however, evidence of past
discrimination did not increase plaintiffs' likelihood of winning
(and in fact tended to decrease it). This discrepancy is consistent
with the results of Schultz's earlier study. As documented more
fully there, the courts have held very different assumptions about
the role of historical discrimination in shaping minorities' and
women's work aspirations."3 In race discrimination cases, the
courts acknowledged the history of racial discrimination in the la-
bor market and recognized that minorities' current work interests
had been formed and limited in that context. Judges applied the
futility doctrine, which held that if minorities had failed to apply
for traditionally segregated jobs, this did not signal any lack of in-
terest in the work but rather a sense of futility created by the em-
ployer's history of discrimination.134 Furthermore, the courts were
willing to infer the requisite history of discrimination from evi-
dence of statistical underrepresentation alone. Judges understood
that many systems of job segregation had been implemented
through informal customs so deeply ingrained that they did not
require formally stating. Accordingly, the courts did not require
plaintiffs to produce "smoking gun" proof that the employer had
once operated an overt system of segregation.1 3 5
have varied as much as they did across cases where the factor in question was present or
absent, by chance alone, is one in ten.
"' We estimated a model that pools the race and sex discrimination cases, and includes
interaction terms between a race/sex dummy variable and each of the variables specified in
the full models. The coefficients for those interaction terms measure the difference in the
effects of the variables on the outcomes of race and sex discrimination cases. The results
from this model confirm that each coefficient in the full race model is different from the
corresponding coefficient in the full sex model at a .10 or less level of significance, with the
exception of the government plaintiff and disparate impact coefficients.
"I See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1771-73, 1781-89 (cited in note 20).
"' See note 117.
13 For examples of cases in which courts concluded that the employer had engaged in
historical discrimination from evidence of statistical underrepresentation alone, see Jones v
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In sex discrimination cases, by contrast, evidence of past dis-
crimination has not helped plaintiffs overcome the lack of interest
argument, because the courts have failed to recognize that past
discrimination has shaped and restricted women's current work as-
pirations. In fact, many conservative judges who have accepted the
lack of interest argument actually deny that employers ever dis-
criminated against women. Even when confronted with statistical
evidence of long-standing, extreme patterns of sex segregation,
conservative judges have refused to attribute these patterns to his-
toric discrimination and have attributed them instead to women's
own past choices. 136 According to these judges, such patterns
merely confirm that women have always found higher-paying, non-
traditional work unappealing. 137 In this conservative approach,
women have always had a timeless set of "feminine" attributes, in-
cluding an aversion for such work.
While conservative judges have denied the history of sex dis-
crimination in the labor market, even those more liberal judges
who have rejected the lack of interest argument have not relied
heavily on evidence of past discrimination to counter this argu-
ment. 38 Although these judges acknowledge the history of discrim-
ination against women, they appear skeptical that past generations
of women would have taken nontraditional jobs even if employers
had permitted them to do so.ls e Rather, the liberal rationale for
rejecting the lack of interest argument rests on a vision of progress,
in which women's current aspirations for nontraditional work re-
present a sharp break from those of most women in the past. This
Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc., 512 F2d 1, 2 (5th Cir 1975); Jones v Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F2d 245, 247-48 (10th Cir 1970); Parham v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
433 F2d 421, 426-27 (8th Cir 1970).
136 For a more complete discussion of this trend, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1783-
85 (cited in note 20).
" See, for example, EEOC v Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F Supp 1, 3 (W D Okla 1977)
("[Clommon practical knowledge tells us that certain work in a bakery operation is not
attractive to females. This is a fact of life that an Act of Congress cannot overcome.")
(emphasis added). See also EEOC v Korn Industries, 17 FEP (BNA) 954, 959 (D SC 1978)
("There has been no showing that any female has ever wanted to work for the Hardwood
Division.... Although the plaintiff may call this stereotype female classification, the Court
has not seen females clamoring to work in such jobs . . ").
"' Although courts rejected the lack of interest argument in the overwhelming majority
of cases in which they acknowledged the employer's past discrimination, only a few of these
courts drew on the employer's history to explain women's present failure to apply. See, for
example, Chrapliwy v Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F Supp 252, 262 (N D Ind 1977). In most of these
cases, judges seemed to mention the employer's past discrimination only in passing.
131 See, for example, Catlett v Missouri Highway & Transportation Comm'n, 828 F2d
1260 (8th Cir 1987); Capaci v Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F2d 647 (5th Cir 1983). For a
discpssion of these cases, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1785-87 (cited in note 20).
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approach attributes the historical change in women's work aspira-
tions not to increased labor market opportunity, but to other un-
specified "societal" influences. Ultimately, this liberal approach
converges with the more conservative one, for neither acknowl-
edges the influence of historical labor market discrimination in
shaping women's contemporary work status.
The courts' different perspectives on the history and sources
of race and sex segregation may also have led to divergent treat-
ment of other types of evidence in race and sex discrimination
cases. In race discrimination cases, for example, direct or anecdotal
evidence of discrimination made little or no difference to the out-
come of the lack of interest argument. Yet, in sex discrimination
cases, it significantly increased plaintiffs' chance of prevailing. This
pattern is also consistent with the results of Schultz's earlier
study.140 In race discrimination cases, the courts refused to individ-
ualize the problem of discrimination. When employers tried to dis-
credit the statistical proof by pointing to plaintiffs' failure to pro-
duce direct or anecdotal evidence of discrimination, the courts held
that plaintiffs need not present individual instances of discrimina-
tion to refute employers' arguments that minorities lacked interest
in nontraditional work."' Courts simply presumed that if minori-
ties had always had the same work opportunities as whites, they
would not have chosen lower-paying, less desirable jobs. In sex dis-
crimination cases, by contrast, judges have insisted on direct or an-
ecdotal evidence of discrimination. While conservative judges have
stated explicitly that they will disregard statistical proof of segre-
gation without supplemental evidence that the employer discrimi-
nated against interested individuals, 42 even more liberal judges
have looked to such evidence to confirm that contemporary women
desire nontraditional jobs.143 Absent proof that the employer took
140 See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1774, 1793-99 (cited in note 20).
14 See note 113 and accompanying text.
142 See, for example, EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F Supp 1264, 1324-25 (N D Ill
1986) (rebuking the plaintiff for failing to introduce "even one witness who could credibly
testify that Sears discriminated against her" and concluding that the failure to produce such
individual testimony proved that the patterns of sex segregation revealed by the statistical
evidence reflected women's lack of interest rather than employer discrimination); Piva v
Xerox Corp., 654 F2d 591, 595 (9th Cir 1981); Gilbert v East Bay Municipal Dist., 19 FEP
(BNA) 304, 307 (N D Cal 1979).
"' See, for example, EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F2d 302, 362 (7th Cir 1988)
(Cudahy concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the EEOC's proof of
sex discrimination would have been stronger if it had produced "even a handful of witnesses
to testify that Sears had frustrated their childhood dreams of becoming commission sell-
ers") (emphasis added); Kohne v Imco Container Co., 480 F Supp 1015, 1027-28 (W D Va
1979) (citing the testimony of women employees to conclude that women "are or have been
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concrete actions to prevent individual women from realizing their
already-formed aspirations for such work, the courts have been re-
luctant to attribute sex segregation to employer discrimination.'44
A similar bias accounts for the courts' differential evaluation
of evidence of special efforts. In sex discrimination cases, employ-
ers' claims of special efforts to attract women to nontraditional
work decreased plaintiffs' chances of winning. In race discrimina-
tion cases, however, such evidence did not hurt plaintiffs, but
tended to help them. This pattern, too, is the same as the one that
emerged in Schultz's previous work.145 In the early era at least, the
courts imposed on employers with historically segregated
workforces an affirmative duty to attract minority workers to for-
merly segregated jobs. Judges evaluated employers' alleged efforts
to attract minorities skeptically, with an eye toward results.14 Be-
cause they believed that minorities' reluctance to seek traditionally
segregated jobs had been conditioned by employers' discriminatory
practices, judges presumed that this reluctance could be overcome
by employers' persistent efforts.147 In sex discrimination cases,
however, the courts' assumption that women's work aspirations are
forged through influences outside the labor market has led judges
to be more skeptical about the extent to which employers can in-
terest women in nontraditional work. Judges have tended to accept
uncritically employers' assertions that their special efforts to at-
interested in the spectrum of traditionally male jobs at the plant"); Ostapowicz v Johnson
Bronze Co., 369 F Supp 522, 537-38 (W D Pa 1973) (rel!ing on the fact that a number of
women had failed to opt out of the class to reject the lack of interest argument).
"' For a more complete discussion of the courts' reliance on anecdotal evidence in sex
discrimination cases, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1793-99 (cited in note 20).
See id at 1773-74, 1789-93.
'" Employers frequently tried to exonerate themselves by claiming that they had made
special efforts to recruit minorities into predominantly white jobs. Courts held that such
efforts, however laudable, did not absolve employers from liability. See, for example,
Parham v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F2d 421, 429 (8th Cir 1970); United States v
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F Supp 532, 549-50, 565-66 (W D NC 1971).
-'41 In case after case, courts condemned employers' efforts for "fall[ing] short of what is
necessary." United States v Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 416 F2d
123, 139 (8th Cir 1969). See also Jones v Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F2d 245, 248
(10th Cir 1970); United States v Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F2d 1038, 1044 (5th Cir 1969). This
approach was based on a belief that employers' efforts could ultimately make a difference.
This belief emerges powerfully from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Morrow v Crisler, 491
F2d 1053 (5th Cir 1974) (en banc). The court held that the relief granted by the district
court was inadequate to eliminate the effects of the Mississippi Highway Patrol's longstand-
ing history of racial discrimination. When the Patrol tried to justify its record by arguing
that it had hired every qualified African American who had applied to be a patrol officer,
the court stated: "If this be true, it is apparent that either the qualifications are discrimina-
tory in effect, or the State has not conducted a sufficient recruitment campaign to enlist
blacks who meet those requirements." Id at 1055-56.
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tract women failed, " 8 despite the fact that most employers' efforts
fell far short of what is encompassed even in a traditional affirma-
tive action plan.14 9
Evidence of formal recruiting also had different effects in race
and sex discrimination cases. In race discrimination cases, judges'
recognition that informal, word-of-mouth recruiting systems tend
to exclude minorities from the network of job information led
them to penalize employers who had not implemented formal
recruiting systems. Employers who failed to implement such sys-
tems were significantly less likely to convince judges that minori-
ties' underrepresentation was due to lack of interest, as the nega-
tive coefficients for this variable in the race models show.150 The
courts have not displayed the same concern about the exclusionary
effects of informal, word-of-mouth recruiting on women, how-
ever.151 Many judges have failed to recognize that even though so-
cial networks may be sexually integrated, male workers are far less
likely to share information about job opportunities with women
than with other men.152 Judges have also overlooked the fact that
"I See, for example, Ste. Marie v Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 650 F2d 395, 403 (2d Cir 1981);
Sears, 628 F Supp at 1292-94, 1306, 1324; Davis v City of Dallas, 483 F Supp 54, 61 (N D
Tex 1979).
19 See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1790 n 154 (cited in note 20) (stating that of the 21
claims of special efforts in sex discrimination cases, only seven involved written affirmative
action plans that appeared to include goals and timetables for women). Of course, not even
a written affirmative action plan guarantees that an employer is serious about trying to
integrate women into nontraditional work. In Parker v Siemens-Allis, Inc., the company's
official affirmative action plan included the following statement about why it was not dis-
criminatory to assign women to electrical work:
There are some things that appeal to the females such as: clean working conditions,
routine work, which once learned, gives the female the opportunity to plan the family
budget, menu and other responsibilities directly related to family ties.
601 F Supp 1377, 1385 (E D Ark 1985).
150 For examples of cases in which the courts rejected the lack of interest argument in
part because the employer had relied on an informal, word-of-mouth recruiting system, see
Stamps, 365 F Supp at 117 ("In light of [the company's] practice of friends-and-relatives
recruiting, its failure to advertise job opportunities generally, and its reputation of excluding
blacks, [it] cannot claim a lack of black applicants as a defense for its failure to hire
them."). See also Parham, 433 F2d at 426-27; Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F2d at 139; Central
Motor Lines, 338 F Supp at 558, 561-62.
"I For examples of cases in which the courts concluded that informal, word-of-mouth
recruiting does not tend to exclude women from the network of information about male-
dominated jobs, see Wilkins v University of Houston, 654 F2d 388, 400 (5th Cir 1981)
("[T]he obstacle of widespread segregation faced by potential black employees is not pre-
sent for women ... [W]e decline to assume that word-of-mouth recruiting ... operates to
isolate women from the web of information surrounding job opportunities . . ."); EEOC v
Service Container Corp., 19 FEP (BNA) 1614 (W D Okla 1976).
"' An extensive literature documents that male workers are more likely to share job
information with other men than with women. For this reason, men are more likely to se-
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an employer's reliance on informal, "old-boy" networks to recruit
new candidates may communicate to women a message of un-
welcomeness that discourages them from applying. 15 3 As a result,
in sex discrimination cases the courts have been no more likely to
reject the lack of interest argument from employers who relied on
word-of-mouth recruiting than from employers who used more for-
mal, open recruiting methods.
The courts have also evaluated employers' use of subjective se-
lection systems differently in sex and race discrimination cases. In
race discrimination cases, evidence that the employer relied on a
subjective selection system substantially increased plaintiffs'
chances of winning; the coefficient for this variable is large, posi-
tive and significant. Many judges were suspicious of employers who
failed to develop clear, objective hiring criteria, yet attributed that
dearth of minority applicants to minorities' own lack of interest in
the jobs. 54 The small and insignificant coefficient for this variable
in the full sex model suggests, however, that courts have failed to
exhibit the same suspicion in sex discrimination cases. In light of
the fact that subjective selection systems provide as much oppor-
tunity for sexual bias as for racial bias,155 the courts' failure to at-
tach importance to the nature of the selection process in sex dis-
crimination cases suggests that judges were simply less inclined to
perceive sex segregation as the product of potentially discrimina-
tory processes. 56
cure their jobs through personal contacts, while women are more likely to rely on formal
job-search methods. For a summary of this literature, see Patricia A. Roos and Barbara F.
Reskin, Institutional Factors Contributing to Sex Segregation in the Workplace, in Reskin,
ed, Sex Segregation in the Workplace at 235, 241-42, 245-46 (cited in note 2).
1"' For a more complete discussion of this point, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1812-
14 (cited in note 20).
1" See, for example, United States v N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F2d 354, 368-69 (8th
Cir 1973); Wade v Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 372 F Supp 126, 141 (N D
Miss 1974); Stamps v Detroit Edison Co., 365 F Supp 87, 111-13 (E D Mich 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 515 F2d 301 (6th Cir 1975).
165 See, for example, Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer, Uncertainty, Secrecy and
the Choice of Similar Others, 41 Soc Psych 246 (1978); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability:
The Neglected Social Context of Judgment and Choice, in L.L. Cummings and Barry M.
Staw, eds, Research in Organizational Behavior 297 (JAI Press, 1985).
161 See, for example, EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F2d 302, 331-32 (7th Cir 1988)
(distinguishing precedent that condemned the use of subjective selection processes, and af-
firming the district court's refusal to infer that such subjective processes facilitated sex dis-
crimination); Durant v Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 656 F2d 89 (5th Cir 1981) (same).
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2. The characteristics of the parties.
The results for the variables that pertain to the parties' status
also suggest that the courts have relied on different assumptions
when assessing the lack of interest argument in sex and race dis-
crimination cases. In race discrimination cases, plaintiffs who
sought access to blue-collar work were significantly more likely to
win on the lack of interest argument than plaintiffs who sought
access to white-collar work; the coefficients for this variable are
large and significant in the race models. In sex discrimination
cases, however, the opposite was true. Plaintiffs were slightly more
likely to win in cases involving white-collar work than in cases in-
volving blue-collar work (though not significantly so). These results
suggest that the courts have acted on common stereotypes about
the types of work that are appropriate for women and minorities.
Schultz's earlier study showed that judges have tended to accept
popular images of blue-collar work as "heavy," "dirty," and "mas-
culine," while envisioning white-collar work as "light," "clean,"
and "feminine. '157 Thus, in sex discrimination cases, the courts
may have been less willing to accept employers' arguments that
women lack interest in white-collar work, because they associated
such work with femininity. " " Conversely, in race discrimination
cases, judges may have been less willing to believe that minorities
lack interest in blue-collar jobs, because popular stereotypes depict
blue-collar and manual labor as suitable for minorities (particu-
larly minority males).1 59 These attitudes parallel larger changes in
the economy. Since Title VII's enactment, women have made
greater strides in integrating white-collar employment, while mi-
nority men have made greater strides in integrating blue-collar
employment.160
See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1801-02 (cited in note 20).
In her study of federal district court cases alleging sex discrimination in employ-
ment, Mills offered a similar explanation for her finding that female plaintiffs had higher
success rates in cases involving white-collar work than in cases involving blue-collar work.
As she observed, a class bias was long evident in federal affirmative action programs, in
which the government did not begin enforcing affirmative action guidelines to integrate
women into blue-collar occupations until the late 1970s. See Mills, 24 Pac Soc Rev at 207
(cited in note 77).
"I See, for example, Christine G. Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers to Equal-
ity for Faculty Women, 16 U C Davis L Rev 975, 982-83 (1983) (arguing that judges readily
understand Title VII cases in which Black men seek access to blue-collar jobs).
10 Compare James J. Heckman and J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employ-
ment Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 Yale L & Policy Rev 276, 284 (1990)
(summarizing research which shows that since 1965, "the largest movements of black work-
ers into new and higher paying occupations came in unskilled and low skill blue collar job
1992] 1129
The University of Chicago Law Review
The government defendant variable also had opposite effects
in sex and race discrimination cases. In race discrimination cases,
plaintiffs fared far better in cases against government employers
than in cases against private employers; the coefficient is large,
positive, and significant. Yet, in sex discrimination cases, the pat-
tern reverses: plaintiffs are more likely to win cases against private
employers. Although we have no straightforward explanation for
these results, it seems plausible that courts have imposed on gov-
ernment employers a greater responsibility to redress racial segre-
gation in employment than sexual segregation. A bias in this direc-
tion would be consistent with constitutional standards, which
require government agencies to satisfy more stringent standards to
justify racial disparities than sexual disparities in general. 61
Among all the variables pertaining to the parties, only the gov-
ernment plaintiff variable had similar effects in sex and race dis-
crimination cases. In both groups of cases, government plaintiffs
were slightly less likely than private plaintiffs to prevail on the
lack of interest argument, after controlling for the evidence and
other case characteristics. Given that government enforcement at-
torneys are believed to enjoy advantages over private attorneys,
this pattern and its explanation may be unique to cases addressing
the lack of interest defense. To many judges, the fact that local
women and minorities were willing to initiate their own private
class actions may have signalled a higher level of interest in the
jobs than if the lawsuit had been brought by remote federal gov-
ernment attorneys. In fact, some judges relied on plaintiffs' in-
volvement in the class to reject employers' arguments that women
were not interested in nontraditional jobs.162 Other judges chas-
tised EEOC attorneys in stern terms that border on accusations of
classifications such as manufacturing operatives") (emphasis in original), with Beller,
Trends in Occupational Segregation at 19 (cited in note 2) (documenting that women's
gains were "most pronounced among the white-collar occupations, especially professional
and managerial, [but] little or no change occurred among the blue-collar occupations"); and
Reskin and Roos, Job Queues, Gender Queues at 16-20 (cited in note 83) (reporting similar
findings).
"I' In Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause cases, courts evaluate govern-
ment actions that treat the races differently under a standard of strict scrutiny. See, for
example, Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 11
(1967). By contrast, courts evaluate government actions that treat the sexes differently
under a less stringent standard that has become known as intermediate or "heightened"
scrutiny. See, for example, Mississippi Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 721 (1982);
Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57, 69-70 (1981); Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 204 (1976).
'6' See Ostapowicz, 369 F Supp at 537-38 (relying on the fact that a number of women
had not opted out of the class to support the proposition that women did have interest in
the work at issue).
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"stirring up trouble" by bringing sex discrimination suits where lo-
cal women had little desire for nontraditional work.163
3. Doctrinal framework.
Our regressions confirm that plaintiffs fare better in disparate
impact cases than in disparate treatment cases. Other factors being
equal, the courts' use of a disparate impact analysis increased
plaintiffs' chances of winning in both sex and race discrimination
cases. This effect was more pronounced in sex discrimination cases,
however. Although we have no clear explanation for this discrep-
ancy, one interpretation is consistent with the results for the other
variables. If a disparate impact analysis helped sex discrimination
plaintiffs more than race discrimination plaintiffs, the converse is
also true: a disparate treatment analysis harmed sex discrimination
plaintiffs more than race discrimination plaintiffs. This means that
in disparate treatment cases, the courts were less willing to attri-
bute sex segregation to intentional discrimination by the employer.
Thus, the results for this variable may reflect the same sort of bias
that affected judges' responses to the evidence and other facts.
4. Court level.
We also examined the effect of court level on the outcomes of
the cases. The first panel of Table 5 (Panel A) shows plaintiffs'
success rates in district court cases that were not appealed (column
2), in district court cases that were appealed (column 3), and in the
resulting group of appellate cases (column 4). The second panel
(Panel B) shows what percentage of appellate court decisions re-
versed district court judgments for plaintiffs (column 2), for em-
ployers (column 3), and for both parties combined (column 4).
103 See, for example, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F Supp 1264, 1324-25 (N D Ill
1986) (berating the EEOC attorneys for "turn[ing] a blind eye to reality" in assuming that
women sales applicants were as interested as men in higher-paying commission sales jobs,
and for failing "to produce even one witness who could credibly testify that Sears discrimi-
nated against her"); EEOC v Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F Supp 1, 4 (W D Okla 1977) (berating
the EEOC attorneys for "refus[ing] to accept the facts of life about work in a bakery" and
remarking that had they done so, "their statistics would have been answered on a basis
other than sex").
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TABLE 5: Plaintiffs' Success Rates in District Court and Court of
Appeals Cases, and Reversal Rates in Court of Appeals,
By Race and Sex
A. Plaintiffs' Success Rates
District Court District Court Court of
Cases Cases Appeals
(Not Appealed) (Appealed) Cases
Race 74.2% (23/31) 25.0% (8/32) 68.8% (22/32)
Sex 57.1% (20/35) 26.3% (5/19) 57.9% (11/19)
B. Reversal Rates in Courts of Appeals,
by Party Who Won in District Court
P Won Below D Won Below Total
Race 50.0% (4/8) 75.0% (18/24) 68.8% (22/32)
Sex 40.0% (2/5) 57.1% (8/14) 52.6% (10/19)
Sex discrimination plaintiffs had lower success rates than race
discrimination plaintiffs in both non-appealed district court deci-
sions and court of appeals decisions. Race discrimination plaintiffs
won 74.2 percent of the district court cases and 68.8 percent of the
court of appeals cases; sex discrimination plaintiffs won 57.1 per-
cent of the district court cases and 57.9 percent of the court of
appeals cases. In appealed district court cases, however, both race
and sex discrimination plaintiffs had experienced much less suc-
cess; race discrimination plaintiffs won only 25 percent, and sex
discrimination plaintiffs won only 26.3 percent of such cases. Thus,
the appellate courts were helpful to both groups of plaintiffs.
Although the courts of appeals helped race and sex discrimi-
nation plaintiffs, they helped race discrimination plaintiffs more.164
Unlike other studies that have found that courts of appeals tend to
affirm trial court decisions, 165 Table 5 reveals that in cases address-
' When we added a variable to test for the influence of the court of appeals to our full
sex model, the coefficient for the court of appeals variable turned out to be small, positive
and insignificant (Beta = 0.434 and t-ratio = 0.518). In an analogous model for the race
cases, the court of appeals coefficient was much larger, though still insignificant (Beta =
1.307 and t-ratio = 0.854). In both of these models, adding the court of appeals variable did
not substantially alter the results for the other variables.
165 See, for example, Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Per-
ceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U Chi L Rev 501, 517-18 (1989); Wheeler, et al,
21 Law & Soc Rev at 406-07 (cited in note 105).
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ing the lack of interest argument the courts of appeals have tended
to reverse lower-court decisions. The appellate courts reversed rul-
ings against race discrimination plaintiffs at disproportion-
ately-and remarkably-high rates. Whereas the courts of appeals
reversed 57.1 percent of all district court rulings against plaintiffs
in sex discrimination cases, they reversed a phenomenal 75 percent
of district court rulings against plaintiffs in race discrimination
cases. In race discrimination cases, the courts of appeals were three
times more likely to reverse rulings against plaintiffs than rulings
against employers; in sex discrimination cases, they were only two
times more likely to do so.
These results are consistent with the courts' overall differences
in approach to race and sex discrimination cases. At least in the
early days of Title VII enforcement, the courts of appeals dis-
played extraordinary zeal to ensure that trial judges did not frus-
trate Title VII by attributing racial segregation to minorities' own
lack of interest in higher-paying jobs. That appellate judges dis-
played less fervor for reversing rulings against plaintiffs in sex dis-
crimination cases suggests that they were less likely to perceive sex
segregation as a serious form of discrimination that demanded
dismantling.
5. Summary and implications.
Our analyses strongly suggest that the courts have imported
gender bias into their resolution of the lack of interest argument.
Neither the underlying activity nor the selection effects explana-
tion adequately explains why sex discrimination plaintiffs have
prevailed less frequently than race discrimination plaintiffs. The
underlying activity explanation is based on the dubious empirical
premise that sex discrimination in employment has been less per-
vasive than race discrimination since 1965. The selection effects
explanation hypothesizes that because different factors governed
the selection of filed race and sex discrimination cases for litiga-
tion, a greater proportion of the sex discrimination cases (including
a greater proportion of sex discrimination cases that were strong
for plaintiffs) settled before trial. The ABF data suggest, however,
that the selection processes for Title VII race and sex discrimina-
tion cases in which the lack of interest argument provides a poten-
tial defense have been very similar. In the ABF sample, the race
and sex discrimination cases were almost equally likely to settle
and to reach trial.
Contrary to the underlying activity and selection effects hy-
potheses, moreover, our analyses suggest that the sex discrimina-
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tion cases were not weaker for plaintiffs to a degree sufficient to
account for sex discrimination plaintiffs' lower success rates. As
noted earlier, our analyses do not control for the persuasive quality
of the evidence within each category beyond a certain minimal
threshold. Although one might argue that the persuasive quality of
the evidence offered by sex discrimination plaintiffs was suffi-
ciently weaker than that offered by race discrimination plaintiffs to
explain the disparity, this argument is implausible. Our logits re-
vealed that the courts have given all five types of evidence the op-
posite effects in race and sex discrimination cases. To attribute
these results to differences in the quality of the evidence, one must
assume that for each of the five types of evidence analyzed, the
persuasiveness of the proof presented by sex discrimination plain-
tiffs was so much weaker than that presented by race discrimina-
tion plaintiffs that unbiased judges would have reacted by giving
that type of evidence a contrary effect on the outcome. Thus, for
example, sex discrimination plaintiffs' evidence of past discrimina-
tion would have to have been so unpersuasive that unbiased judges
regarded it as actually harming plaintiffs' cases-even though the
identical evidence aided race discrimination plaintiffs. Even if one
were willing to accept such heroic assumptions about the evidence,
this would still not explain why the courts responded to three of
the four non-evidentiary factors differently in race and sex dis-
crimination cases. The judicial bias explanation explains the
courts' responses better.
Taken as a whole, the courts' different responses to the evi-
dence create a more stringent legal standard for sex discrimination
plaintiffs to refute the lack of interest argument. Historically, race
discrimination plaintiffs have been able to overcome the lack of
interest argument by presenting evidence of historical segregation,
the lack of formal recruiting, and the use of a subjective selection
system. In sex discrimination cases, however, these types of evi-
dence have not helped plaintiffs. To overcome the lack of interest
argument, sex discrimination plaintiffs have been forced to present
direct or anecdotal evidence of discrimination-the equivalent of
"smoking gun" proof that the employer discriminated against al-
ready-interested women. In addition, judges have tended to accept
uncritically employers' allegations that their special efforts to at-
tract women to higher-paying jobs failed. These differences in the
courts' approaches to the evidence, as well as their responses to the
non-evidentiary factors, suggest that the courts have failed to treat
sex segregation in employment with the same seriousness as race
segregation.
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The differences in the courts' standards for evaluating the lack
of interest argument in sex and race discrimination cases remain
even after controlling for the effect of time on each group of cases.
Yet, as the coefficients for the date variable in Table 4 confirm,
time has not had the same effect in sex and race discrimination
cases. After controlling for the evidence and other case characteris-
tics, sex discrimination plaintiffs were somewhat more likely to win
on the lack of interest argument in the 1978-89 period than in the
1967-77 period. Race discrimination plaintiffs, however, were sub-
stantially less likely to win on this argument in the more recent
period. These results suggest that while courts may have "soft-
ened" their approach toward sex discrimination plaintiffs, they
have "hardened" their approach toward race discrimination plain-
tiffs. The next Section examines the reasons for race discrimina-
tion plaintiffs' declining success.
III. THE CHANGE IN PERCEPTIONS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION ON
THE JOB: JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE LACK OF INTEREST DEFENSE
IN RACE DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE EARLY AND MODERN ERAS
A. Alternative Theoretical Explanations for the Decline in
Success Rates
The familiar judicial bias and weaker evidence theories pro-
vide potential explanations for the decline in race discrimination
plaintiffs' success rates. Just as biased attitudes led judges to treat
sex discrimination plaintiffs less favorably than race discrimination
plaintiffs in the aggregate group of cases, so too, a shift in judicial
attitudes may have led judges to treat race discrimination plain-
tiffs less favorably in more recently decided cases. If, after an ini-
tial period of vigorous Title VII enforcement, federal judges began
to believe that racial employment discrimination was no longer a
serious problem, alternative explanations for remaining patterns of
racial segregation may have become more appealing. The lack of
interest defense would have provided an alternative interpretation
of segregation that resonated with popular attitudes about the
sources of minorities' economic disadvantage. Alternatively, plain-
tiffs' success rates may have declined because their cases became
weaker over time. The courts may have continued to apply the
same pro-plaintiff standards in the modern period, but judges
ruled against plaintiffs more frequently because their cases pro-
vided a weaker refutation of the lack of interest argument.
The underlying activity theory provides one explanation for
why the race discrimination cases may have been weaker in the
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modern period than in the earlier era. According to this explana-
tion, racial discrimination was prevalent and blatant during the
early era of Title VII enforcement. Over time, however, as employ-
ers have changed their practices, racial discrimination has become
less pervasive and, as a result, race discrimination cases have be-
come weaker and more difficult to win. As one scholar expressed it,
"[S]econd generation cases are different. [Their] facts... arose in
the 1970s, after employers and unions had implemented changes.
The discrimination pattern is no longer so clear. . . . Plaintiffs'
cases are therefore less substantial, and less winnable under any
standard." 166 Thus, in the modern era, "employers may [have] pre-
vail[ed] in a greater number of cases because the extent of discrim-
ination has been reduced. 1 67
Although this is a popular explanation for declining success in
the courts, it contains an important leap of logic. Even if racial
discrimination declined substantially over time, this would not
necessarily imply that race discrimination plaintiffs filed weaker
cases in the more recent period. As noted in our earlier discussion
of the underlying activity theory, a number of complex processes
intervene between the experience of discrimination and the deci-
sion to litigate. There is evidence, for example, that victims of em-
ployment discrimination have found it increasingly difficult to se-
cure legal representation since the late 1970s.11" It has also become
more difficult for lawyers to bring class action lawsuits since
then. '9 As a result of these new pressures, in the modern period,
minorities may have been able to obtain lawyers and to initiate
class actions only in circumstances involving evidence and facts
that were at least as strong as those presented in the earlier cases.
Furthermore, the types of racial discrimination associated
with job segregation may not have declined since the late 1970s to
a degree that accounts for the sizeable decrease in plaintiffs' suc-
cess rates. Although there has been progress in eliminating racial
16 Blumrosen, 6 Indus Rel L J at 347 (cited in note 37)_
167 Id.
108 See, for example, Holmes, NY Times at Al (cited in note 93); Janet Sanders, Title
VII: The Boom is Over, Natl L J 1 (May 28, 1979); Steel, The Nation at 362 (cited in note
93); Ray Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff's Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation: A
Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 Labor Law 63 (1989).
109 For evidence that class action employment discrimination suits have declined dra-
matically between 1975 and 1989, see Donohue and Siegelman, 43 Stan L Rev at 1019-21
(cited in note 59). For a description of the changes in judicial doctrine that have made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to initiate Title VII class actions, see Judith Johnson, Rebuilding
the Barriers: The Trend in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 19 Colum Hum Rts
L Rev 1 (1987).
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segregation over the past twenty-five years, the biggest advances
occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.170 Recent evidence sug-
gests that this progress stagnated in the late 1970s. 117 Since then,
African Americans have made little advancement into higher-pay-
ing occupations, particularly upper-level white-collar employ-
ment.172 Although employers may have eliminated many of the
most overt forms of discrimination, evidence shows that they con-
tinue to discriminate. 17  A 1991 study by the Urban Institute
found, for example, that Chicago and Washington, D.C. employers
favored white job seekers over equally qualified African Americans
approximately twenty percent of the time. 174 Braddock and
McPartland's 1983 national survey found that most employers con-
tinue to use informal recruiting practices that draw on racially seg-
regated social networks. African Americans who rely on such segre-
gated networks are more likely to end up in low-paying, segregated
jobs than those who have access to more integrated networks. 75 In
addition, the survey disclosed that many employers evaluate indi-
vidual minority candidates on the basis of negative group stereo-
types. As a result, African Americans tend to be excluded from
jobs believed to require academic skills in reading and math, quick
learning, and good judgment. 7
A controversy exists about the extent to which legal regulation
prompted the early progress toward eliminating job segregation
that occurred in Title VII's wake.'. To those who believe that the
law contributed significantly to desegregation, the direction of cau-
170 See Heckman and Verkerke, 8 Yale L & Policy Rev at 282-83 (cited in note 160)
(summarizing the relevant research and concluding that the "rate of black progress acceler-
ated between 1965 and 1975, [and] then levelled off").
171 See Farley and Allen, The Color Line at 274, 277-80 (cited in note 2); Bound and
Freeman, Black Economic Progress at 41, 45-46 (cited in note 2); Malveaux and Wallace,
Minority Women in the Workplace at 273-85 (cited in note 2).
171 See, for example, Farley and Allen, The Color Line at 271-74 (cited in note 2);
Bound and Freeman, Black Economic Progress at 45-46 (cited in note 2); Donohue and
Siegelman, 43 Stan L Rev at 1010 (cited in note 59). See also Jonathan S. Leonard, The
Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employ-
ment, 4 J Econ Persp 47, 58 (Fall 1990) (reporting that in the 1970s, affirmative action
regulations led federal contractors to provide greater job opportunities for minorities than
non-regulated contractors; in the 1980s, however, this pattern reversed itself).
1l See, for example, Kirschenman and Neckerman, The Meaning of Race for Employ-
ers at 203.04 (cited in note 24); Braddock and McPartland, 43 J Soc Issues at 5, 6-24 (cited
in note 38).
174 See Turner, Fix, and Struyk, Opportunities Denied at 61 (cited in note 38).
See Braddock and McPartland, 43 J Soc Issues at 7-9, 11 (cited in note 38).
170 See id at 14-17.
17' For two recent overviews of this controversy, see John J. Donohue III and James J.
Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the
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sation in the underlying activity explanation may be reversed. The
substantial decline in plaintiffs' success rates in race discrimina-
tion cases may not reflect a decrease in the level of employment
discrimination against minorities since the late 1970s.11 8 Instead,
race discrimination plaintiffs' lower success rates may reflect a
shift toward a less favorable legal climate, which has itself contrib-
uted to the lack of progress toward dismantling job segregation
since that time.11' Ironically, the early advances toward greater ra-
cial equality may have contributed to this development. If the visi-
ble signs of increased opportunities for minorities led judges to be-
lieve that racial discrimination had largely been eliminated, they
may have become more inclined to interpret remaining patterns of
job segregation as the expression of minorities' own lack of interest
in higher-paying jobs.
Before inferring that judicial attitudes and standards have be-
come less favorable to race discrimination plaintiffs, however, one
must also consider the possibility that the .decline in their success
rates is attributable to a change in the types of cases selected for
litigation. As our earlier discussion of selection effects indicated,
the lower success rates in race discrimination cases may signal a
change in the parties' relative stakes or sophistication rather than
a change in the legal standards. If employers' stakes or ability to
predict case outcomes increased substantially relative to plaintiffs'
between the 1967-77 and 1978-89 periods, this could help explain
why race discrimination plaintiffs were less successful in the mod-
ern period. According to the selection effects literature, an increase
in employers' relative stakes or abilities would have led them to
offer more to settle race discrimination cases, especially cases that
were particularly strong for plaintiffs. The resultant pool of claims
Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J Econ Literature 1603 (1991); and Heckman and Verkerke,
8 Yale L & Policy Rev at 286-91 (cited in note 160).
178 Donohue and Siegelman's recent analysis of the number of charges of hiring dis-
crimination filed with the EEOC between 1966 and 1986 may provide some support for the
proposition that racial discrimination in hiring has not declined dramatically since the late
1970s. According to their chart, the number of hiring discrimination charges fell between
1977 and 1979, but rose fairly steadily thereafter. By 1986, the number of charges had risen
to a level approaching the peak 1976 level. See Donohue and Siegelman, 43 Stan L Rev at
1016, Figure 6 (cited in note 59). Their analysis is not limited to charges of racial discrimi-
nation in hiring, however, but includes charges of discrimination in hiring on all legally
protected grounds (including sex, national origin, religion, and age). It is possible that the
aggregate trends they report do not hold true for charges of racial discrimination in hiring
alone.
179 See, for example, Bound and Freeman, Black Economic Progress at 46-47 (cited in
note 2); Farley and Allen, The Color Line at 281 (cited in note 2); Leonard, 4 J Econ Persp
at 58 (cited in note 172).
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that were litigated in the more recent period would have been
weaker and less winnable than the earlier cases even under the
same legal standards. As a result, plaintiffs would have experienced
lower success rates in the more recent period. 180
This explanation raises an important issue. Why would em-
ployers' relative stakes in race discrimination cases challenging job
segregation have increased so substantially since the late 1970s? It
is difficult to see, for example, why employers would have become
more concerned about the damage to their reputations in the 1978-
89 period than they were in the 1967-77 period. It seems equally
plausible that any stigma associated with an accusation of discrim-
ination would have waned over time, as increasing numbers of em-
ployers were held liable for employment discrimination. Although
an increased judicial willingness to order employers to restructure
their practices might have raised employers' relative stakes over
time, this explanation also seems implausible. In light of the seri-
ous legal and political challenges to affirmative action that began
in the late 1970s, it seems likely that the courts have ordered such
relief less frequently, not more frequently, in the 1978-89 period.
There is one plausible set of explanations for why employers'
relative stakes might have increased in the 1978-89 period. As dis-
cussed earlier, the literature suggests that government agencies
and attorneys may have greater stakes or greater legal sophistica-
tion than their private counterparts. If this is true, a decrease in
the proportion of race discrimination suits initiated by the govern-
ment over time might have reduced plaintiffs' overall stakes or so-
phistication, with the result of raising employers' relative stakes or
sophistication. An increase in the proportion of suits against gov-
ernment defendants might have led to a similar result. Our data
set reflects both of these phenomena. 81 In addition, although the
150 For an analogous explanation of how selection effects might account for declining
success rates in other types of civil cases, see James A. Henderson, Jr. and Theodore Eisen-
berg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 37 UCLA L Rev 479, 504 (1990) (discuss-
ing selection effects in the context of product liability suits).
181 In our data set, 46.5% of the early race discrimination cases involved the federal
government as plaintiff, compared to only 10.0% of the modern race discrimination cases. In
addition, only 16.3% of the early race discrimination cases involved government employers,
compared to 30.0% of the modern race discrimination cases. See Table 6. Because our data
set involves published litigated cases, however, it is possible that these changes are attribu-
table to the same sort of selection effects under consideration. If, for example, plaintiffs
were equally likely to file suit against government employers in the early and more recent
periods, but cases against such employers were more likely to be tried or published in the
more recent period, our data set would show a higher level of government employer repre-
sentation among the more recent cases. Thus, the ABF data set provides a more appropriate
basis for determining whether such changes occurred.
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ABF sample includes too few cases involving government plaintiffs
to test the first trend,182 the sample reflects the second trend.
Among filed race discrimination cases in which the lack of interest
argument was a potential defense, the proportion of cases involving
government employers rose from 22.2 percent (10 out of 45) of
those filed between 1972 and 1977 to 33.3 percent (5 out of 15) of
those filed between 1978 and 1987.
Other data from the ABF sample, however, suggest that selec-
tion effects do not account for the decline in race discrimination
plaintiffs' success rates. According to the selection effects explana-
tion, race discrimination plaintiffs' success rates declined because
employers began to settle a greater proportion of race discrimina-
tion cases, including a disproportionate number of cases that were
strong for plaintiffs. In the ABF sample, however, race discrimina-
tion cases actually became slightly less likely to settle in the more
recent period. Whereas 53.3 percent (20 out of 45) of the race dis-
crimination cases filed between 1972 and 1977 settled, only 46.7
percent (7 out of 15) of the race discrimination cases filed between
1978 and 1987 settled. The more recent race discrimination cases
were less likely to reach trial: 15.6 percent (7 out of 45) of the cases
filed in the earlier period reached trial, while only 6.7 percent (1
out of 15) of the cases filed in the more recent period did so. This
result did not occur because the more recent race discrimination
cases were more likely to settle, however, but because the courts
were more likely to grant pre-trial motions dismissing them on the
merits. In the early period, the courts granted such motions in only
11.1 percent (5 out of 45) of the cases, as compared to 26.7 percent
(4 out of 15) of the recent cases. 8 ' Thus, plaintiffs experienced de-
clining success at the pre-trial motion stage as well as the trial
stage.
To the extent that these trends from the small ABF sample
accurately represent trends among all filed race discrimination
cases in which the lack of interest argument was a potential de-
182 There is only one race discrimination case involving a government plaintiff in the
ABF sample.
183 The category of cases dismissed on the merits before trial includes cases dismissed
on summary judgment, cases dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted, and cases dismissed for other non-procedural reasons. In addition to being settled,
tried, or dismissed on the merits, some cases were dropped by plaintiffs and, in others, the
disposition was unknown. In the 1972-77 period, 24 cases settled, seven reached trial, five
were dismissed on the merits, eight were dropped, and the remaining case was of unknown
disposition. In the 1978-87 period, seven cases settled, one reached trial, four were dismissed
on the merits, two were dropped, and the remaining case was of unknown disposition.
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fense, the trends undermine the selection effects explanation. Even
accounting for settlement rates and assuming that settlements
benefitted plaintiffs, race discrimination plaintiffs fared worse in
the modern period than in the earlier period. In the more recent
period, employers have not pushed to settle more cases, but in-
stead have contested and won more cases on pre-trial motions.
That the courts have dismissed more cases before trial may suggest
that they adopted legal standards that are less favorable to plain-
tiffs than their earlier standards. 4
As noted earlier, however, both a shift toward less favorable
judicial attitudes and a shift toward weaker cases could have con-
tributed to the decline in race discrimination plaintiffs' success
rates. The next Section attempts to sort out these explanations by
evaluating the relative strength of early and modern race discrimi-
nation cases in our data set. Our methodology is similar to that
employed in our earlier comparison of the strength of the race and
sex discrimination cases.
B. A Comparison of the Content of Early and Modern Race
Discrimination Cases
To sort out the causes of the decline in plaintiffs' success rates
in race discrimination cases, we first assume that the courts did
not alter their approach to the lack of interest argument. We then
analyze the proportion of the decline that may be accounted for by
shifts in the content of the cases alone. Columns two and three of
Table 6 show the means (or the percentage of cases in which that
factor was present) for the evidence and other independent vari-
ables in race discrimination cases decided in the 1967-77 and 1978-
89 periods, respectively.
To evaluate the importance of the changes in the composition
of the cases over time, we conducted a decomposition analysis,
which quantifies the amount of the decline in plaintiffs' success
rates that may be attributed to changes in the means for each vari-
able. The last column of Table 6 shows the percentage of the de-
cline that can be explained by changes in the means for each varia-
ble, assuming that the effect of the variables on plaintiffs'
likelihood of winning remained constant across both time periods.
Because the degree to which the change in a variable contributed
1"' See Henderson and Eisenberg, 37 UCLA L Rev at 530-32 (cited in note 180) (sug-
gesting that if a decline in plaintiffs' success in products liability cases is attributable to a
shift toward new, more pro-defendant legal standards, one would expect an increase in the
rate at which district courts dismiss cases on pre-trial motions).
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to the decrease in success rates is a function of both the difference
in the mean for the variable across periods and the effect of that
variable on case outcome, the analysis weights the difference in va-
riable means across periods with the coefficients from our earlier
full logit model for the race cases (Table 4, column 2).lss A positive
percentage indicates that the shift in the mean for the variable
contributed to the decline in plaintiffs' success; the larger the
value, the greater the proportion of the decline that is accounted
for by the shift in the mean for that variable.
186 The percentages in column three were calculated in two steps. First, we calculated
the components of change by subtracting the variable means for the 1967-77 period from
the variable means for the 1978-89 period. Then we weighted these differences by the corre-
sponding logit coefficient from Table 4, column 2. The component of change for the evi-
dence of past discrimination variable, for example, is equal to (0.550 - 0.884) x 2.405 =
-0.803. Second, to calculate the percentage of the decline in success rates attributable to
changes in the means of the variables across periods, we divided the component of change
figures by the total change across periods in the predicted log odds of plaintiffs' success (the
sum of the components of change). The total estimated change of the log odds is equal to
-4.129, so the proportion of the decline in plaintiffs' success rate that can be accounted for
by the decline in the percentage of cases in which evidence of past discrimination is present,
for instance, is equal to -0.803/-4.129 = .194 or 19.4 percent.
For an example of a similar decomposition analysis which uses the coefficients from
logistic regressions to compute the components of change in marriage rates between 1960
and 1980 for different ages, races, and sexes, see Robert D. Mare and Christopher Winship,
Socioeconomic Change and the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites, in Jencks and
Peterson, eds, The Urban Underclass at 175, 201-02 (cited in note 24).
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TABLE 6: Variables Means for Early and Modern Race Discrimination Cases
and Decomposition of Change in Success Rates Attributable to
Changes in Variables
Variables Variable Means Decomposition
1967-1977 1977-1989 Percentage of
(n=43) (n=20) the Decline in
Success Rates
Accounted for
by Changes in
Variable Mean
Evidence of Past
Discrimination 88.4% 55.0% 19.4%
Direct or Anecdotal
Evidence 62.8% 55.0% -0.3%
Special Efforts 41.9% 20.0% 8.8%
Formal Recruiting 11.6% 20.0% 8.8%
Subjective Selection System 69.8% 60.0% 6.7%
Percentage of Decline
Accounted for by Changes
in the Evidence 43.4%
Blue-Collar Work 90.7% 70.0% 15.8%
Government Plaintiff 46.5% 10.0% -6.9%
Government Defendant 16.3% 30.0% -14.5%
Disparate Impact Analysis 88.4% 25.0% 16.6%
Percentage of Decline
Accounted for by Changes
in Non-Evidentiary Factors 11.0%
Unexplained Decline 45.6%
Total 100.0%
Assuming that judges continued to evaluate the evidence the
same way in the early and modern periods, the evidentiary
strength of race discrimination cases has weakened somewhat over
time. The most significant shift occurred in connection with evi-
dence of past discrimination: plaintiffs were far less likely to intro-
duce this type of evidence in the 1978-89 period than in the 1967-
11431992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
77 period. This change does not seem surprising. To the extent
that employers tended to eliminate the more blatant forms of dis-
crimination in the late 1960s and early 1970s, fewer employers may
have had recent histories of extreme segregation in the modern pe-
riod. Plaintiffs may have had to go back farther in time to uncover
such patterns. Not only would such remote patterns be more diffi-
cult to document; judges would probably perceive the patterns as
less probative than more recent records of discrimination. As a re-
sult, plaintiffs may have become less likely to proffer such evi-
dence. In addition, employers may have pushed harder to settle
cases in which plaintiffs had gathered evidence of past discrimina-
tion, because they realized that this evidence greatly strengthened
plaintiffs' likelihood of winning. To the extent that the courts have
continued to rely heavily on evidence of past discrimination to re-
ject the lack of interest argument, the reduced incidence of this
type of evidence would have weakened plaintiffs' chances of pre-
vailing in the modern period considerably. In our decomposition
analyses, this factor contributed more than any other factor to the
decline in plaintiffs' success rate, accounting for 19.4 percent of the
decline. °
Interestingly, in the more recent period, employers were less
likely to claim that they had made special efforts to attract minori-
ties. To those who believe employers have become more committed
to affirmative action with the passage of time, this result may seem
surprising. As noted earlier, however, it is possible that employers
who are sued do not represent all employers. Employers who failed
to implement affirmative action measures may have been consid-
ered easier targets for lawsuits in the modern period. s18 In addi-
tion, given that claims of special efforts tended to arouse judicial
suspicion in the early period, employers may have realized over
time that this evidence was not worth pursuing. Instead, they may
have turned their attention to producing evidence of formal
recruiting, which was present in a greater proportion of the more
recent cases. In our earlier logit results, evidence of formal recruit-
ing significantly improved employers' chances of winning (Table 4,
row 5, columns 2 and 4), while claims of special efforts had the
opposite effect (Table 4, row 4, columns 2 and 4). Thus, perhaps
ironically, employers could enhance their prospects of prevailing
18' Conversely, in the earlier period, larger employers may have been targeted by the
government or civil rights organizations for purposes of demonstration. See Jonathan S. Le-
onard, The Effectiveness of Equal Employment Law and Affirmative Action Regulation, 8
Res in Lab Econ 319, 340-41 (1986).
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by backing off their allegations of affirmative action measures and
beefing up their allegations of neutral recruiting measures. In our
decomposition, each of these shifts contributed equally (8.8 per-
cent) toward the decline in plaintiffs' success.
The remaining evidence variables manifested only minor dif-
ferences across time periods. The more recent cases were slightly
less likely to involve subjective selection systems than the earlier
cases. Assuming that the employers' use of subjective criteria con-
tinued to strengthen the inference of discrimination in the more
recent era, the shift toward more objective systems contributed a
modest 6.7 percent of the decline in plaintiffs' success rates. The
more recent cases were also slightly less likely to involve direct or
anecdotal evidence of discrimination than the earlier cases. Be-
cause the courts attach so little significance to this type of evidence
in race discrimination cases, plaintiffs may have decided to forego
the trouble and expense of compiling this proof. In fact, in our
logit models, direct or anecdotal evidence tended to decrease
plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing in race discrimination cases
rather than increasing it. Insofar as this evidence continued to
have a negative effect, its reduced incidence served to strengthen
rather than weaken the more recent race discrimination cases.
The variables relating to the parties showed some substantial
changes across time periods. Federal government participation on
the side of plaintiffs plummeted in the 1978-89 period. This result
is consistent with the trend for published appellate employment
discrimination cases, in which the proportion of race discrimina-
tion cases initiated by the federal government has declined sub-
stantially over time.187 Perhaps the federal government shifted its
focus away from classwide race discrimination cases in the late
1970s or early 1980s;lss evidence shows that the Reagan adminis-
tration backed away from the previous federal commitment to dis-
mantling racial segregation.18 9 Our logit analysis revealed that
other factors being equal, government plaintiffs fared slightly
187 In Burstein's study of all federal appellate employment discrimination cases pub-
lished between 1965 and 1985, federal government participation in race discrimination cases
declined steadily over time. See Burstein, 96 Am J Soc at 1217-18 (cited in note 75).
I See id at 1218 ("Perhaps the federal government focused special efforts in the early
years on race discrimination cases and major 'pattern or practice' cases .... but has shifted
its focus in recent years.").
"I See, for example, Leonard, 4 J Econ Persp at 58-59 (cited in note 172); Majority
Staff of HR Committee on Education and Labor, A Report on the Investigation of the Civil
Rights Enforcement Activities of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs,
U.S. Department of Labor, HR Rep No 100-R, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 40-41, 53-55 (1987).
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worse than private plaintiffs in cases addressing the lack of interest
argument (Table 4, row 8, column 2). Thus, perhaps counter-intui-
tively, if the courts continued to react negatively to government
enforcement agencies across both time periods, the reduced pres-
ence of the federal government as a plaintiff would have increased
rather than decreased plaintiffs' likelihood of winning in the more
recent period.
While the level of government plaintiff participation de-
creased, the level of government defendant involvement increased
over time. As we noted earlier, this same trend appears in the ABF
sample, which makes it doubtful that the increased involvement of
government employers in our data set is attributable to selection
effects. In our logit models, after controlling for the content of the
cases, plaintiffs fared significantly better against government em-
ployers than against private employers (Table 4, row 9, columns 2
and 4). Assuming that this effect continued into the 1978-89 pe-
riod, the increased presence of government employers would have
substantially improved plaintiffs' prospects of winning in the more
recent period.
These gains for plaintiffs were offset by shifts in the nature of
the work. Race discrimination plaintiffs were far more likely to be
seeking white-collar work in the 1978-89 cases than in the 1967-77
cases. In our logit models, the courts were significantly more likely
to rule in favor of race discrimination plaintiffs in cases involving
blue-collar work than in cases involving white-collar work (Table 4,
row 7, columns 2 and 4). Once employers realized that the courts
were more likely to reject the lack of interest argument in blue-
collar cases than in white-collar cases, they may have begun to
make greater efforts to settle blue-collar cases. Alternatively, the
increased level of white-collar cases may reflect the larger patterns
of desegregation that occurred in the wake of Title VII. Because
African Americans and other minorities have made greater strides
in obtaining blue-collar jobs than white-collar jobs, they may have
begun to file suit more frequently to obtain the white-collar em-
ployment that has eluded them. Ironically, however, such a shift
would have contributed to minorities' declining success. Assuming
that the courts continued to respond less favorably to plaintiffs in
white-collar cases in the modern period, the increased level of
white-collar cases would have diminished plaintiffs' chances of
winning substantially. In our decomposition analysis, this shift ac-
counted for 15.8 percent of the decline in plaintiffs' success rates.
The shift away from disparate impact analysis produced the
second largest change in plaintiffs' success rates, accounting for
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16.6 percent of the decline. Use of a disparate impact analysis
dropped from an overwhelming 88.4 percent of the cases in the
early period to only 25 percent of the cases in the modern period.
This trend may be attributable in part to selection effects. If em-
ployers realized that a disparate impact framework benefitted
plaintiffs more than a disparate treatment framework, they may
have begun to offer more to settle cases that could be analyzed
under a disparate impact framework. The decline in disparate im-
pact cases probably also reflects changes in legal doctrine. Since
the late 1970s, the courts have restricted the application of the dis-
parate impact framework. In 1977, for example, the Supreme
Court held that the disparate impact doctrine does not apply to
seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of pre-Act hiring dis-
crimination.190 In the early 1980s, some courts of appeals also be-
gan to hold that the disparate impact doctrine does not apply to
subjective employment systems.""' Although the Supreme Court
eventually rejected this reasoning in 1989,192 other decisions have
limited the use of the disparate impact doctrine to cases in which
plaintiffs can pinpoint the particular employment practices that
caused their underrepresentation.1 9e Such developments have
tended to force plaintiffs to challenge job segregation under a dis-
parate treatment framework, which requires them to prove a nar-
190 See Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 353 n 38 (1977).
See, for example, Pouncy v Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F2d 795, 801 (5th Cir
1982) (refusing to apply disparate impact analysis to a subjective promotional system or its
various components, including failure to post job openings and the use of subjective employ-
ment evaluations); Talley v United States Postal Service, 720 F2d 505, 506-07 (8th Cir
1982) (holding that disparate impact analysis was inapplicable to subjective decisionnaking
by a predominantly white supervisory force); EEOC v Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
698 F2d 633, 639 (4th Cir 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 US 867 (1984) (refusing to
apply the disparate impact model where plaintiff failed to identify any "objective standard,
applied evenly and automatically").
192 See Watson v Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US 977, 990-91 (1988) (holding that
challenges to subjective promotion systems may be analyzed under a disparate impact
framework as well as a disparate treatment framework).
193 Around the same time that some courts of appeals began to conclude that disparate
impact analysis was inapplicable to subjective selection processes, some circuits also began
to require disparate impact plaintiffs to prove that specific employment practices caused the
disproportionate exclusion of protected class members. See, for example, Pouncy, 668 F2d
at 801; Carroll v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F2d 183, 189 (5th Cir 1983); Griffin v Bd. of
Regents of Regency Universities, 795 F2d 1281, 1288-89 (7th Cir 1986). The Supreme Court
adopted this reasoning in Wards Cove. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio, 490 US 642,
657 (1989) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particu-
lar employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack. Such a showing
is an integral part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in a disparate-impact suit under Title
VII").
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row definition of discriminatory intent.14 Our logits confirmed that
plaintiffs fare far worse under a disparate treatment analysis than
under a disparate impact analysis (Table 4, row 10). Assuming that
this trend held across both time periods, courts' decreased use of
the disparate treatment framework would have contributed sub-
stantially to reduced race discrimination plaintiffs' success after
1977.
Although the race discrimination cases decided in the 1978-89
period are somewhat weaker than their 1967-77 counterparts,
weaker evidence alone cannot explain the dramatic reduction in
plaintiffs' success rates in the more recent period. As our decompo-
sition analysis shows, shifts in the incidence of all five types of evi-
dence account for less than half (43.4 percent) of the decline in
plaintiffs' success rates in the 1978-89 period. Shifts in the non-
evidentiary variables, which do not necessarily imply any weaken-
ing of the more recent cases, do not account for the remaining de-
cline in plaintiffs' success. Taken together, changes in the eviden-
tiary and non-evidentiary factors account for only around half
(54.4 percent) of the decline. This result is consistent with the re-
sults of our earlier logit analyses. The coefficient for the date varia-
ble in our full race model showed that even after controlling for all
the evidentiary and non-evidentiary factors simultaneously, plain-
tiffs were substantially less likely to prevail in the more recent pe-
riod than in the earlier period (Table 4, row 11, column 2). In our
parsimonious model, this difference was highly significant (Table 4,
row 11, column 4).
So far, our analyses have assumed that the courts have not
altered their standards for evaluating the lack of interest argument
in race discrimination cases over time. That plaintiffs won less fre-
quently even in cases with similar characteristics suggests, how-
ever, that the courts began to respond to the evidence in a manner
less favorable to plaintiffs in the more recent period. Particularly if
judges began to believe that racial discrimination posed a leis seri-
ous social problem, they may have become more inclined to accept
the lack of interest argument even in strong cases in which they
would have rejected this argument in the earlier era. If so, our
characterization of the cases as having become weaker due to shifts
in the evidence may be overstated. Some types of evidence that
1" In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court decided a series of constitutional cases that
adopted a narrow definition of discriminatory intent. See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229,
242 (1976); Arlington Heights v Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 US 252, 264-66 (1977);
Personnel Admin. of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979).
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significantly increased plaintiffs' likelihood of winning in the ear-
lier period may have become less powerful predictors of success in
the modern period. As a result, these types of evidence may have
become less prevalent in the modern cases not because the nature
of employers' underlying practices or the composition of filed cases
selected for litigation changed, but instead because plaintiffs real-
ized that these types of evidence had become less beneficial and
pursued them less frequently in the modern period. Plaintiffs may
have won less frequently not because they failed to introduce evi-
dence that judges considered strong under the old standards-but
because judges became more inclined to accept the lack of interest
explanation in cases that would have been considered strong in the
earlier era.
C. A Comparison of Judicial Approaches to the Lack of Interest
Defense in Early and Modern Race Discrimination Cases
Our analyses confirm that a shift in judicial attitude and ap-
proach has occurred in race discrimination cases. Although there
are too few cases in the 1978-89 period to permit us to run separate
logistic regression models for the early and modern race discrimi-
nation cases, we present alternative comparisons of plaintiffs' suc-
cess rates in cases with the same types of evidence. Table 7 shows
plaintiffs' success rates in the 1967-77 and 1978-89 periods in cases
with every combination of the evidence that is present in the race
discrimination cases in our data set.
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TABLE 7: Comparison of Plaintiffs' Success Rates in Early and Modern Race
Discrimination Cases With the Same Combinations of Evidence
Evidentiary Success Rate in Cumulative Success Rate in Cumulative
Combinations 1967-77 Period Success Rate in 1978-89 Period Success Rate in
1967-77 Period 1978-89 Period
1. W+S+E+A+D 100.0% 100.0% (8/8) 100.0% 100.0% (1/1)
2. W+S+E+A 100.0% 100.0% (12/12) - 100.0% (1/1)
3. W+S+E+D 100.0% 100.0% (23/23) 100.0% 100.0% (4/4)
4. W+E+A 100.0% 100.0% (24/24) - 100.0% (4/4)
5. W+S+D - 100.0% (24/24) 100.0% 100.0% (5/5)
6. A only 100.0% 100.0% (25/25) 100.0% 100.0% (6/6)
7. W+S+E 100.0% 100.0% (29/29) 50.0% 87.5% (7/8)
8. W+E 100.0% 100.0% (31/31) 50.0% 80.0% (8/10)
9. W+E+A+D 100.0% 100.0% (33/33) 0.0% 72.7% (8/11)
10. S only 100.0% 100.0% (34/34) 0.0% 66.7% (8/12)
11. W+E+D 75.0% 97.4% (37/38) 0.0% 57.1% (8/14)
12. All Others 0.0% 86.0% (37/43) 0.0% 40.0% (8/20)
W=No Formal Recruiting; S=Subjective System;
E=Evidence of Past Discrimination; A=Special Efforts;
D=Direct or Anecdotal Evidence of Discrimination
1. The change in approach.
This analysis illustrates the courts' changing reactions to the
evidence in race discrimination cases. Since the late 1970s, judges
have become more likely to accept the lack of interest argument
even in strong cases in which they would have rejected it in the
earlier era. In the 1967-77 period, the courts treated the first ten
combinations of evidence as a compelling basis for rejecting the
lack of interest argument. Plaintiffs won 100 percent of the cases
involving these types of evidence (Table 7, row 10, column 3). In
the 1978-89 period, however, plaintiffs' combined success rate fell
to 66.7 percent in cases with these'same combinations of evidence
(Table 7, row 10, column 5). There was only one other pattern of
evidence in which plaintiffs won any cases in either period, and
including this eleventh pattern in the analysis yields similar re-
sults. In the early period, courts rejected the lack of interest argu-
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ment in 97.4 percent of all cases with these eleven combinations of
evidence combined (Table 7, row 11, column 3). By contrast, in the
more recent period, courts rejected this argument in only 57.1 per-
cent of such cases (Table 7, row 11, column 5). Thus, even in cases
that involved the very same types of evidence, judges were signifi-
cantly less likely to attribute racial segregation to employer dis-
crimination in the more recent period than in the earlier era.
A close reading of judicial opinions confirms the change in ju-
dicial perceptions of job segregation. The opinions reveal a
profound shift in judges' attitudes toward statistical evidence,
which signals a change in their underlying assumptions about the
causes of job segregation. In the initial decade of Title VII enforce-
ment, the courts presumed that patterns of job segregation re-
vealed by statistical evidence were attributable to discrimination.
Judges relied heavily on statistical evidence to "uncover clandes-
tine and covert discrimination by the employer or union in-
volved."' 95 The judicial faith in statistical evidence was reflected in
the oft-repeated aphorism: "[S]tatistics often tell much, and
Courts listen."19 Indeed, in this early era, there was "virtual una-
nimity on the proposition that the statistical absence of blacks dis-
proportionate to whites makes out a Title VII ... violation."'197
Since the late 1970s, however, judicial rhetoric about statisti-
cal evidence has changed dramatically. The courts now express
considerable skepticism about its probative value.'98 Some courts
have gone so far as to question whether statistical proof even suf-
fices to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 99 Contrary
191 See Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 339-40 n 20 (1977)
(citing early courts of appeals decisions making this point).
' This phrase apparently was first used in State of Alabama v United States, 304 F2d
583, 586 (5th Cir 1962), a voter registration case. Judges quickly borrowed and repeated it in
Title VII cases to emphasize the value of statistical evidence for uncovering patterns of
racial segregation in the labor market. See, for example, United States v Ironworkers Local
86, 443 F2d 544, 551 (9th Cir 1971); Parham v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F2d 421, 426
(8th Cir 1970); Jones v Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F2d 245, 247 (10th Cir 1970);
Sagers v Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 388 F Supp 507, 515 (N D Ga 1973).
197 Stamps v Detroit Edison Co., 365 F Supp 87, 109 (1973), rev'd on other grounds 515
F2d 301 (6th Cir 1975) (citing early cases). One court held "as a matter of law that these
statistics, which revealed an extraordinarily small number of black employees, except for the
most part as menial laborers, established a violation of Title VII ... ." Parham, 433 F2d at
426.
", See, for example, Eubanks v Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 635 F2d 1341, 1347 (8th Cir
1980) (citing Teamsters, 431 US at 340, for the proposition that the usefulness of statistics
"depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances"); Croker v Boeing Co., 662 F2d
975, 995 (3d Cir 1981) (en banc) (same).
" See, for example, Hilton v Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F2d 379, 381 n 1 (1st Cir 1980).
See also Eubanks, 635 F2d at 1351 (suggesting that plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie
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to the earlier judicial confidence in statistical evidence, the modern
mood is captured in strong warnings about its shortcomings. "We
again warn plaintiffs that their statistical evidence should show
more than a racial imbalance in the workforce, but should prove
that the [specific] practices result in discrimination. "20 "[Statis-
tics] which purport to demonstrate a predominance of blacks in
less desirable positions may reflect imbalances but do not show
that race... cause[d] the imbalances, and are thus of little proba-
tive value." 20 1
As many judges have noted in dissent, the courts' changed at-
titude toward statistical evidence reflects a shift in their underly-
ing assumptions about the prevalence of racial discrimination in
the workplace. Judges have become less willing to infer that "race
caused the imbalances," in part because they believe that racial
discrimination is no longer sufficiently common to support such an
inference.0 2 The lack of interest argument provides an alternative
explanation for segregation that conforms to popular stereotypes
about minorities' "lack of motivation. '20 3 In general, the courts
have become more likely to accept the lack of interest argument
across a wide range of evidentiary patterns that they once treated
as powerful refutations of this argument. As part of this general
pattern, judges have begun to attach less importance to each indi-
vidual type of evidence that they relied on to dismiss the lack of
interest argument in the earlier era.
The Fourth Circuit's 1978 decision in Lewis v Tobacco Work-
ers' International Union2 0 4 provides a powerful example of the
case in part because they failed to supplement their statistical proof with "evidence of spe-
cific instances of discrimination").
200 Carroll v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F2d 183, 195 (5th Cir 1983).
201 Harris v Marsh, 45 FBP (BNA) 1037, 1043 (E D NC 1983).
202 See, for example, Eubanks, 635 F2d at 1352, 1356 (McMillian dissenting from the
majority's holding that plaintiffs' statistical evidence did not suffice to show racial discrimi-
nation in promotions, and criticizing the majority for "[c]onsidering each single promotion
decision separately and considering the whole pattern in isolation from the persuasive na-
tional experience of racial discrimination in employment that gave rise to the need for Title
VII"). See also Wards Cove, 490 US at 661 (Blackmun dissenting) ("One wonders whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination
against non-whites-is a problem in our society .... "); City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co.,
488 US 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall dissenting) (noting that the majority's invalidation of a
minority set-aside program "signals that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phe-
nomenon of the past, and that government bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with
rectifying racial injustice").
"03 See, for example, Kluegel, 28 Am Behav Scientist at 767-78 (cited in note 24).
204 577 F2d 1135 (4th Cir 1978), vacating and remanding Lewis v Philip Morris, Inc.,
419 F Supp 345 (E D Va 1976).
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shift in judicial attitudes and approach. Until the early 1960s, the
cigarette manufacturer Phillip Morris had practiced overt discrimi-
nation, restricting African Americans to seasonal, unskilled work
processing tobacco in the stemmery department and prohibiting
them from the higher-paying, permanent jobs in other depart-
ments. The plaintiffs alleged that after Title VII took effect, the
company merely switched to a covert system of discrimination and
continued to assign African Americans disproportionately to the
stemmery. The evidence showed that from 1964 to 1974, over fifty
percent of all new African American employees were hired for the
stemmery, compared to only eleven percent of the new white em-
ployees. In fact, as late as 1974, ninety-five percent of all stemmery
workers were African American. 0 5
Phillip Morris sought to explain these disparities by appealing
to racial differences in work preferences. After presenting evidence
that African Americans constituted ninety-five percent of the ap-
plicants to the stemmery, the company argued that it had not dis-
criminated in job assignment but had merely honored African
Americans' preference for stemmery jobs. 206 When the district
judge inquired as to why they would be more willing than whites to
accept less desirable jobs, the company responded: "[B]lacks work
in the Stemmery because they prefer the work demands there or
are willing to work there, while whites are unwilling to accept that
work., 20 7
The district judge refused to accept this explanation. The
judge concluded that African Americans had applied dispropor-
tionately for the stemmery because the company's extended his-
tory of discrimination had led them to believe it would be futile to
seek jobs in the higher-paying departments.208 Invoking the well-
established principle that an employer with a history of discrimi-
205 Lewis, 577 F2d at 1137, 1142.
,o Lewis, 419 F Supp at 354-55.
20 Id at 355.
208 The district judge stated:
Philip Morris' history of segregated departments, and the continued dominance of
blacks in the traditionally black departments, has led a substantial number of the
blacks applying to Philip Morris for work to the understanding that their most likely
opportunity for employment would be in the Stemmery. It is not surprising that the
lines to the Stemmery hiring office are populated with aspiring black workers, nor is it
surprising that blacks may, in interviewing, express a preference for Stemmery work. It
appears to a substantial number of black applicants that they either take a Stemmery
job or look for work with another employer. Given this background, any notion of
"preference" is meaningless; to prefer one alternative to another, one must believe that
both alternatives are available.
Id at 356.
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nation has a duty to overcome the chilling effects of its prior dis-
crimination, the district judge held the company liable and di-
rected it to take steps to welcome African Americans into the more
lucrative departments." 9
The Fourth Circuit reversed. In the Fourth Circuit's analysis,
the question was not whether Phillip Morris had a duty to elimi-
nate the chilling effects of its own past discrimination, but instead
whether the company's failure "to announce [its present] inno-
cence is a violation of Title VII."21 0 According to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, "[t]he question [was] whether or not the company did in fact
discriminate, not whether or not the [Black] employee[s] did in
fact believe the company had discriminated."21' Because African
Americans populated departments other than the stemmery at
rates at least approximating their proportion of the local labor
market, the court concluded that there was no racial discrimina-
tion (or even racial disparity).2 2 Using the local labor market as
the basis for comparison obscured the real problem, however, for
the record clearly indicated that African Americans who sought
work at Philip Morris were far more likely than whites to be hired
for the stemmery and not the better-paying departments. 213 By ig-
noring this evidence and treating the stemmery as a separate labor
market, the court of appeals converted the record from one in
which Philip Morris had systematically relegated African Ameri-
cans to the most menial jobs into one in which they held a baseless
belief that the company would not consider them fairly for more
desirable jobs.
As an additional ground for reversal, the Fourth Circuit held
that the district court had erred in finding that African Americans
even felt discouraged from pursuing the higher-paying jobs. Al-
though a witness testified that Philip Morris's practices led sub-
stantial numbers of African Americans to believe it would be futile
to pursue such employment, the court of appeals dismissed her tes-
timony on the ground that she herself had not been dissuaded
from seeking work in a predominantly white department.2 4 The
court emphasized that "not a single other witness testified that he
had been discouraged by belief or otherwise from applying for
See id at 356-58.
310 Lewis, 577 F2d at 1143.
211 Id.
212 Id at 1142.
213 Lewis, 419 F Supp at 353-54, 355-56.
214 Lewis, 577 F2d at 1143. Ironically, the company had rejected the witness when she
applied for that department, and hired her only when she applied for work in the stemmery.
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work in one of the permanent departments.... -218 In the absence
of such an explanation, only Phillip Morris's lack of interest argu-
ment remained to account for the patterns of racial segregation in
departmental placement.
The Fourth Circuit's reversal in Lewis reflects the larger trans-
formation in judges' understanding of job segregation that began in
the late 1970s. The most fundamental change has occurred in
judges' perception of the relevance of historical context, as re-
vealed by their reactions to evidence of past discrimination. In the
early period, the courts treated proof of past discrimination as dis-
positive. Judges presumed that minorities' failure to apply for tra-
ditionally segregated jobs reflected a sense of futility created by
past discrimination rather than an inherent lack of interest in the
work. As a corollary, courts imposed on employers with a history of
segregation a duty to overcome their "reputation for discrimina-
tion" by attracting minorities to historically segregated jobs.21
This approach held employers responsible for the continuing leg-
acy of labor market discrimination rather than its victims.2 17
The approach in Lewis stands this early reasoning on its head.
In contemporary decisions, the historical context of discrimination
has become irrelevant. Not only is the era of discrimination as-
sumed to be over; it is almost as though it never existed. The
courts now assume that the employer's past discrimination had no
role in influencing minorities' work preferences and no role in con-
tributing to current patterns of job segregation. Indeed, the causa-
tion is reversed: it is minorities' perceptions and preferences that
have led to the segregation. Because the company no longer dis-
criminates, it is irrational for minority workers to believe that the
company would refuse to consider them equally for traditionally
segregated jobs. Thus, even after insisting on anecdotal evidence,2"8
215 Id.
116 See, for example, United States v Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 FEP (BNA) 710,
748-49 (W D Okla 1973); United States v Central Motor Lines, 338 F Supp 532, 561-62 (W
D NC i971).
'17 For a powerful illustration of this perspective, see Morrow v Crisler, 491 F2d 1053,
1056-57 (5th Cir 1974) (en banc) ("[W]e are not sanguine enough to be of the view that
benign recruitment programs can purge in two years a reputation which discriminatory
practices of approximately 30 years have entrenched in the minds of blacks in Missis-
sippi .... Imaginative initiative is needed from all present members of the Highway
Patrol.").
I" For cases other than Lewis that suggest that the courts have placed greater empha-
sis on anecdotal evidence of discrimination in the modern period, see Eubanks, 635 F2d at
1351 (reversing the district court's finding of discrimination in promotion in part because
"the plaintiff class did not bolster its case with any evidence of specific instances of discrim-
ination"); Hilton v Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F2d 379, 381 n 1 (1st Cir 1980) (suggesting that
1992] 1155
The University of Chicago Law Review
modern courts may refuse to credit minority witnesses' testimony
that the employer's record discouraged them from applying unless
the witnesses can identify specific incidents of discriminatory
treatment to validate their "subjective belief[s]."21 In this brave
new world, the very concept that an employer might have a "repu-
tation for discrimination" has become an anomaly;220 the present is
presumed to be a sharp break with the past. As a result, evidence
of past discrimination alone no longer carries as much weight as it
once did in persuading judges to reject the lack of interest argu-
ment, as Table 8 shows.221
statistical evidence alone may be insufficient to make a prima facie case, in the absence of
anecdotal evidence to support the inference of discrimination).
219 Lewis, 577 F2d at 1143. See also EEOC v Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local
No. 122, 463 F Supp 388, 427 (D Md 1978) ("The [] testimony by black sheet metal workers
in the building trade does not disclose any specific actions taken by Local 122 ... to dis-
courage black journeymen from applying to Local 122.... [T]he court finds the plaintiff has
not shown ... that [] Local 122 has a general reputation for racial discrimination among
black sheet metal workers .... although plaintiff has shown specific individuals who be-
lieved Local 122 to discriminate on the basis of race.").
220 See, for example, Sheet Metal Workers, Local 122, 21 FEP (BNA) at 962-65 (ques-
tioning the relevance of a union's reputation for discrimination to the determination of
liability).
22 The analyses in Table 8 examine the effect on case outcomes of each factor in isola-
tion, without controlling simultaneously for the other evidence and facts presented. As
stated above, our sample size was too small to permit us to estimate separate logistic regres-
sion models for the early and modern race cases that controlled simultaneously for all nine
of our independent variables. We were, however, able to estimate separate logit models that
controlled simultaneously for all five of the evidence variables; the results are consistent
with the results for the evidence variables reported in Table 8. In the logit model for the
early race cases, the coefficients for evidence of past discrimination, formal recruiting, and
subjective selection system were all large, positive, and significant at .10 or less. In the
model for the modern race cases, by contrast, the coefficients for each of these three vari-
ables decreased in size and significance; none remained significant at .10 or less.
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TABLE 8: Plaintiffs' Success Rates in Early and Modern Race
Discrimination Cases With Selective Characteristics
Variables 1967-77 1978-89
Evidence of Past
Discrimination
Yes 92.1% 54.5%
No 40.0% 22.2%
Formal Recruiting
Yes 40.0% 25.0%
No 92.1% 43.8%
Subjective Selection
System
Yes 93.3% 50.0%
No 69.2% 25.0%
Job-Type
Blue-Collar 84.6% 57.1%
White-Collar 100.0% 0.0%
Doctrinal Analysis
Disparate Treatment 100.0% 26.7%
Disparate Impact 84.2% 80.0%
Table 8 reveals that in the more recent period, the courts have
also begun to accord less weight to the other types of evidence and
facts that they relied on to reject the lack of interest argument in
the earlier period. Before the late 1970s, courts presumed that in-
formal, word-of-mouth-recruiting systems excluded minorities
from the network of job opportunity. "With an almost completely
white work force, it is hardly surprising that such a system of re-
cruitment produced few, if any, black applicants. As might be ex-
pected, existing white employees tended to recommend their own
relatives, friends and neighbors, who would likely be of the same
race." '222 As a result, employers who failed to establish that they
had implemented formal recruiting programs-and who therefore
presumably relied on word-of-mouth recruiting-were significantly
less likely to persuade judges to accept the lack of interest argu-
ment than employers who had adopted formal programs. In the
more recent period, however, whether the employer had adopted a
formal recruiting system made a smaller difference to the outcome:
the courts were almost as likely to accept the lack of interest argu-
ment from employers who relied on word-of-mouth recruiting as
from employers who had attempted to disseminate job information
222 Parham v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F2d 421, 427 (8th Cir 1970).
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to minorities and whites on a more equal basis. Thus, over time,
judges have become less inclined to attribute minorities' failure to
seek out higher-paying jobs to employers' racially exclusionary
recruiting practices. 223 Remarkably, some judges have even failed
to interpret the use of nepotistic preferences as a race-related
barrier. 24
Evidence that the employer used a subjective selection system
also benefitted plaintiffs less in the modern period. In the early
period, courts concluded that "procedures which depend almost
entirely upon the subjective evaluation and favorable recommen-
dation of the immediate foreman are a ready mechanism for dis-
crimination against Blacks much of which can be covertly con-
cealed .... " Consequently, judges refused to accept the lack of
interest argument from employers who left hiring and promotion
decisions in the hands of white supervisors without specifying
standards to guide their discretion.
[The employer's] contention that the reason black employees
were not promoted to supervisory positions was because they
did not "ask" to be promoted is without merit .... [A] black
employee with knowledge of the nominal number of black
foremen, the Company's past discriminatory policies, and the
current practice of promotion via the recommendation of an
incumbent foreman could hardly be expected to make a
meaningless request indicating his willingness to be
promoted.226
In the more recent period, courts have retreated from this ap-
proach. Although plaintiffs still prevail more often against employ-
ers who use subjective selection systems, the strong judicial con-
demnation of subjective employment processes is missing from
most opinions. Rather, judges now emphasize that the "use of sub-
223 In Lee v Washington County Bd. of Education, 625 F2d 1235 (5th Cir 1980), for
example, a school board attempted to excuse its failure to hire Black coaches by arguing
that few Blacks had applied for coaching positions. The evidence showed that the Board
had not advertised its coaching positions, but had instead relied on word-of-mouth recruit-
ing. In a departure from its long-established approach, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that the school board's reliance on word-of-mouth recruiting had not "actu-
ally discriminated against blacks" by excluding them from the network of job information.
Id at 1238.
224 See, for example, Eubanks, 635 F2d 1341 (characterizing the promotion of a white
man made on the basis of nepotism as a decision that was unrelated to race); Sheet Metal
Workers, Local 122, 463 F Supp at 422 (finding that any discriminatory impact of nepotism
was negated by the union's use of an affirmative action program).
225 Rowe v General Motors Corp., 457 F2d 348, 359 (5th Cir 1972).
226 United States v N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F2d 354, 369 (8th Cir 1973).
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jective criteria . . . does not in itself . . supply an inference of
discrimination." '227 Absent concrete proof that "minority employees
were directed away from higher-paying [job] classifications,"
judges have become more inclined to view job segregation as a re-
flection of minorities' own job preferences, even in cases in which
assignment and progress depends on the unguided discretion of
white superiors.12 8 Because employers use subjective processes
more often in connection with white-collar work than blue-collar
work,22 9 this shift may have been particularly harmful to minorities
seeking higher-level white-collar jobs. Over time, as the courts have
become less skeptical of subjective selection processes, they have
also reacted less favorably to minorities' efforts to challenge racial
segregation in white-collar employment.230
Just as the courts have evaluated the evidence in a manner
that is less favorable to plaintiffs, they have also applied the dispa-
rate treatment framework in a manner that is less favorable to
plaintiffs in the more recent period. The preceding Section noted
that the courts have restricted plaintiffs' use of the disparate im-
pact framework since the late 1970s. Further analyses reveal that
in addition to forcing plaintiffs into a disparate treatment model
more frequently, the courts have also toughened their approach to
disparate treatment cases over time. In contrast to disparate im-
pact cases, in which plaintiffs' success rates remained stable across
the periods, in disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs' success rates
plummeted. In the 1967-77 period, courts rejected the lack of in-
terest argument in 100 percent of the disparate treatment claims;
17 Eubanks, 635 F2d at 1347. See also Page v U.S. Industries, Inc., 34 FEP (BNA) 430,
435 (5th Cir 1984) (containing a similar statement).
"2 Page, 34 FEP at 437.
29 See, for example, Bartholet, 95 Harv L Rev at 973 n 86 (cited in note 120) (collect-
ing sources). In our data set, 80% (8 out of 10) of the race discrimination cases in which
plaintiffs sought access to white-collar work involved subjective selection systems. By con-
trast, 64.2% (34 out of 53) of the race discrimination cases in which plaintiffs sought access
to blue-collar work involved subjective selection systems. This difference is not statistically
significant, however (p-value= .33).
230 As Table 8 shows, in the early period, the type of employment plaintiffs sought
made little difference to the outcome of the lack of interest argument. In fact, plaintiffs
fared slightly better in white-collar cases than in blue-collar cases. In the more recent pe-
riod, however, the pattern reversed. Although plaintiffs won over half of the blue-collar
cases, they did not win any of the white-collar cases.
These results suggest that the negative effect for white-collar work that emerged from
our earlier logit analysis is attributable to, or at least more pronounced in, the early period.
If so, then contrary to the implications of the weaker evidence explanation, the increased
proportion of white-collar cases in the modern period did not "weaken" the modern cases,
but in fact, would have strengthened them slightly if the courts had continued to respond to
them in the same favorable manner as they had in the early period.
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in the 1978-89 period, they did so in only 26.7 percent of such
claims.23
This change parallels the other, larger shifts in judicial atti-
tude and approach. The courts' skepticism toward statistical evi-
dence has led them to impose a more stringent standard of proof
in disparate treatment cases. Early courts presumed that if minori-
ties had always had the same work opportunities as whites, they
would not have chosen their own economic disenfranchisement. 23 2
Over time, however, judges have become less willing to attribute
racial disparities in employment to discrimination. In order to find
for plaintiffs under a disparate treatment model, the courts now
insist on proof that the employer took specific actions to cause the
disparities at issue. "If the plaintiffs' statistics fail to establish a
causal link between [some specifically] challenged practice and dis-
crimination, courts can infer discrimination only when the 'inexo-
rable zero' or gross statistical disparities . . . compel this infer-
ence."23 3 Because it is frequently impossible to trace broad
patterns of segregation to particular employment practices, few
plaintiffs could meet this heightened standard of proof even if
courts still evaluated non-statistical evidence as favorably as they
had in the earlier era. Given that judges respond less favorably to
evidence that the employer relied on word-of-mouth recruiting or
subjective criteria, plaintiffs now face an almost impossible burden
of establishing classwide disparate treatment.
Ironically, the courts' success in dismantling racial segregation
in the early era of Title VII enforcement may have contributed to
the less favorable treatment of race discrimination plaintiffs in the
modern era-but not because all forms of employment discrimina-
tion were legally destroyed. As legal pressure induced some em-
ployers to lower racial barriers, many African Americans and other
231 Table 8 shows that in the early period plaintiffs fared as well (in fact, slightly bet-
ter) under a disparate treatment framework as they did under a disparate impact frame-
work; they won 100% (5 out of 5) of the disparate treatment cases, and 84.2% (32 out of 38)
of the disparate impact cases. In the modern period, however, although plaintiffs continued
to win 80.0% (4 out of 5) of the disparate impact cases, their success rate dropped to only
26.7% (4 out of 15) in disparate treatment cases. These results suggest that the negative
effect for disparate treatment that emerged from our earlier logit analysis is attributable to
the 1978-89 period. Although it is also possible that the decline in plaintiffs' success in dis-
parate treatment cases reflects the fact that the modern disparate treatment cases were
weaker than the early disparate treatment cases, it is doubtful that the modern disparate
treatment cases were weaker to a degree sufficient to explain a decline of this magnitude.
232 See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens v City of Santa Ana,
410 F Supp 873, 892 (C D Cal 1976) (stating that "Title VII . . . assumes that protected
groups are both qualified for and interested in employment").
233 Carroll v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F2d 183, 195 (5th Cir 1983).
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minorities took advantage of opportunities that had never before
been available to them. These signs of progress have led many
whites to believe that employers no longer discriminate.2 3 4 In this
view, continuing patterns of racial segregation must reflect racial
differences that arose from influences outside the labor market.
The lack of interest argument targets racial differences in culture
and upbringing to attribute remaining job disparities to minorities'
lack of initiative in pursuing higher-paying employment.23 5
Like many others, federal judges have become more inclined
to accept this rationalization. From a legal environment in which
the courts proclaimed that "Title VII [] assumes ... that protected
groups are . . . interested in [higher-paying] employment, '236 we
have entered an era in which many judges espouse such racially
stereotyped assertions as "blacks prefer housekeeping jobs. 2 37
2. The role of the courts of appeals.
The courts of appeals have played an important role in bring-
ing about this shift in judicial attitudes, as Table 9 shows. Panel A
presents plaintiffs' success rates in district court cases that were
not appealed (column 2), in district court cases that were appealed
(column 3), and in the resulting group of appellate cases (column
4). Panel B shows the percentage of courts of appeals decisions
that reversed district court judgments for plaintiffs (column 2), for
employers (column 3), and for both parties combined (column 4),
in race discrimination cases.
23, See, for example, Kluegel, 28 Am Behav Scientist at 764-65 (cited in note 24) (re-
porting that in 1976, 71.2% of whites believed that Blacks "no longer face[d] unfair employ-
ment conditions," and "in fact... are favored in many training and job programs"); Kluegel
and Smith, 47 Am Soc Rev at 519 (cited in note 43) (reporting that in 1980, 73% of whites
saw "blacks' opportunity as equal to or greater than the average person in America (assum-
ing that persons work hard)").
215 See Croker v Boeing Co., 662 F2d 975, 992-93 (3d Cir 1981) (disregarding evidence
that the company "directed applicants to indicate certain job choices" to affirm the district
court's finding that preference explained African Americans' placement in lower-paying
jobs); Hilton v Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F2d 379, 380 (1st Cir 1980) (affirming the district
court's finding that "blacks preferred housekeeping jobs" to jobs in higher-paying depart-
ments); Lewis v Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 577 F2d 1135, 1143 (4th Cir 1978) (implic-
itly finding that African Americans preferred lower-paying, seasonal jobs in the stemmery).
236 League of United Latin American Citizens, 410 F Supp at 892.
"37 Hilton, 624 F2d at 380.
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TABLE 9: Plaintiffs' Success Rates in District Court and Court of Appeals
Cases, and Reversal Rates in Court of Appeals, for Early and
Modern Race Discrimination Cases
A. Plaintiffs' Success Rates
District Court District Court Court of
Cases Cases Appeals
(Not Appealed) (Appealed) Cases
1967-77 82.6% (19/23) 30.0% (6/20) 90.0% (18/20)
1978-89 50.0% (4/8) 16.7% (2/12) 33.3% (4/12)
B. Reversal Rates in Courts of Appeals,
by Party Who Won in District Court
P Won Below D Won Below Total
1967-77 33.3% (2/6) 100.0% (14/14) 80.0% (16/20)
1978-89 100.0% (2/2) 40.0% (4/10) 50.0% (6/12)
In the 1967-77 period, the appellate courts were critical to race
discrimination plaintiffs' near-universal success. Although plain-
tiffs prevailed on the lack of interest argument in 82.6 percent of
the district court cases that were not appealed, they did so in only
30 percent of the district court cases that were appealed. The
courts of appeals ruled for plaintiffs in an overwhelming 90 percent
of the appealed cases. They accomplished this by reversing district
court rulings for employers at disproportionate-and phenome-
nal-rates. Whereas the courts of appeals reversed rulings in favor
of plaintiffs in only 33.3 percent of the cases, they reversed rulings
in favor of employers in 100 percent of the cases that came before
them. Thus, appellate judges acted as strong allies in minority
plaintiffs' efforts to dismantle job segregation; they ensured that
trial judges did not excuse segregation as the expression of minori-
ties' own lack of interest in more remunerative work.
In the 1978-89 period, however, the pattern changed markedly.
Race discrimination plaintiffs fared worse in the district courts
than they had in the earlier era. When they sought help from the
courts of appeals, assistance was far less forthcoming: plaintiffs'
success rate on appeal fell from 90 percent in the earlier period to
only 33.3 percent in the later period. Contrary to their previous
approach, the courts of appeals were more likely to reverse rulings
in favor of plaintiffs than rulings in favor of employers. In fact, the
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reversal rates are almost the mirror image of what they had been
in the earlier era; they reversed rulings in favor of plaintiffs in 100
percent of the cases, while reversing rulings in favor of employers
in only 40 percent of the cases. Although the numbers of cases are
small, these results suggest that appellate judges have retreated
from their earlier pro-civil rights approach. In the more recent era,
they have allied themselves with employers rather than plaintiffs.
The data also show that the decline in race discrimination
plaintiffs' success rate is not a function of an increase in plaintiffs'
rate of appeal. As noted earlier, a number of studies have reported
that appellate courts tend to affirm trial court decisions. 8  Theo-
retically, because our data set includes appellate cases, the decline
in plaintiffs' overall success rate could have resulted from an in-
crease in the rate at which plaintiffs began to appeal adverse rul-
ings.2 39 Table 9 indicates, however, that this explanation cannot ac-
count for the decline. Plaintiffs' success rates declined considerably
in district court cases as well as courts of appeals cases. Further-
more, plaintiffs' success rate fell by similar proportions in cases ap-
pealed by plaintiffs and by employers. That courts of appeals be-
came more likely to accept the lack of interest defense in the
modern era, regardless of which party appealed, suggests that ap-
pellate judges may have been actively attempting to reverse the
earlier, pro-plaintiff direction of the law. °
3. Summary and implications.
Our findings suggest that in the late 1970s, the courts adopted
an approach to the lack of interest argument that is less favorable
to race discrimination plaintiffs. Our variable means and decompo-
sition analyses reveal that the more recent cases are not suffi-
ciently weaker (or otherwise different) than the earlier cases to ac-
238 See note 165 and accompanying text.
239 See Henderson and Eisenberg, 37 UCLA L Rev at 504 n 115 (cited in note 180);
Eisenberg and Schwab, 56 U Chi L Rev at 517 (cited in note 165).
2"0 Because courts of appeals may be more likely to publish reversals than affirmances,
the published decisions in our data set may overstate the actual number of cases in which
courts of appeals reversed on the lack of interest argument. Nonetheless, because this effect
should be uniform across cases in which plaintiffs won below and cases in which employers
lost below, it cannot explain the increased rate at which courts of appeals began to reverse
judgments in favor of plaintiffs and to affirm judgments in favor of employers in the modern
period. On the other hand, if the courts of appeals were attempting to change the law in a
direction less favorable to plaintiffs, they may have published a higher proportion of deci-
sions reversing judgments in favor of plaintiffs and affirming judgments in favor of employ-
ers in the modern period. See Eisenberg and Schwab, 56 U Chi L Rev at 535-38 (cited in
note 165).
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count for the dramatic decline in plaintiffs' success. Because our
analyses do not control directly for the persuasive quality of the
evidence beyond a certain threshold, one might argue that an
unobserved deterioration in the quality of the evidence accounts
for the unexplained portion of the decline in plaintiffs' success
rate. For a number of reasons, however, this possibility is unlikely.
In the 1978-89 period, the courts became substantially more
likely to accept the lack of interest defense even in cases that pro-
vided a strong evidentiary basis for rejecting this argument in the
1967-77 era. In fact, since 1978 the courts have responded in a
manner less favorable to plaintiffs to all three types of evidence
that they considered compelling proof in the earlier era (evidence
of past discrimination, formal recruiting, and subjective selection
systems). To accept the weaker evidence explanation, one would
have to argue that the courts' responses to these three types of
evidence changed because the quality of the evidence within each
category became so much poorer that it merited less weight even
under the same standards of evaluation. For some types of evi-
dence, such as evidence that the employer relied on a subjective
selection system, our coding strategy makes this argument uncon-
vincing. We treated a case as one involving a subjective selection
system, for example, only if the court's opinion included an affirm-
ative acknowledgement that the employer's system satisfied a stan-
dardized definition of a subjective system that we applied uni-
formly across all cases. Given that our definition of a subjective
system did not change over time, it is difficult to see how the ear-
lier cases could have involved evidence of subjectivity that was suf-
ficiently more powerful than that present in the more recent cases
to explain the sizeable decline in the effect of this factor on case
outcomes. Rather, the shift suggests that judges now regard a sub-
jective selection process as a less powerful indicator of
discrimination.241
Even if one assumes a deterioration in the quality of the evi-
dence, this still does not account for our results for some of the
non-evidentiary factors. Over time, the courts have begun to re-
spond to white-collar and blue-collar cases, and to disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact cases, in opposite ways; the courts of
appeals have become more likely to reverse rulings in favor of
241 Compare, for example, United States v N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F2d 354, 368 (8th
Cir 1973); and Rowe v General Motors Corp., 457 F2d 348, 359 (5th Cir 1972); with Eubanks
v Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 635 F2d 1341, 1347 (8th Cir 1980); and Page v U.S. Industries,
34 FEP (BNA) 430, 434 (5th Cir 1984).
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plaintiffs than rulings in favor of employers. It is unlikely that the
relative quality of the proof in these sets of cases changed suffi-
ciently to account for such dramatic reversals. Judicial bias ex-
plains the results more consistently and plausibly.
The language of the opinions supports the judicial bias expla-
nation, not the weaker evidence explanation. In the more recent
opinions, judges did not emphasize that the plaintiffs' evidence
was weak. Instead, they expressed skepticism about the extent to
which evidence of past discrimination, subjective selection systems,
and word-of-mouth recruiting suffice to refute the lack of interest
explanation. Taken together with their declarations of lack of faith
in statistical proof, the courts' rhetoric signals an increase in
judges' underlying willingness to attribute job segregation to forces
other than discrimination-rather than a decrease in the quality of
plaintiffs' proof.
Finally, data from the ABF sample also undercut the selection
effects explanation. This theory hypothesizes that plaintiffs' suc-
cess rates declined not because the courts adopted less favorable
legal standards, but because an increase in employers' relative
stakes or abilities to predict case outcomes led them to offer more
to settle the cases, especially cases that were strong for plaintiffs. If
this theory were accurate, a greater proportion of the cases filed
after 1977 should have settled before trial. Yet, in the ABF sample,
race discrimination cases were slightly less likely to settle-and
more likely to be resolved against plaintiffs on pre-trial mo-
tion-than they had been in the earlier period. Thus, even after
accounting for settlement and other pre-trial dispositions, race dis-
crimination plaintiffs have fared worse in the modern era.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the decline in plain-
tiffs' success rates reflects in part a shift toward less pro-plaintiff
standards for evaluating the validity of the lack of interest defense
in race discrimination cases. Just as the courts' culturally-laden as-
sumptions about women's work aspirations led judges to impose
more difficult standards for refuting the lack of interest argument
in sex discrimination cases than in race discrimination cases in the
1967-89 period as a whole, so too the courts' changed perceptions
of racial discrimination have led judges to impose higher standards
on race discrimination plaintiffs since the late 1970s. The shift has
been more subtle in race discrimination cases. Judges have contin-
ued to consider the same types of evidence but have simply given
it less weight.
Because the shift away from a pro-plaintiff approach in race
discrimination cases was not accomplished through the announce-
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ment of a new "bright-line" rule but instead through a "low-pro-
file" change in judges' evaluation of the sufficiency of the evi-
242dence, attorneys may have been slow to realize that the shift was
occurring. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1977 decisions in Tearh-
sters, Dothard, and Hazelwood, the courts of appeals in effect (if
not explicitly) rejected the lack of interest argument as a matter of
law; they reversed all of the cases in which the trial courts had
accepted this argument. By defining the lack of interest issue as a
question of fact to be delegated to the trial courts,2 43 the Court's
1977 decisions created an opportunity for employers to litigate this
issue on a case-by-case basis.244 Yet, the earlier judicial approach
was sufficiently well-established and favorable to plaintiffs that
even seasoned attorneys may not have predicted that under a more
open-ended factual inquiry, the lower courts would widely accept
minorities' lack of interest as an adequate justification for racial
segregation on the job.
If attorneys were slow to detect the change, this could help
account for plaintiffs' lower success rates after 1977. That the more
recent race discrimination cases addressing the lack of interest ar-
gument were no stronger (and, if anything, were somewhat weaker)
than their earlier counterparts may indicate that plaintiffs' attor-
neys continued to pursue claims that were considered reasonably
strong under the old, more lenient standards, but not under the
new ones. 24  If so, race discrimination plaintiffs would have suf-
24 For a discussion of the distinction between bright-line and low-profile legal changes
within the context of product liability cases, see Henderson and Eisenberg, 37 UCLA L Rev
at 509-10 (cited in note 180).
243 See Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1759-66 (cited in note 20).
24 Hazelwood provided the clearest signal of this opportunity. The Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit's judgment for the plaintiff and remanded the case to the trial court for a
more in-depth factual analysis of Blacks' level of interest in the work at issue. Hazelwood
School District v United States, 433 US 299, 309, 310-13 (1977). For a discussion of this
aspect of the Hazelwood decision, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1763-65 (cited in note 20).
24I Even if, as we have suggested, the legal standard changed to become less favorable
to plaintiffs, selection models predict that the parties will adjust to the new standard over
time. Assuming that plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys have equal information about the
change in standards, and assuming that the parties' relative stakes and abilities to assess
their cases accurately remain unaltered, plaintiffs should eventually stop pursuing the
claims that are no longer considered meritorious under the new standard. As a result, case
filings should decline, and the subset of cases litigated under the new, more burdensome
standard should be stronger than the cases litigated under the old standard. See Priest, 3 J
of L Econ & Org at 199-200 (cited in note 91). Particularly if the nature of the change was a
"low-profile" change, however, we should "find some significant period during which plain-
tiffs would fall to detect the true magnitude of the change, bring the same old set of claims
(let alone an increasingly ambitious set, based on prior trends), and suffer unprecedented
losses." Henderson and Eisenberg, 37 UCLA L Rev at 517 n 154 (cited in note 180).
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fered unprecedented losses. In our data set, plaintiffs' success rates
on the lack of interest issue fell dramatically and steadily between
1978 and 1983. Thereafter, both the number of filed cases in which
the lack of interest argument was a potential defense and the num-
ber of published cases litigating this defense dropped off to almost
zero. Eventually, plaintiffs' attorneys may have realized that the
legal system was less hospitable to challenges to racial segregation,
and stopped pursuing claims that unfavorable legal developments
had doomed to failure.
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE LACK OF INTEREST DEFENSE: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDGES' DECISIONS AND
THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Both our quantitative analyses of the cases and our more qual-
itative readings of the judicial opinions suggest that the disparities
in plaintiffs' success rates on the lack of interest defense reflect
differences in the attitudes and approaches courts have brought to
their interpretation of cases of similar merit. To explore the causes
of the disparities in success rates more fully, this Section examines
the relationship between judges' political affiliations and their rul-
ings on the lack of interest defense. There is little disagreement
that judges' political, social, and personal values may affect their
decisions. Although a wide range of factors may exert an influence,
political scientists regard the president who appointed the judge as
an important indicator of the larger values that may influence a
judge's decisions. As one prominent pair of scholars explained:
[P]residents consider the political values and attitudes of po-
tential judges because they have realized intuitively what
American judicial scholars have taught for almost a century:
the business of judging is not merely a mechanical process of
"following the law" and "being guided by past precedents";
there is considerable discretion involved in judicial decision-
making; the political values and orientations of the judges do
affect the way they resolve judicial issues, especially when
precedents are conflicting or when the court is being asked to
tread in new and uncharted realms.2 "
For analogous reasons, many researchers conceptualize political
party affiliation as a measure of the larger values that affect judges'
"' Robert A. Carp and C. K. Rowland, Policymaking and Politics in the Federal Dis-
trict Courts 52 (Tennessee, 1983).
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voting behavior. "Party affiliation... [is] regarded as a crude, but
still.., effective, background indicator of judges' values because it
indicates a collection of like minded persons (especially among po-
litical activists), is an important socializing institution, and is an
important reference group for people active in public affairs."2 47
Despite a consensus that judges' political leanings may influ-
ence their decisions, scholars disagree about whether this influence
can be discerned in the outcomes of litigated cases. An extensive
political science literature is premised on the assumption that par-
tisan influences can be detected and measured through the parties'
success rates or judges' voting records in litigated cases. There is
substantial support for this view. A number of studies of appellate
courts have found that Democratic judges and judges appointed by
Democratic presidents tend to have more liberal voting
records-voting more frequently for labor unions or civil rights
claimants, for example-than Republican judges and judges ap-
pointed by Republican presidents. 48 Although earlier work did not
find similar relationships at the trial court level, more recent and
comprehensive research reports that among federal district judges,
Democrats vote more liberally than Republicans. This research
also finds that the appointing president is an important predictor
of judges' decisions, particularly in civil rights and civil liberties
cases.2 49 According to many political scientists, differences in judi-
cial voting patterns by political affiliation vary with the ideological
content of the cases and the degree of discretion permitted judges.
Judges' partisan values emerge more powerfully in eras and areas
24 Malcolm M. Feeley, Another Look at the 'Party Variable' in Judicial Decision
Making: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 Polity 91, 93 (1971). As Carp and
Rowland have cautioned, however, there is no simple causal relationship between party affil-
iation and subsequent voting patterns. "[T]he homogeneity of the bench ensures that even
judges from different parties will bring more similar than different attributes to their task."
Carp and Rowland, Policy Making and Politics at 30 (cited in note 246). In addition, party
affiliation is not always a good indicator of a judge's political and social values, because
people frequently choose their party affiliations for reasons other than value conformity. Id.
Finally, "the very nonideological, nonprogrammatic nature of American political parties in
general tends to restrain the party factor from becoming a potent indicator of liberal-con-
servative policy propensity." See id at 31.
248 See, for example, Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 Judicature 48, 54 (1986); Donald R.
Songer and Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in The United
States Courts of Appeal, 1955-1986, 43 W Pol Q 317, 323 (1990). For summaries of such
research, see Carp and Rowland, Policymaking and Politics at 25-32 (cited in note 246);
Schwab and Eisenberg, Influence of Judicial Background at 2-3 (cited in note 78).
29 See Carp and Rowland, Policymaking and Politics at 32-36, 64-73 (cited in note
246).
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of law in which controlling Supreme Court precedent leaves indi-
vidual judges more room to maneuver.250
In contrast to the political science literature, the literature on
litigation selection effects suggests that even if judges' political val-
ues influence their decisions, this influence will not be reflected in
the outcomes of litigated cases. Because the parties will adjust
their assessments of their likelihood of prevailing and their settle-
ment strategies to account for judges' attitudes, plaintiffs' success
rates will be similar even across cases tried by courts or judges
with different political perspectives. Priest and Klein state:
It is widely believed that the decisions of a single judge will
reflect that judges' individual attitudes .... The selection hy-
pothesis, on the other hand, presumes that the parties in set-
tlement negotiations will anticipate the predilections of a
judge, just as they would anticipate the application of a legal
rule or the collective attitudes of a jury. Thus, the rate of suc-
cess in contested civil bench trials similarly ought to tend to-
ward equality among judges .... 251
Priest and Klein treat the selection hypothesis as empirically veri-
fiable. To support it, they cite evidence that in contract and negli-
gence cases decided between 1960 and 1980 and published in
LEXIS, plaintiffs experienced substantially similar success rates
before five different United States district court judges. 52 The au-
thors concluded that although they had "little doubt that the atti-
tudes of some of the judges ...differ in some degree ... , no
evidence of a difference in the attitudes of these judges [is] dis-
cernible from trial outcomes because of the selection effect. '25 3
The political science and selection effects literature thus yield
differing predictions about whether the outcomes of the cases in
our data set will vary according to judges' political affiliations. The
political science literature suggests that judges' rulings on the lack
of interest argument may vary substantially depending on their po-
litical leanings. In particular, partisan differences should emerge in
cases and time periods for which there is little ideological consen-
sus and/or little controlling legal precedent on the lack of interest
issue. On the other hand, the selection effects literature predicts
that no partisan differences in judges' voting records will emerge in
,11 See id at 10-11.
151 Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 34-35 (cited in note 53).
'" See id at 35-36.
253 Id at 36.
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any areas. Consequently, any findings of substantial differences in
judges' rulings on the lack of interest argument according to their
political affiliation would undermine the selection effects
hypothesis.
To investigate these issues, we examine the relationship be-
tween judges' political affiliations and their decisions on the lack of
interest issue in (1) the race and sex discrimination cases in the
1967-89 period, and (2) the race discrimination cases in the 1967-
78 and 1978-89 periods. For both pairings of cases, we present
three sets of analyses. The first set of analyses (Tables 10A and
11A) shows the percentage of judges appointed by each president
(or group of presidents), and the percentage of judges appointed
by Democratic and Republican presidents, who ruled or voted to
rule in favor of plaintiffs on the lack of interest argument. The
second set of analyses (Tables 10B and lB) shows the percentage
of judges identified as Democrats, Republicans and independents
who ruled or voted to rule in favor of plaintiffs on the lack of inter-
est argument.254 In both these sets of analyses, the unit of focus is
the decision of the individual judge rather than the decision of the
court.255 By contrast, Tables 10C and llC show the percentage of
cases in which the courts resolved the lack of interest in favor of
plaintiffs, according to whether the district judge or a majority of
the appellate judges were appointed by Democratic or Republican
presidents. None of these analyses controls for the relative
strength or weakness of the cases decided by judges of differing
political affiliations. To the extent that the absence of such con-
trols introduces any bias into the analyses, it would bias them
2" For these analyses, we consulted several standard biographic sources to determine
the political party affiliation of each judge. From these sources, we were unable to identify
the party affiliation of 11.1% (17 out of 153) of the judges involved in the race discrimina-
tion cases, and 12.0% (11 out of 92) of the judges involved in the sex discrimination cases.
Interestingly, in both race and sex discrimination cases, the percentage of judges for whom
we were unable to determine party affiliation increased over time. In race discrimination
cases, this percentage rose from 8.7% (9 out of 104) of all judges in the 1967-77 period to
16.3% (8 out of 49) of all judges in the 1978-89 period. In sex discrimination cases, there
were no unidentified judges for the early period.
255 Because district courts consist of single judges, the unit of analysis makes no differ-
ence to the analysis of district court decisions. Appellate courts consist of panels of at least
three judges, however, and these first two sets of analyses reflect how each individual appel-
late judge voted to resolve the lack of interest issue rather than how the majority of the
panel resolved the issue. For purposes of these analyses, appellate judges are treated as
having voted for plaintiffs if they joined in a majority opinion which rejected the lack of
interest argument or dissented from a majority opinion which accepted this argument.
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against finding any relationship between judges' voting records
and their political affiliations.2 5 6
TABLE 10: Percentage of Judicial Decisions in Favor of Plaintiffs in Sex and
Race Discrimination Cases, By Judges' Political Affiliations
A. By Appointing President (and Party of Appointing President)
Roosevelt/ Eisenhower Kennedy/ Nixon/ Carter Reagan Democrat Republican Total
Truman Johnson Ford
Race 50.0% 85.7% 79.5% 53.7% 26.7% 0.0% 70.0% 63.5% 67.3%
(1/2) (18/21) (58/73) (22/41) (4/15) (0/1) (63/90) (40/63) (103/153)
Sex 50.0% 42.9% 57.9% 44.8% 81.5% 75.0% 70.8% 50.0% 60.9%
(1/2) (3/7) (11/19) (13/29) (22/27) (6/8) (34/48) (22/44) (56/92)
B. By Judge's Political Party
Democrat Republican Independent Unidentified Total
Race 71.7% 65.1% 100.0% 47.1% 67.3%
(66/92) (28/43) (1/1) (8/17) (103/153)
Sex 70.8% 38.7% 100.0% 72.7% 60.9%
(34/48) (12/31) (2/2) (8/11) (56/92)
C. By Party of President Who Appointed Court Majority
Democrat Republican Total
Race 73.8% 66.7% 71.4%
(31/42) (14/21) (45/63)
Sex 66.7% 48.1% 57.4%
(18/27) (13/27) (31/54)
Table 10 provides little support for the selection effects hy-
pothesis. Contrary to its predictions, judges' decisions on the lack
28 According to the selection effects literature, the parties adjust their settlement strat-
egies to account for any judicial partisanship. If, for example, Democratic judges are more
predisposed to favor plaintiffs than Republican judges, defendants should offer more to set-
tle cases to be heard by Democratic judges, particularly cases that are relatively strong for
plaintiffs. Because Republican judges will hear cases that are stronger for plaintiffs than
those heard by Democratic judges, both groups of judges will rule in favor of plaintiffs with
approximately the same frequency. As a result of this selection process, no differences in
Democratic and Republican judges' voting records would be evident unless one controlled
for the relative strength of the cases heard by the two groups of judges. Thus, if anything,
our failure to control for the relative strength of the cases biases our analyses against find-
ing the differences in Democratic and Republican judges' votes that would emerge if such
controls were present.
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of interest issue vary substantially depending on their political af-
filiations, particularly in some areas. In sex discrimination cases, as
Panel A shows, judges appointed by different presidents had mark-
edly different voting records. The percentage of judges voting for
plaintiffs ranged from a high of 81.5 percent for judges appointed
by Carter to a low of 42.9 percent for judges appointed by Eisen-
hower. Overall, judges appointed by Democratic presidents were
significantly more likely to vote for plaintiffs than those appointed
by Republicans. Panel B also discloses significant differences be-
tween Democratic and Republican judges' records in sex discrimi-
nation cases, and Panel C reveals similar (though less substantial)
differences in the outcomes of sex discrimination cases decided by
courts controlled by Democratic appointees and Republican ap-
pointees. 257 Although in race discrimination cases, no significant
party differences emerge, there are substantial differences in the
voting records of judges appointed by different presidents. The
proportion of judges who voted for race discrimination plaintiffs
ranged from a high of 85.7 percent for Eisenhower-appointed
judges to a low of 26.7 percent for Carter-appointed judges.
The analyses in Table 10 also suggest that plaintiffs' lower
overall success rate in sex discrimination cases is attributable to
the decisions of Republican judges, appointees and courts, rather
than to their Democratic counterparts. As Panel A shows, judges
appointed by-Democratic presidents were equally likely to vote for
plaintiffs in sex and race discrimination cases (approximately 70
percent). By contrast, however, judges appointed by Republican
presidents were far more likely to vote for plaintiffs in race dis-
crimination cases than in sex discrimination cases: Republican ap-
pointees voted for plaintiffs in 63.5 percent of all race discrimina-
tion cases, but they did so in only 50 percent of all sex
discrimination cases. Panel B reveals similar trends among Demo-
cratic and Republican judges. In fact, because Republican judges
were even less likely than judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents to vote for plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases, the differ-
ence in judges' voting records in sex and race discrimination cases
is more pronounced among Republican judges than among judges
2B1 For Panel A, the difference in Democratic and Republican appointees' voting
records reported in sex discrimination cases is significant at .04. Similarly, for Panel B, the
difference in Democratic and Republican judges' records in sex discrimination cases is sig-
nificant at .005. For Panel C, however, the difference in plaintiffs' success rates in cases
decided by Democratically-controlled courts and Republican-controlled courts is not statis-
tically significant (p-value= .17).
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appointed by Republican presidents. Similar, though slightly
smaller, differences emerge among Republican-controlled courts in
Panel C.258
In sex discrimination cases addressing the lack of interest ar-
gument, judges' voting patterns parallel remarkably closely the
larger trends in judges' voting behavior reported in the political
science literature. The liberal judicial position rejects the lack of
interest argument; the conservative judicial position accepts this
rationalization.5 9 Thus, our finding of a stronger pro-plaintiff rec-
ord on the part of judges with Democratic affiliations is consistent
with the finding of greater Democratic liberalism reported in other
studies.6 0
258 Among these three analyses, only the difference in Republican judges' voting records
in race and sex discrimination cases (shown in Panel B) is statistically significant at .10 or
less; the p-value is .04. The p-value for the difference in Republican appointees' records in
race and sex discrimination cases (Panel A) is .16, and the p-value for the difference in
Republican-controlled courts' records in race and sex discrimination cases (Panel C) is .20.
The greater disparity in the voting records of Republican judges (Panel B), compared to
the voting records of Republican appointees or Republican-controlled courts (Panels A and
C), is attributable mainly to the combined effects of (1) the fact that Republican presidents
were more likely to appoint Democratic judges than were Democratic presidents to appoint
Republican judges; and (2) the fact that Democratic judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents ruled in favor of sex discrimination plaintiffs more frequently than Republican judges
appointed by Republican presidents. Specifically, in our data set, Republican presidents ap-
pointed 19 Democratic judges and 73 Republican judges, but Democratic presidents ap-
pointed only one Republican judge as opposed to 121 Democratic judges.
The voting records of the various groups of judges in sex and race discrimination cases
were as follows:
Sex Race
Democratic Appointee
Democratic Judge 73.2% 72.5%
Republican Judge 0.0% -
Republican Appointee
Democratic Judge 57.1% 66.7%
Republican Judge 40.0% 65.1%
Thus, consistent with trends reported by Carp and Rowland in their study of all federal
district court decisions, see Carp and Rowland, Policymaking and Politics at 79 (cited in
note 246), in the sex discrimination cases in our data set, Democratic judges appointed by
Republican presidents voted in favor of plaintiffs more frequently than Republican judges
appointed by Republicans (but less frequently than Democratic judges appointed by Demo-
crats). The figures in Panel B of Table 10 reflect the sharper differences in the voting
records of Republican-appointed, Republican-affiliated judges.
259 For a description of the rhetoric and assumptions underlying the liberal and con-
servative judicial positions, see Schultz, 103 Harv L Rev at 1800-14 (cited in note 20).
2,0 In their study of over 27,000 federal trial court decisions issued between 1933 and
1977, for example, Carp and Rowland found that the liberal-conservative voting disparity
between Democrats and Republicans "widen[ed] into a sizable chasm" beginning in 1969,
around the period when our data set begins. See Carp and Rowland, Policymaking and
Politics at 14-23, 36 (cited in note 246).
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In addition, although the number of sex discrimination cases
decided by some of the presidential appointees in our data set is
small, the trends that emerge are consistent with those reported in
other studies. Panel A shows that Kennedy and Johnson appoin-
tees voted for plaintiffs more frequently than Eisenhower appoin-
tees, and Nixon and Ford appointees voted for plaintiffs less fre-
quently than Kennedy and Johnson appointees. Similarly, in Carp
and Rowland's study, Kennedy and Johnson appointees voted
more liberally than Eisenhower appointees, and Nixon and Ford
appointees voted more conservatively than Kennedy and Johnson
appointees in both the entire sample of cases and in the subset of
civil rights and civil liberties cases. 26 1 As Carp and Rowland em-
phasize, these results "are all in the expected direction and they
conform to the body of intuitive, anecdotal, and historical informa-
tion about these ... presidents and the judges each appointed. '262
Even if Carter and Reagan appointees are excluded from our data
set, judges appointed by Democratic presidents (Roosevelt, Tru-
man, Kennedy, and Johnson) were more likely to rule for sex dis-
crimination plaintiffs than judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford).6
The largest advance for women on the lack of interest issue
came with the Carter appointees. Whereas Nixon and Ford ap-
pointees ruled for sex discrimination plaintiffs on the interest issue
in 44.8 percent of the cases, and Kennedy and Johnson appointees
ruled for plaintiffs on this issue in 57.9 percent of the cases, Carter
appointees ruled for plaintiffs in an overwhelming 81.5 percent of
the cases. Both district court and appellate judges appointed by
Carter exhibited this same strongly pro-plaintiff record. 264 The
281 See id at 65, 72. See also Gottschall, 70 Judicature at 52, 54 (cited in note 248)
(reporting that in sex discrimination cases decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeals between
1983 and 1984, Kennedy/Johnson appointees voted more liberally than Nixon/Ford appoin-
tees). In Carp and Rowland's study, as in our data set, Roosevelt and Truman appointees
combined also had slightly more liberal voting records than Eisenhower appointees in all
cases as well as in the subset of civil rights and civil liberties cases. See Carp and Rowland,
Policymaking and Politics at 65, 72 (cited in note 246). Because our data set includes only
two cases decided by Roosevelt and Truman appointees, however, we decline to draw con-
clusions about those judges.
262 Id at 70. For a discussion of the way the various presidents approached judicial
appointments, and of the opportunities and constraints they encountered in appointing
judges who were in tune with their own political and personal philosophies, see id at 53-64.
283 Excluding cases decided by Carter and Reagan appointees from our data set, Demo-
cratic appointees voted for sex discrimination plaintiffs in 57.1% of the cases, and Republi-
can appointees voted for plaintiffs in 44.4% of the cases.
284 Among district court judges appointed by Carter, 85.7% (6 out of 7) ruled for plain-
tiffs on the lack of interest issue in sex discrimination cases. Similarly, among appellate
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Carter appointees' record is not simply a function of the fact that
they assumed the bench in the more recent 1978-89 period, when
the tides may have begun to turn in plaintiffs' favor among the
judiciary as a whole. Even in the 1978-89 period alone, Carter ap-
pointees voted for sex discrimination plaintiffs far more frequently
than previous presidential appointees.2 5 In fact, the data suggest
that the rise in plaintiffs' success rates in the more recent period is
attributable to advances initiated by the Carter appointees, rather
than the other way around.266
The pro-plaintiff record of the Carter appointees in sex dis-
crimination cases is consistent with the findings of other studies,87
as well as with the political commentators' expectations. In light of
Carter's opportunity to appoint large numbers of new judges, his
degree of influence with the Senate Judiciary Committee, and his
strategy of making partisan appointments while increasing the
number of minorities and women on the bench, commentators pre-
dicted that Carter would be able to exert a strong liberal influence
on lower federal court decisions.2 68 The timing was right with re-
spect to the lack of interest argument. The Supreme Court's 1977
court judges appointed by Carter, 80% (16 out of 20) ruled for plaintiffs on this issue in sex
discrimination cases.
261 In sex discrimination cases decided in the 1978-89 period, Roosevelt and Truman
appointees voted for plaintiffs in 50% (1 out of 2) of the cases; Eisenhower appointees did
so in 40% (2 out of 5) of the cases; Kennedy and Johnson appointees did so in 61.5% (8 out
of 13) of the cases; and Nixon and Ford appointees did so in 42.3% (11 out of 26) of the
cases. Because all the decisions by Carter and Reagan appointees occurred after 1977, their
voting records for the 1978-89 period are those shown in Table 1OA: Carter appointees voted
for plaintiffs in 81.5% (22 out of 27) of the cases, and Reagan appointees did so in 75% (6
out of 8) of the cases.
268 In sex discrimination cases, plaintiffs' success rate rose from 48.3% in 1978-83 to
78.6% in 1984-89. This increase is largely attributable to the decisions of courts controlled
by Carter appointees (defined to include district judges appointed by Carter and courts of
appeals panels in which Carter appointees formed a majority). Even in the 1978-83 period,
Carter-controlled courts were more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs than other courts;
Carter-controlled courts ruled for plaintiffs in 60% (3 out of 5) of the cases, whereas other
courts did so in 45.8% (11 out of 24) of the cases. Yet, because Carter appointees controlled
the courts in only 17.2% of the cases decided in that period, their influence on plaintiffs'
success rates was not that substantial. By the 1984-89 period, however, Carter appointees
controlled the courts in 57.1% of the cases. In addition, the disparity between their deci-
sions and the decisions of other courts grew: Carter-controlled courts ruled for plaintiffs in
100% (8 out of 8) of the cases, whereas other courts did so in 50% (3 out of 6) of the cases.
Thus, the Carter appointees made a substantial contribution toward increasing plaintiffs'
success rates in sex discrimination cases after 1984.
"I See, for example, Gottschall, 70 Judicature at 52, 54 (cited in note 248) (reporting
that in sex discrimination cases decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1983 and
1984, Carter appointees' voting record was more liberal than any other group of appointees).
268 See, for example, Carp and Rowland, Policymaking and Politics at 82 (cited in note
246).
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decisions expanding the lower courts' discretion over the lack of
interest argument may have provided the newly-appointed Carter
judges with an unprecedented opportunity to reject this rationali-
zation for job segregation by sex.
In sex discrimination cases, the only group of presidential ap-
pointees whose record fails to conform to conventional political in-
tuitions are the Reagan appointees. To date, Reagan appointees
have voted for sex discrimination plaintiffs on the lack of interest
issue only slightly less frequently than Carter appointees (and
more frequently than Johnson and Kennedy appointees). This
trend is inconsistent with the general wisdom about the direction
of Reagan's influence on the judiciary, and with the findings of
other empirical studies which have reported that Reagan appoin-
tees vote far more conservatively than Carter, Johnson, and Ken-
nedy appointees in sex discrimination cases and in civil rights
cases generally.26e  One might argue that the Carter appointees
helped create a pro-plaintiff body of precedent and a liberal under-
standing of the lack of interest issue that has influenced and con-
strained their generally more conservative Reagan-appointed suc-
cessors. Such an interpretation is premature, however. At the time
we compiled our data set, only five different Reagan appointees
had addressed the lack of interest issue,2 70 and at least one of these
five judges may be more liberal than the typical Reagan ap-
pointee.271 In addition, all of the Reagan appointees confronted
this issue in the appellate context, where the norms of collegiality
and the obligation to justify dissenting views may have permitted
them less freedom to give expression to their own partisan val-
269 See, for example, Gotschall, 70 Judicature at 52-54 (cited in note 248) (sex discrimi-
nation cases); Ronald Stidham and Robert A. Carp, Exploring Regionalism in the Federal
District Courts, 18 Publius 113, 119-20 (1988); Ronald Stidham and Robert A. Carp,
Judges, Presidents, and Policy Choices: Exploring the Linkage, 68 Soc Sci Q 395, 399-401
(1987).
270 Although Table 10A shows eight decisions by Reagan appointees in sex discrimina-
tion cases, there were actually only five different Reagan appointees ruling on this issue in
five separate cases. See Wheeler v City of Columbus, Miss., 686 F2d 1144 (5th Cir 1982)
(Garwood); Babrocky v Jewel Food Co., 773 F2d 857 (7th Cir 1985) (Eschbach); Catlett v
Missouri Highway & Transportation Comm'n, 828 F2d 1260 (8th Cir 1987) (Fagg and Ma-
gill); Palmer v Shultz, 815 F2d 84 (DC Cir 1987) (Bork); and EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F2d 302 (7th Cir 1988) (Eschbach). Because in Palmer and Sears the court addressed
the lack of interest issue separately in connection with two different claims, each of these
cases is double-counted in our data set.
271 Although he was appointed by President Reagan to the Seventh Circuit in 1981,
Judge Eschbach had been appointed by President Kennedy to the district court in 1962.
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ues.2 72 In fact, in all but one of the cases in our data set, the Rea-
gan appointee simply joined in the opinion of a more senior col-
league. It is doubtful that the decisions of the handful of
Reagan-appointed appellate judges in our data set accurately re-
flect the way the entire group of Reagan-appointed judges will re-
solve this issue in the future, particularly as they are joined by
increasing numbers of Bush appointees.
Although in sex discrimination cases judges' decisions on the
lack of interest issue generally break down along predictable parti-
san lines, in race discrimination cases the patterns do not conform
to conventional partisan expectations. As Table 10 shows, Demo-
cratic judges, appointees, and courts were not significantly more
likely to rule in favor of race discrimination plaintiffs than their
Republican counterparts.7 4 Nor do the voting records of the presi-
dential appointees in race discrimination cases square neatly with
larger trends in judicial voting patterns. Only the sharp retreat
from a pro-plaintiff position on the part of Nixon/Ford appointees
relative to their Kennedy/Johnson predecessors conforms to the
patterns reported by Carp and Rowland. In our data set, Eisen-
hower appointees voted for plaintiffs as frequently (in fact, some-
what more frequently) than their Kennedy/Johnson successors.
Carter appointees displayed a strongly anti-plaintiff record, re-
'27 See, for example, Schwab and Eisenberg, Influence of Judicial Background at 3
(cited in note 78) ("Multiple decisionmakers may check judicial discretion. Judges feel pres-
sure to be careful lawyers and craftsmen [sic]. If one's fellow judges evaluate the legal argu-
ments a certain way, concern for collegiality and respect pushes one to conform to these
views, regardless of whether the result is liberal or conservative, unless the judge can make
plausible counter legal arguments.").
'73 See Wheeler, 686 F2d 1144 (Garwood joining in the opinion of Clark); Babrocky, 773
F2d 857 (Eschbach joining in the opinion of Cummings); Palmer, 815 F2d 84 (Bork joining
in the opinion of Wald); Sears, 839 F2d 302 (Eschbach joining in the opinion of Wood).
Sears was the only one of these cases in which the court of appeals accepted the lack of
interest argument, and the only case that involved a dissent. 839 F2d at 360-66 (Cudahy
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Catlett, however, Judge Fagg, a Reagan appointee, wrote an opinion joined by Judge
Magill, another Reagan appointee, and by Judge Bright, a Johnson appointee. 828 F2d at
1260. The panel affirmed the district court's rejection of the lack of interest argument.
2' The difference in Democratic and Republican appointees' voting records in race dis-
crimination cases in Panel A is not statistically significant (p-value= .40) - nor is the dif-
ference in Democratic and Republican judges' voting records in Panel B (p-value= .43), or
the difference in plaintiffs' success rates in cases decided by Democratically-controlled and
Republican-controlled courts in Panel C (p-value= .55).
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jecting the lack of interest argument less frequently than any other
group of presidential appointees (only 26.7 percent of the time).27 5
These puzzling patterns make sense when analyzed in histori-
cal context. In race discrimination cases, as our separate analyses
of judges' voting patterns for the 1967-77 and 1978-89 periods in
Table 11 disclose, judicial decisions on the lack of interest argu-
ment are explained by the era in which the decisions were made
rather than by the judges' political affiliations. In the 1967-77 era,
there was a strong bipartisan consensus that patterns of racial seg-
regation should not be rationalized as the expression of minorities'
own lack of interest in higher-paying jobs. Both Democrats and
Republicans and Eisenhower and Kennedy/Johnson appointees
overwhelmingly voted to reject the lack of interest argument. The
shift toward a less pro-plaintiff position on the part of the Nixon
appointees suggests that by the end of the early period, the pro-
plaintiff consensus on the lack of interest issue was beginning to
break down.
217 Although we are not aware of any other study reporting such an extreme turn to-
ward conservatism on the part of Carter appointees in race discrimination cases, Gott-
schall's study does report that in race discrimination cases decided by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals between July 1, 1983 and December 31, 1984, Carter appointees voted more con-
servatively than Kennedy/Johnson appointees (but more liberally than Nixon/Ford and
Reagan appointees). See Gottschall, 70 Judicature at 52, 54 (cited in note 248).
In addition, Gottschall's study reports a finding which is consistent with our finding
that Carter appointees voted more liberally in sex discrimination cases than in race discrim-
ination cases. In Gottschall's study, in unanimous and nonunanimous decisions combined,
Carter appointees voted in favor of plaintiffs in 63% of all sex discrimination cases but in
only 46% of all race discrimination cases. See id at 54. But see id at 52 (reporting that in
non-unanimous appellate decisions, Carter appointees voted in favor of race discrimination
plaintiffs slightly more frequently than sex discrimination plaintiffs).
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TABLE 11: Percentage of Judicial Decisions in Favor of Plaintiffs in Early and
Modern Race Discrimination Cases, by Judges' Political Affiliations
A. By Appointing President (and Party of Appointing President)
Roosevelt/ Eisenhower Kennedy/ Nixon/ Carter Reagan Democrat Republican Total
Truman Johnson Ford
1967- 50.0% 94.4% 86.9% 69.6% - - 85.7% 80.5% 83.7%
1977 (1/2) (17/18) (53/61) (16/23) (54/63) (33/41) (87/104)
1978- - 33.3% 41.7% 33.3% 26.7% 0.0% 33.3% 31.8% 32.7%
1989 (1/3) (5/12) (6/18) (4/15) (0/1) (9/27) (7/22) (16/49)
B. By Judge's Political Party
Democrat Republican Independent Unidentified Total
1967- 87.9% 82.8% - 55.6% 83.7%
1977 (58/66) (24/29) (5/9) (87/104)
1978- 30.8% 28.6% 100.0% 37.5% 32.7%
1989 (8/26) (4/14) (1/1) (3/8) (16/49)
C. By Party of President Who Appointed Court Majority
Democrat Republican Total
1967- 90.0% 76.9% 86.0%
1977 (27/30) (10/13) (37/43)
1977- 33.3% 50.0% 40.0%
1989 (4/12) (4/8) (8/20)
By the 1978-89 period, the bipartisan pro-plaintiff consensus
had become a pro-employer consensus. The proportion of Demo-
cratic appointees who rejected the lack of interest argument de-
clined from 85.7 percent in the early period to 33.3 percent in the
modern period; the proportion of Republican appointees who re-
jected this argument similarly declined from 80.5 percent to 31.8
percent. This same trend occurred among every group of presiden-
tial appointees, liberal and conservative alike. Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy/Johnson, and Nixon appointees all embraced the lack of in-
terest defense in the vast majority of cases in the modern period.
Given the general conservatism among judges in this era, the
Carter appointees' record is less surprising; they simply voted in
line with the pro-employer tendencies of their contemporaries. As
Table 11 makes clear, race discrimination plaintiffs' declining suc-
cess on the lack of interest argument cannot be attributed to Rea-
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gan's influence. Only one race discrimination case in our data set
involved a Reagan appointee.
These analyses of judges' voting records provide further elabo-
ration for our earlier conclusions about the sources of the two ma-
jor disparities in plaintiffs' success on the lack of interest argu-
ment. Section II showed that historically, sex discrimination
plaintiffs have fared worse than race discrimination plaintiffs not
because their cases presented a weaker basis for rejecting the lack
of interest argument, but because judges have brought to their in-
terpretations of the evidence and facts a biased set of assumptions
about women's work aspirations. That judges with Republican af-
filiations, and not those with Democratic affiliations, are primarily
responsible for the difference in sex and race discrimination plain-
tiffs' success rates reinforces the conclusion that conservative judi-
cial bias explains the disparity.
The analyses of judges' voting patterns in race discrimination
cases place an even more pessimistic gloss on our previous observa-
tions about the decline in race discrimination plaintiffs' success.
Section III showed that a shift in the merits of the race discrimina-
tion cases selected for litigation cannot fully explain this decline.
Rather, since 1978, judges have reacted less favorably to evidence
they once relied on heavily to reject the lack of interest argument.
That this conversion occurred among judges of all political affilia-
tions-Democrats and Republicans, Eisenhower, Kennedy/John-
son, and Nixon/Ford appointees alike-suggests a significant
transformation in judicial consciousness. After a decade of efforts
to enforce Title VII, federal judges apparently began to share the
general public's belief that employment discrimination against mi-
norities had been largely eradicated. In the wake of this shift in
perceptions, judges have become more predisposed to interpret ra-
cial segregation as the expression of minorities' own lack of interest
in higher-paying jobs.
CONCLUSION
Our analyses strongly suggest that the courts have imported
bias into their decisions in cases raising the lack of interest argu-
ment. During the 1965-89 period as whole, the courts have re-
quired sex discrimination plaintiffs to meet more difficult stan-
dards of proof than race discrimination plaintiffs to refute the lack
of interest argument. Since the late 1970s, the courts have also
changed their approach to the lack of interest argument in race
discrimination cases to one less favorable to plaintiffs. They have
moved toward a conservative understanding of racial segregation
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that converges with the way they have always understood sex seg-
regation in employment.
Title VII promised minorities and women equality. For the
first decade of Title VII enforcement, judges kept faith with this
promise in race discrimination cases. They created a Title VII ju-
risprudence that expressed our nation's highest ideals of openness
and equality. When employers sought to justify racial segregation
as the expression of minorities' own lack of interest in better jobs,
the courts almost universally rejected this argument. They as-
sumed that any racial differences in job preferences were the prod-
uct of the very labor market inequalities that plaintiffs were seek-
ing to dismantle. By acknowledging that people's work aspirations
are shaped in the context of what larger institutional and legal en-
vironments define as possible, the courts refused to allow employ-
ers to escape responsibility for continuing labor market discrimina-
tion by pinning the blame on its victims.
In sex discrimination cases, and in more recent race discrimi-
nation cases, however, the courts have undermined Title VII's
transformative capacity. Through their widespread acceptance of
the lack of interest argument, judges have interpreted the statute
to embody the same stereotypes that have traditionally been used
to justify women's and minorities' economic disadvantage.
Throughout history, the dominant culture has rationalized
women's employment in low-paying, dead-end jobs as the expres-
sion of their own preordained preferences for suitably "feminine"
work. Similarly, our society has rationalized minorities' inferior ec-
onomic status as the reflection of their own lack of initiative.
Whereas Title VII jurisprudence once rejected and stood in tension
with such cultural attitudes, it now incorporates them to a large
extent. By portraying job segregation as the product of minorities'
and women's preexisting job preferences, and attributing these
preferences to forces beyond employers' control, the courts have
privatized job segregation and placed it beyond the reach of the
law. Unless the courts change course, Title VII may someday be
perceived as a short-lived, but failed, experiment in equality.
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